§368ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸν τρίτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τὸν ἀστρονόμον, ἧς αὖ σὺ τέχνης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἴει εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
SO. Now, then, let us also examine the third, the astronomer, in which art again you think you are even more knowledgeable than in the previous ones.
ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία;
Is it not so, Hippias?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν;
SO. Therefore, is it not the same in astronomy too?
ΙΠ. εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIP. It is likely, Socrates.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἄρα εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ψευδής, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀστρονόμος ψευδὴς ἔσται, ὁ δυνατὸς ψεύδεσθαι.
SO. In astronomy too, then, if indeed anyone else is false, it is the good astronomer who will be false, the one capable of lying.
οὐ γὰρ ὅ γε ἀδύνατος· ἀμαθὴς γάρ.
For the incapable one indeed will not be, for he is ignorant.
ΙΠ. φαίνεται οὕτως.
HIP. It seems so.
ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδὴς ἔσται.
SO. Therefore, the same person will be both truthful and false in astronomy too.
ΙΠ. ἔοικεν.
HIP. It seems likely.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ὦ Ἱππία, ἀνέδην οὑτωσὶ ἐπίσκεψαι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, εἴ που ἔστιν ἄλλως ἔχον ἢ οὕτως.
SO. Come now, Hippias, examine without restraint in this way throughout all sciences, to see if there is any other way than this.
πάντως δὲ πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος εἶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου, πολλὴν σοφίαν καὶ ζηλωτὴν σαυτοῦ διεξιόντος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις.
For you are surely the wisest of all men in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boasting when you were detailing your much-envied wisdom in the marketplace near the tables of the money-changers.
ἔφησθα δὲ ἀφικέσθαι ποτὲ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἃ εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἅπαντα σαυτοῦ ἔργα ἔχων· πρῶτον μὲν δακτύλιον—ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἤρχου—ὃν εἶχες σαυτοῦ ἔχειν ἔργον, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίους γλύφειν, καὶ ἄλλην σφραγῖδα σὸν ἔργον, καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ λήκυθον ἃ αὐτὸς ἠργάσω· ἔπειτα ὑποδήματα ἃ εἶχες ἔφησθα αὐτὸς σκυτοτομῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον ὑφῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον· καὶ ὅ γε πᾶσιν ἔδοξεν ἀτοπώτατον καὶ σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ζώνην ἔφησθα τοῦ χιτωνίσκου, ἣν εἶχες, εἶναι μὲν οἷαι αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὸς πλέξαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους, καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ παντοδαποὺς συγκειμένους· καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὴ ὧν ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ἐπιστήμων ἀφικέσθαι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ὀρθότητος, καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλά, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μνημονεύειν· καίτοι τό γε μνημονικὸν ἐπελαθόμην σου, ὡς ἔοικε, τέχνημα, ἐν ᾧ σὺ οἴει λαμπρότατος εἶναι· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα ἐπιλελῆσθαι.
You said that you once arrived at Olympia with everything you had on your body being your own handiwork: first, a ring—for you began with that—which you had was your own work, because you knew how to engrave rings, and another seal-ring of your own work, and a scraper and an oil-flask which you made yourself; then, you said you yourself cobbled the shoes you were wearing, and wove your cloak and tunic; and what seemed most bizarre to everyone and a proof of the greatest wisdom was when you said that the belt of your tunic, which you were wearing, was like the luxurious Persian ones, and that you had woven this yourself; and in addition to these, you came with poems, epics, tragedies, and dithyrambs, and many speeches of all kinds composed in prose; and you said you had arrived as a expert superior to all others in those arts I just now mentioned, and also in rhythms, harmonies, and correctness of letters, and very many other things besides, as I think I remember; although I seem to have forgotten your art of memory, in which you think you are most brilliant; and I think I have forgotten very many other things too.
ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ εἰς τὰς σαυτοῦ τέχνας βλέψας—ἱκαναὶ δέ—καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄλλων εἰπέ μοι, ἐάν που εὕρῃς ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, ὅπου ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής, χωρὶς καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός;
But as I say, look both at your own arts—which are sufficient—and at those of others, and tell me if you can find anywhere, based on what has been agreed between you and me, where the truthful man and the false man are separate and not the same person.
ἐν ᾗτινι βούλει σοφίᾳ τοῦτο σκέψαι ἢ πανουργίᾳ ἢ ὁτιοῦν χαίρεις ὀνομάζων· ἀλλʼ οὐχ εὑρήσεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε— οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν—ἐπεὶ σὺ εἰπέ.
Examine this in any wisdom you please, or knavery, or whatever you delight in calling it; but you will not find it, my friend—for it does not exist—unless you can tell me.
§369ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτως.
HIP. But I cannot, Socrates, at least not now in this way.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἕξεις, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι·
SO.
εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μέμνησαι ὃ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ὦ Ἱππία.
And you never will, I think; and if I speak the truth, do you remember what follows for us from the argument, Hippias?
ΙΠ. οὐ πάνυ τι ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ λέγεις.
HIP. I do not quite understand, Socrates, what you mean.
ΣΩ. νυνὶ γὰρ ἴσως οὐ χρῇ τῷ μνημονικῷ τεχνήματι— δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἴει δεῖν—ἀλλὰ ἐγώ σε ὑπομνήσω.
SO. For now, perhaps, you are not employing your mnemonic art—for it is clear you do not think it necessary—but I will remind you.
οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὲν Ἀχιλλέα ἔφησθα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα ψευδῆ καὶ πολύτροπον;
Do you know that you said Achilles was truthful, and Odysseus false and wily?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. νῦν οὖν αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής, ὥστε εἰ ψευδὴς ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἦν, καὶ ἀληθὴς γίγνεται, καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴς ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ ψευδής, καὶ οὐ διάφοροι ἀλλήλων οἱ ἄνδρες οὐδʼ ἐναντίοι, ἀλλʼ ὅμοιοι;
SO. Now, then, do you perceive that the same person has been shown to be both false and truthful, so that if Odysseus was false, he becomes also truthful, and if Achilles was truthful, he becomes also false, and the men are not different from each other, nor opposite, but similar?
ΙΠ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχῃ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ ἀγωνίζῃ τῷ πράγματι περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ·
HIP. Socrates, you always weave some such arguments, and choosing whatever is the most difficult part of the argument, you hold onto it, touching it bit by bit, and you do not contend with the whole matter about which the argument is.
ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, ἐπὶ πολλῶν τεκμηρίων ἀποδείξω σοι ἱκανῷ λόγῳ Ὅμηρον Ἀχιλλέα πεποιηκέναι ἀμείνω Ὀδυσσέως καὶ ἀψευδῆ, τὸν δὲ δολερόν τε καὶ πολλὰ ψευδόμενον καὶ χείρω Ἀχιλλέως.
For even now, if you wish, I will demonstrate to you on the strength of many proofs with sufficient argument that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and free from falsehood, and the other wily and speaking many lies and worse than Achilles.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὖ ἀντιπαράβαλλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὡς ὁ ἕτερος ἀμείνων ἐστί· καὶ μᾶλλον εἴσονται οὗτοι ὁπότερος ἄμεινον λέγει.
But if you wish, you on your side set speech against speech to show that the other is better; and these people here will know better which of us speaks better.
ΣΩ. ὦ Ἱππία, ἐγώ τοι οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ μὴ οὐχὶ σὲ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἢ ἐμέ· ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ εἴωθα, ἐπειδάν τις λέγῃ τι, προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι δοκῇ σοφὸς εἶναι ὁ λέγων, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν μαθεῖν ὅτι λέγει διαπυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐπανασκοπῶ καὶ συμβιβάζω τὰ λεγόμενα, ἵνα μάθω·
SO. Hippias, I certainly do not dispute that you are wiser than I; but I am always accustomed, whenever someone says something, to pay attention, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise.
ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος δοκῇ μοι εἶναι ὁ λέγων, οὔτε ἐπανερωτῶ οὔτε μοι μέλει ὧν λέγει.
And desiring to learn what he says, I question him thoroughly and re-examine and compare the things said, so that I may learn; but if the speaker seems to me to be of no account, I neither question him further nor do I care about what he says.
καὶ γνώσῃ τούτῳ οὓς ἂν ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι σοφοὺς εἶναι· εὑρήσεις γάρ με λιπαρῆ ὄντα περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τούτου καὶ πυνθανόμενον παρʼ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μαθών τι ὠφεληθῶ.
And you will recognize by this those whom I consider to be wise; for you will find me persistent about the things said by such a person, and questioning him, so that I may learn something and be benefited.