Humanitext Reader

Plato · Republic §1.338

Thrasymachus's Claim that Justice Is the Advantage of the Stronger

Passage 8 of 153 · Greek

Summary

Urged by Socrates, Thrasymachus asserts that justice is nothing other than "the advantage of the stronger," arguing that the rulers of each city make laws for their own benefit and call it justice.

§1.338πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται, περὶ τούτων ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἡγεῖται ὑπʼ ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου;
"For how, my good sir," I said, "could anyone answer, in the first place, when he does not know and does not claim to know, and next, if he does have some opinion, when he has been forbidden by no ordinary man to say any of the things he thinks?
ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῂς εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.
Rather, it is more reasonable for you to speak, for you claim to know and to be able to tell.
μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα, ὅ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν.
So do not do otherwise, but do me a favor by answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glaucon here and the others." When I had said this, Glaucon and the others begged him not to do otherwise.
καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν ἵνʼ εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.
And Thrasymachus was clearly eager to speak in order to win a reputation, thinking he had an excellent answer; but he pretended to be contentious, insisting that I should be the one to answer.
τελευτῶν δὲ συνεχώρησεν, κἄπειτα, αὕτη δή, ἔφη, ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία· αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιιόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. ὅτι μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι δὲ οὔ με φῂς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδῃ·
In the end, however, he agreed, and then said, "This indeed is the wisdom of Socrates: he refuses to teach himself, but goes around learning from others and does not even pay thanks in return." "That I learn from others," I said, "is true, Thrasymachus, but when you say that I do not pay thanks, you are lying; for I pay as much as I can.
ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω.
And I can only praise, for I have no money.
ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τίς μοι δοκῇ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσῃ αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνῃ· οἶμαι γάρ σε εὖ ἐρεῖν. ἄκουε δή, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
How eagerly I do this, when someone seems to me to speak well, you will know very well indeed as soon as you answer; for I think you will speak well." "Listen then," he said.
φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.
"For I say that the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.
ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.
Well, why don't you praise?
ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὔπω οἶδα.
But you won't be willing." "If I learn first, at any rate," I said, "what you mean; for now I do not yet know.
τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῂς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι.
You say that the advantage of the stronger is the just.
καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις;
And what on earth do you mean by this, Thrasymachus?
οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῄς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστὴς καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις ᾗ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις. εἶτʼ οὐκ οἶσθʼ, ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; πάνυ γε. τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὑτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως·
For surely you do not mean something like this: if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and beef is advantageous to his body, this food is also advantageous and therefore just for us who are weaker than he." "You are disgusting, Socrates," he said, "and you take it in the way you can best damage the argument." "Not at all, my excellent friend," I said; "but tell me more clearly what you mean." "Do you not know, then," he said, "that of cities, some are ruled by tyrants, some by democracies, and some by aristocracies?" "How could I not?" "Therefore, the ruling power in each city is what is in control?" "Certainly." "And each ruling power lays down laws for its own advantage: a democracy lays down democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical ones, and the others likewise.
θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα.
And having laid them down, they declare this to be just for the ruled—namely, what is to their own advantage—and they punish the one who departs from this as a lawbreaker and doer of injustice."

Notes

  1. 338aἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ — ἀπειρημένον is the perfect passive participle neuter singular of ἀπαγορεύω (to forbid). Here it is used in an impersonal accusative absolute or a periphrastic optative with εἴη, meaning "it has been forbidden." The clause ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ features ὅπως with the future indicative, functioning as a noun clause expressing the content of the prohibition ("that he should say nothing").
  2. 338aπρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον — This prepositional phrase consists of πρὸς and the articular infinitive τὸ εἶναι, indicating the object or goal of the preceding verb φιλονικεῖν (to be contentious, dispute). ἐμέ is the subject accusative of the infinitive εἶναι, and τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον functions as its complement.
  3. 338dᾗ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον — This clause consists of the relative adverb ᾗ (in the way in which) followed by the potential optative ἂν κακουργήσαις (you might most maliciously damage). It expresses Thrasymachus's accusation that Socrates interprets (ὑπολαμβάνεις) the statement in the exact manner that would best allow him to distort or ruin the argument.

Cite this passage

Plato, Republic §1.338. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:1.338

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