§372ΙΠ. καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ἑκόντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι βελτίους ἂν εἶεν τῶν ἀκόντων, οἷς πολλὴ δοκεῖ συγγνώμη εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ εἰδώς τις ἀδικήσῃ ἢ ψεύσηται ἢ ἄλλο τι κακὸν ποιήσῃ;
HIP. And how, Socrates, could those who do wrong voluntarily and who design and do evil voluntarily, be better than those who do so involuntarily, for whom there is thought to be great allowance, if anyone does wrong or lies or does some other evil without knowing it?
καὶ οἱ νόμοι δήπου πολὺ χαλεπώτεροί εἰσι τοῖς ἑκοῦσι κακὰ ἐργαζομένοις καὶ ψευδομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἄκουσιν.
And the laws, surely, are much more severe toward those who do evil and lie voluntarily than toward those who do so involuntarily.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λέγων ὡς λιπαρής εἰμι πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις τῶν σοφῶν;
SO. Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men?
καὶ κινδυνεύω ἓν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, τἆλλα ἔχων πάνυ φαῦλα·
And I run the risk of having only this one good thing, while being in other respects quite worthless.
τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ᾗ ἔχει ἔσφαλμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπῃ ἐστί.
For I am mistaken about how things are, and do not know how they stand.
τεκμήριον δέ μοι τούτου ἱκανόν, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν συγγένωμαί τῳ ὑμῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ οἷς οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες μάρτυρές εἰσι τῆς σοφίας, φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς· οὐδὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.
And a sufficient proof of this for me is that whenever I associate with one of you who are highly esteemed for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks are witnesses, I am shown to know nothing; for nothing, so to speak, seems to me the same as it does to you.
καίτοι τί μεῖζον ἀμαθίας τεκμήριον ἢ ἐπειδάν τις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι διαφέρηται;
And yet, what greater proof of ignorance is there than when someone differs with wise men?
ἓν δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὅ με σῴζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐρωτῶ καὶ χάριν πολλὴν ἔχω τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε ἀπεστέρησα χάριτος.
But I have this one wonderful good thing which saves me: for I am not ashamed to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and feel great gratitude to the one who answers, and I have never deprived anyone of gratitude.
οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἔξαρνος ἐγενόμην μαθών τι, ἐμαυτοῦ ποιούμενος τὸ μάθημα εἶναι ὡς εὕρημα· ἀλλʼ ἐγκωμιάζω τὸν διδάξαντά με ὡς σοφὸν ὄντα, ἀποφαίνων ἃ ἔμαθον παρʼ αὐτοῦ.
For I have never denied it when I learned something, making out that the learning was my own discovery; instead, I praise the one who taught me as being wise, declaring what I learned from him.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἃ σὺ λέγεις οὐχ ὁμολογῶ σοι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρομαι πάνυ σφόδρα· καὶ τοῦτʼ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι διʼ ἐμὲ γίγνεται, ὅτι τοιοῦτός εἰμι οἷόσπερ εἰμί, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμαυτὸν μεῖζον εἴπω.
And so indeed now I do not agree with what you say, but differ with you very strongly; and I know well that this happens because of me, because I am just the sort of person I am, not to say anything greater of myself.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὦ Ἱππία, πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις· οἱ βλάπτοντες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ψευδόμενοι καὶ ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἑκόντες ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντες, βελτίους εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.
For it seems to me, Hippias, the exact opposite of what you say: those who hurt people, do wrong, lie, deceive, and make mistakes voluntarily rather than involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily.
ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ τοὐναντίον δοκεῖ μοι τούτων καὶ πλανῶμαι περὶ ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι· νυνὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι μοι ὥσπερ κατηβολὴ περιελήλυθεν, καὶ δοκοῦσί μοι οἱ ἑκόντες ἐξαμαρτάνοντες περί τι βελτίους εἶναι τῶν ἀκόντων.
Sometimes, however, the opposite of these things seems to me to be the case and I wander about these matters, clearly because of my not knowing; but now, at the present moment, a sort of fit has come over me, and those who err in something voluntarily seem to me to be better than those who do so involuntarily.
αἰτιῶμαι δὲ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος παθήματος τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους αἰτίους εἶναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς ἄκοντας τούτων ἕκαστα ποιοῦντας πονηροτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἑκόντας.
And I blame the previous arguments as the cause of this present state, so that now at the present moment those who do each of these things involuntarily appear more wicked than those who do so voluntarily.
§373ΣΩ. σὺ οὖν χάρισαι καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχήν μου· πολὺ γάρ τοι μεῖζόν με ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσῃ ἀμαθίας παύσας τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ νόσου τὸ σῶμα.
SO. Do me a favor, then, and do not grudge to heal my soul; for you will do me a much greater good by curing my soul of ignorance than my body of disease.
μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ ʼθέλεις λέγειν, προλέγω σοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄν με ἰάσαιο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκολουθήσαιμι —ὥσπερ δὲ ἄρτι εἰ ʼθέλεις μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, πάνυ ὀνήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδʼ αὐτὸν σὲ βλαβήσεσθαι.
Now if you wish to make a long speech, I forewarn you that you would not heal me—for I could not follow—but if you wish to answer me as you did just now, you will benefit me greatly, and I think you yourself will not be harmed either.
δικαίως δʼ ἂν καὶ σὲ παρακαλοίην, ὦ παῖ Ἀπημάντου· σὺ γάρ με ἐπῆρας Ἱππίᾳ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ νῦν, ἐὰν μή μοι ἐθέλῃ Ἱππίας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, δέου αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.
And I might justly call upon you too, son of Apemantus; for you urged me to converse with Hippias, and now, if Hippias does not wish to answer me, entreat him on my behalf.
ΕΥ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι οὐδὲν δεήσεσθαι Ἱππίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας δεήσεως· οὐ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αὐτῷ ἐστι τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἂν φύγοι ἀνδρὸς ἐρώτησιν.
EU. But, Socrates, I think Hippias will not need our entreaty; for his previous statements were not of that kind, but rather that he would avoid no man's questioning.
ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία;
Is that not so, Hippias?
οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ ἔλεγες;
Was this not what you said?
ΙΠ. ἔγωγε·
HIP.
ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ὦ Εὔδικε, ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι.
Yes; but Socrates, Eudicus, always causes confusion in the arguments and behaves as if he were acting maliciously.
ΣΩ. ὦ βέλτιστε Ἱππία, οὔτι ἑκών γε ταῦτα ἐγὼ ποιῶ— σοφὸς γὰρ ἂν ἦ καὶ δεινὸς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον—ἀλλὰ ἄκων, ὥστε μοι συγγνώμην ἔχε· φῂς γὰρ αὖ δεῖν, ὃς ἂν κακουργῇ ἄκων, συγγνώμην ἔχειν.
SO. My excellent Hippias, I by no means do these things voluntarily—for then I should be wise and clever according to your argument—but involuntarily, so have allowance for me; for you say again that whoever does evil involuntarily must have allowance.
ΕΥ. καὶ μηδαμῶς γε, ὦ Ἱππία, ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων σοι λόγων ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἄν σε ἐρωτᾷ Σωκράτης.
EU. And by no means, Hippias, do otherwise, but both for our sake and because of your previous words, answer whatever Socrates asks you.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, σοῦ γε δεομένου.
HIP. Well, I will answer, since you entreat me.
ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.
Ask whatever you wish.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν σφόδρα γε ἐπιθυμῶ, ὦ Ἱππία, διασκέψασθαι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον, πότεροί ποτε ἀμείνους, οἱ ἑκόντες ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνοντες.
SO. Indeed, Hippias, I very much desire to examine what was just said: which of the two are better, those who err voluntarily or involuntarily?
οἶμαι οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν ὧδε ἐλθεῖν.
I think, then, that the most correct way to come to the examination is this.
ἀλλʼ ἀπόκριναι· καλεῖς τινα δρομέα ἀγαθόν;
Answer: do you call someone a good runner?
ΙΠ. ἔγωγε.
HIP. I do.
ΣΩ. καὶ κακόν;
SO. And a bad one?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁ εὖ θέων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ κακῶς;
SO. Then the one who runs well is good, and the one who runs badly is bad?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ βραδέως θέων κακῶς θεῖ, ὁ δὲ ταχέως εὖ;
SO. And the one who runs slowly runs badly, and the one who runs quickly runs well?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα καὶ τῷ θεῖν τάχος μὲν ἀγαθόν, βραδυτὴς δὲ κακόν;
SO. In a race, then, and in running, speed is good and slowness is bad?
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει;
HIP. Of course.
ΣΩ. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων δρομεύς, ὁ ἑκὼν βραδέως θέων ἢ ὁ ἄκων;
SO. Which runner, then, is better: the one who runs slowly voluntarily, or the one who does so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. ὁ ἑκών.
HIP. The one who does so voluntarily.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ποιεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ θεῖν;
SO. And is running not a doing of something?
ΙΠ. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν.
HIP. Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ ποιεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαί τι;
SO. And if it is a doing, is it not also working at something?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. ὁ κακῶς ἄρα θέων κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐν δρόμῳ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται;
SO. Then the one who runs badly works at this bad and shameful thing in a race?
ΙΠ. κακόν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
HIP. A bad thing; how could it be otherwise?
ΣΩ. κακῶς δὲ θεῖ ὁ βραδέως θέων;
SO. And the one who runs slowly runs badly?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δρομεὺς ἑκὼν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων;
SO. Then the good runner works at this bad and shameful thing voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily?
ΙΠ. ἔοικέν γε.
HIP. So it seems.