§1.335τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον· τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι φίλον.
"The one who both seems and is good is a friend," he said, "while the one who seems so, but is not, is a friend in appearance but not in reality.
καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις. φίλος μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός. ναί. κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δʼ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς·
And the same definition holds for the enemy." "Then, as it seems, according to this argument, the good man will be a friend, and the bad man an enemy." "Yes." "Are you bidding us, then, to make an addition to what we said at first about the just, when we said it is just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy?
νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δʼ ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι. ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων; καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη· τούς γε πονηρούς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. βλαπτόμενοι δʼ ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται; χείρους. ἆρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετήν; ἀνάγκη. ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλʼ ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή; καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀνάγκη. καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι. ἔοικεν. ἆρʼ οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύνανται ποιεῖν; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱππικῇ οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἀφίππους; οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους;
Do you now want us to add to this and say that it is just to do good to a friend who is good, and to harm an enemy who is bad?" "Most certainly," he said, "it seems to me that it would be beautifully stated that way." "Is it then," I said, "the part of a just man to harm any human being at all?" "Certainly," he said, "one must harm those who are bad and are enemies." "But when horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?" "Worse." "With respect to the virtue of dogs, or that of horses?" "That of horses." "Then when dogs are harmed, do they also become worse with respect to the virtue of dogs and not that of horses?" "Necessarily." "And must we not say the same of human beings, my friend, that when harmed they become worse with respect to human virtue?" "Most certainly." "But is not justice a human virtue?" "That too is necessary." "Then those human beings who are harmed, my friend, must necessarily become more unjust." "It seems so." "Can musicians, then, by music make people unmusical?" "Impossible." "Or horse-experts, by horsemanship, make people bad riders?" "It cannot be." "But then, can the just, by justice, make people unjust?
ἢ καὶ συλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακούς; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος οἶμαι ἔργον ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. ναί. οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. πάνυ γε. οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. φαίνεται. ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός; πάνυ γε. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Or in short, can the good, by virtue, make people bad?" "But that is impossible." "For, I suppose, it is not the function of heat to cool, but of its opposite." "Yes." "Nor is it the function of dryness to moisten, but of its opposite." "Certainly." "Nor indeed is it the function of the good to harm, but of its opposite." "So it appears." "And the just man is good?" "Certainly." "Then, Polemarchus, it is not the function of the just man to harm either a friend or anyone else, but of his opposite, the unjust man." "You seem to me to speak the absolute truth, Socrates," he said.
εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών.
"If, then, anyone says that it is just to render to each what is owed to him, and he understands by this that harm is owed to enemies by the just man, and benefit to friends, he who said this was not wise.
οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν. συγχωρῶ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
For he was not speaking the truth; for it has nowhere appeared to us that it is just to harm anyone." "I agree," he said.
μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἤ τινʼ ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη, ἕτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης.
"We shall fight, then, in common," I said, "both you and I, if anyone asserts that Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other of the wise and blessed men, said this." "I, at any rate," he said, "am ready to share in the battle."