§1.339τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον·
"This, then, my excellent friend, is what I say is the same in all cities as the just: the advantage of the established ruling power.
αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. νῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν.
And this, I suppose, is in control; so that it follows for anyone who calculates correctly that everywhere the just is the same: the advantage of the stronger." "Now," I said, "I have learned what you mean; but whether it is true or not, I must try to learn.
τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην—πρόσεστιν δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ
τοῦ κρείττονος. σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.
Now, Thrasymachus, you too have answered that the just is the advantageous—although you forbade me to give this very answer—and yet the words 'of the stronger' are indeed added to it." "A small addition, perhaps," he said.
οὔπω δῆλον οὐδʼ εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον.
"It is not yet clear whether it is even a large one; but that we must examine this, to see if you speak the truth, is clear.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστιθεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ φῂς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δή. σκόπει, ἔφη.
For since I too agree that the just is something advantageous, and you add to this and say it is that of the stronger, while I do not know, we must indeed examine it." "Examine it, then," he said.
ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
"That shall be done," I said.
καί μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῂς εἶναι; ἔγωγε. πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις ἢ οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; πάντως που, ἔφη, οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δέ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; οἶμαι ἔγωγε. τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἆρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀσύμφορα;
"And tell me: do you not also say that it is just to obey the rulers?" "I do." "And are the rulers in each of the cities infallible, or are they such as to make some mistakes too?" "By all means, indeed," he said, "they are such as to make some mistakes too." "Therefore, when they attempt to lay down laws, do they lay down some correctly, and some not correctly?" "I believe so." "And is 'correctly' to lay down what is advantageous to themselves, and 'not correctly' what is disadvantageous?
ἢ πῶς λέγεις; οὕτως. ἃ δʼ ἂν θῶνται ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη.
Or how do you say?" "Thus." "And what they lay down must be done by the ruled, and this is the just?" "How could it not be?" "Therefore, not only is it just, according to your argument, to do what is advantageous to the stronger, but also the opposite, what is disadvantageous." "What are you saying?" he said.
ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον.
"What you are saying, it seems to me; but let us examine it better.
οὐχ ὡμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἄττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δʼ ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν;
Has it not been agreed that the rulers, in commanding the ruled to do certain things, sometimes miss what is best for themselves, and that whatever the rulers command is just for the ruled to do?
ταῦτʼ οὐχ ὡμολόγηται; οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
Has this not been agreed?" "I believe so," he said.
οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὑτοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῇς ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν —ἆρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσί, δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀσύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσιν ποιεῖν.
"Think then," I said, "that you have also agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things bad for themselves, and you say it is just for the others to do these things which those commanded—does it not then necessarily follow, Thrasymachus, most wise sir, that it is just to do the opposite of what you say?
§1.340ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε. ἐὰν σύ γʼ, ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβών.
For the disadvantage of the stronger is surely commanded to the weaker to do." "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates," said Polemarchus, "most clearly indeed." "If you at least witness for him," said Cleitophon, interrupting.
καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος;
"And what need is there of a witness?" he said.
αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο.
"For Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes command what is bad for themselves, and that it is just for the others to do these things." "Yes, for Thrasymachus laid down, Polemarchus, that doing what is ordered by the rulers is just." "And he also laid down, Cleitophon, that the advantage of the stronger is the just.
ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὡμολόγησεν αὖ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀσύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν.
And having laid down both of these, he further agreed that the stronger sometimes command what is disadvantageous to themselves for the weaker and ruled to do.
ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. ἀλλʼ, ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ συμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δʼ ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο.
From these agreements, the advantage of the stronger would be no more just than the disadvantage." "But," Cleitophon said, "he meant by the advantage of the stronger what the stronger believes to be advantageous to himself; this is what must be done by the weaker, and this is what he laid down as the just." "But that was not how it was said," Polemarchus said.
οὐδέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλʼ εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχώμεθα. καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε·
"It makes no difference, Polemarchus," I said, "but if Thrasymachus now says so, let us accept it from him in this way.
τοῦτο ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάντε συμφέρῃ ἐάντε μή;
And tell me, Thrasymachus: was this what you wished to call the just, namely, what seems to the stronger to be the advantage of the stronger, whether it is advantageous or not?
οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἴει καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ; ἔγωγε, εἶπον, ᾤμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει;
Shall we say that you mean it this way?" "Not at all," he said; "but do you think I call a person who makes a mistake 'stronger' when he is making a mistake?" "I certainly thought you meant this," I said, "when you agreed that the rulers are not infallible but make some mistakes too." "For you are a sycophant in arguments, Socrates," he said; "since, to take an immediate example, do you call a person a physician who makes a mistake about the sick in respect of this very thing in which he makes a mistake?
ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἁμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἁμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν;
Or a calculator, who mistakes in calculation, at the moment when he mistakes, in respect of this mistake?
ἀλλʼ οἶμαι λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δʼ οἶμαι ἕκαστος τούτων, καθʼ ὅσον τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογῇ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει.
But I believe we say in words that 'the physician made a mistake' and 'the calculator made a mistake' and 'the scribe'; but I believe each of these, so far as he is what we call him, never mistakes; so that according to precise speech, since you too speak precisely, none of the craftsmen mistakes.
ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γʼ ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτεν.
For it is when knowledge fails him that he who mistakes makes a mistake, in which he is no craftsman; so that no craftsman or wise man or ruler mistakes at the time when he is a ruler, though everyone would say that 'the physician made a mistake' and 'the ruler made a mistake.'"