§1.333χρήσιμον. καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὔ; ναί. πρός γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν; ναί. καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική; ναί. πρός γε ὑποδημάτων ἂν οἶμαι φαίης κτῆσιν; πάνυ γε.
"Useful." "And agriculture too, is it not?" "Yes." "For acquiring crops?" "Yes." "And also shoemaking?" "Yes." "For acquiring shoes, I suppose you would say?" "Certainly." "What then?
τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες. συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός; ὁ πεττευτικός. ἀλλʼ εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων; εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. πλήν γʼ ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἱππικός.
For the use or acquisition of what in peace would you say justice is useful?" "For contracts, Socrates." "And by contracts do you mean partnerships, or something else?" "Partnerships, indeed." "Then is the just man a good and useful partner in the placing of draughts, or is the draughts-player?" "The draughts-player." "But in the placing of bricks and stones, is the just man a more useful and better partner than the builder?" "In no way." "But in what partnership is the just man a better partner than the builder or the lyre-player, just as the lyre-player is better than the just man in striking the strings?" "In money matters, it seems to me." "Except perhaps, Polemarchus, with respect to using money, when it is necessary to buy or sell a horse in common; for then, as I think, the horse-expert is better.
ἦ γάρ; φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης; ἔοικεν. ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων; ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐκοῦν λέγεις ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι; πάνυ γε. ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ᾖ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη; κινδυνεύει. καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἡ ἀμπελουργική; φαίνεται. φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικήν; ἀνάγκη. καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος; κινδυνεύει. οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὂν τυγχάνει.
Is he not?" "So it appears." "And indeed when it is a ship, the shipwright or the pilot?" "So it seems." "When, then, is it necessary to use silver or gold in common that the just man is more useful than others?" "When one must deposit it and have it safe, Socrates." "Do you mean, then, when there is no need to use it at all, but to let it lie?" "Certainly." "Is it when money is useless, then, that justice is useful for it?" "It looks like it." "And when a pruning-knife must be guarded, justice is useful both in common and in private; but when it is to be used, the vine-dresser's art?" "So it appears." "And you will say that when a shield and a lyre must be guarded and not used, justice is useful, but when they are to be used, the hoplite's art and the musician's?" "Necessarily." "And about all other things too, in their use justice is useless, but in their disuse useful?" "It looks like it." "Then justice, my friend, would not be anything very serious, if it happens to be useful for useless things.
τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα.
But let us look at this.
ἆρʼ οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; πάνυ γε. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. §1.334ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις; πάνυ γε. ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φὼρ δεινός. ἔοικεν. εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός. ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.
Is not he who is most capable of striking a blow in a fight, whether boxing or some other, also most capable of guarding against one?" "Certainly." "Then is he also who is clever at guarding against a disease, also most capable of instilling it without being detected?" "It seems so to me." "And indeed, is not the same man a good guardian of an army camp who is also clever at stealing the enemy's plans and other operations?" "Certainly." "Of whatever, then, one is a clever guardian, of this he is also a clever thief." "So it seems." "If, then, the just man is clever at guarding money, he is also clever at stealing it." "So the argument indicates, at any rate," he said.
κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται, καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρʼ Ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καί φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας
"ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνῃ θʼ ὅρκῳ τε"
. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθʼ Ὅμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπʼ ὠφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν.
"The just man, then, has been revealed to be a kind of thief, it seems, and you are likely to have learned this from Homer; for he loves Odysseus' maternal grandfather, Autolycus, and says that he "surpassed all men in thievery and swearing." It seems, then, according to you, and Homer, and Simonides, that justice is a kind of thieving, for the benefit, however, of friends and for the harm of enemies.
οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον·
Was this not what you were saying?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "but I no longer know what I was saying.
τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς. φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἑκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη, οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δʼ ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον; ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; πάνυ γε. ἀλλʼ ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν; φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἀληθῆ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν; οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, συμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν—πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσιν—τοὺς δʼ ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν —ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω συμβαίνει.
This, however, still seems to me, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies." "And by friends do you mean those who seem to each to be good, or those who are, even if they do not seem so, and similarly with enemies?" "It is likely," he said, "that one loves whomsoever he thinks to be good, and hates whomsoever he thinks to be bad." "Do not men make mistakes about this, so that many seem to them to be good when they are not, and many the opposite?" "They do make mistakes." "To these, then, are the good enemies and the bad friends?" "Certainly." "But is it nevertheless just then for these to benefit the bad and harm the good?" "So it appears." "And yet, are not the good just, and such as not to do injustice?" "True." "According to your argument, then, it is just to do evil to those who do no injustice." "By no means, Socrates," he said, "for the argument seems to be bad." "Then it is just to harm the unjust," I said, "and to benefit the just?" "This appears more beautiful than that." "To many, then, Polemarchus, as many of mankind as have made mistakes, it will happen to find that it is just to harm their friends—for they are bad to them—and to benefit their enemies—for they are good; and so we shall say the very opposite of what we said Simonides meant." "Very much so," he said, "it happens that way.
ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε; τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι. νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα;
But let us change the definition; for we likely did not define 'friend' and 'enemy' correctly." "How defining them, Polemarchus?" "The one who seems good, that this man is a friend." "But now," I said, "how shall we change it?"