§1.332ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπιστεῖν—σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ—τοῦτο μέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ·
"But indeed," I said, "it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides—for he is a wise and divine man—but what on earth he means by this, you, Polemarchus, perhaps know, but I do not.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὁτῳοῦν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι.
For it is clear that he does not mean this which we were just mentioning, namely, returning something to someone who deposited it, when he demands it back while not in his right mind.
καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ; ναί. ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; ἀληθῆ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
And yet, what he deposited is surely something owed to him, is it not?" "Yes." "But one must not return it in any way at all at that time when someone demands it back while not in his right mind?" "True," he said.
ἄλλο δή τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι. ἄλλο μέντοι νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. μανθάνω, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ—ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὃς ἄν τῳ χρυσίον ἀποδῷ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὅ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς—οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
"Then Simonides, it seems, means something other than this sort of thing when he says that to give back what is owed is just." "Something else indeed, by Zeus," he said; "for he thinks that friends owe it to friends to do some good, and nothing bad." "I understand," I said—"that he who gives back gold to one who deposited it does not give back what is owed, if indeed the giving back and the receiving become harmful, and the receiver and the giver are friends—is this not what you say Simonides means?" "Most certainly." "What then?
τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε οἶμαι παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι. ἠινίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη.
Must we give back to enemies whatever happens to be owed to them?" "Absolutely," he said, "what is owed to them; and what is owed, I think, from an enemy to an enemy is just what is appropriate, namely, some evil." "It seems then," I said, "that Simonides made a riddle poetically about what justice is.
διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτʼ εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη.
For he was thinking, as it appears, that this is justice, to give back what is appropriate to each, but he named this 'what is owed'." "But what do you think?" he said.
ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἴει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται; ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. εἶεν·
"By Zeus," I said, "if someone then had asked him: 'Simonides, the art that gives back what to whom as owed and appropriate is called medicine?' What do you think he would have answered us?" "Clearly," he said, "the one that gives back drugs, food, and drinks to bodies." "And the art that gives back what to whom as owed and appropriate is called cookery?" "The one that gives back seasonings to dishes." "Very well.
ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο; εἰ μέν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα. τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; δοκεῖ μοι. τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν; ἰατρός. τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον; κυβερνήτης. τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος;
Then the art that gives back what to whom would be called justice?" "If indeed, Socrates," he said, "we must follow at all what was said before, the one that gives back benefits and harms to friends and enemies." "Does he say then that doing good to friends and evil to enemies is justice?" "It seems so to me." "Who then is most capable of doing good to sick friends and evil to enemies with respect to sickness and health?" "A physician." "Who to those sailing with respect to the danger of the sea?" "A pilot." "And the just man?
ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. εἶεν·
In what action and for what task is he most capable of benefiting friends and harming enemies?" "In waging war and in being an ally, it seems to me." "Very well.
μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος. ἀληθῆ. καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. ναί. ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;
But to those who are not sick, my dear Polemarchus, a physician is useless." "True." "And to those who are not sailing, a pilot." "Yes." "Is the just man, then, also useless to those who are not waging war?" "I do not think so at all." "Justice, then, is useful also in peace?"