§367ΣΩ. τί δὲ τὰ ψευδῆ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων;
SO. And what about false statements regarding these same matters?
καί μοι, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, γενναίως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Ἱππία· εἴ τίς σε ἔροιτο τὰ τρὶς ἑπτακόσια πόσα ἐστί, πότερον σὺ ἂν μάλιστα ψεύδοιο καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ψευδῆ λέγοις περὶ τούτων, βουλόμενος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ ὁ ἀμαθὴς εἰς λογισμοὺς δύναιτʼ ἂν σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου;
And answer me, Hippias, in a noble and generous manner, just as before: if someone should ask you how much three times seven hundred is, would you lie best and always speak falsehoods consistently about these things, if you wished to lie and never answer the truth, or would the man ignorant of calculations be more capable of lying than you who wished to lie?
ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς πολλάκις ἂν βουλόμενος ψευδῆ λέγειν τἀληθῆ ἂν εἴποι ἄκων, εἰ τύχοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, σὺ δὲ ὁ σοφός, εἴπερ βούλοιο ψεύδεσθαι, ἀεὶ ἂν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψεύδοιο;
Or, while the ignorant man, though wishing to say falsehoods, might often speak the truth against his will, if it so happened, because of his not knowing, would you, the wise man, if you indeed wished to lie, always lie consistently?
ΙΠ. ναί, οὕτως ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.
HIP. Yes, it is as you say.
ΣΩ. ὁ ψευδὴς οὖν πότερον περὶ μὲν τἆλλα ψευδής ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι περὶ ἀριθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμῶν ἂν ψεύσαιτο;
SO. Is the false person, then, false about other things, but not indeed about number, nor would he lie about numbers?
ΙΠ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν.
HIP. Yes, by Zeus, about number too.
ΣΩ. θῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Ἱππία, περὶ λογισμόν τε καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον ψευδῆ;
SO. Shall we assume this too, then, Hippias, that there is some false person in regard to calculation and number?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη οὗτος;
SO. Who, then, would this be?
οὐχὶ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ μέλλει ψευδὴς ἔσεσθαι, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις, δυνατὸν εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;
Must he not possess, if he is to be false, as you just now agreed, the capability of lying?
ὁ γὰρ ἀδύνατος ψεύδεσθαι, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέγετο ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ψευδὴς γένοιτο.
For the person incapable of lying, if you remember, was said by you to be someone who could never become false.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι καὶ ἐλέχθη οὕτως.
HIP. Yes, I remember, and it was so said.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι ἐφάνης σὺ δυνατώτατος ὢν ψεύδεσθαι περὶ λογισμῶν;
SO. Then did you not just now appear to be most capable of lying about calculations?
ΙΠ. ναί, ἐλέχθη γέ τοι καὶ τοῦτο.
HIP. Yes, that indeed was said too.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ δυνατώτατος εἶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν;
SO. Are you, then, also most capable of speaking the truth about calculations?
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIP. Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν δυνατώτατος· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τούτων, ὁ λογιστικός.
SO. Therefore, the same person is most capable of speaking both falsehoods and truth about calculations; and this is the man who is good at these things, the calculator.
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ψευδὴς περὶ λογισμὸν γίγνεται, ὦ Ἱππία, ἄλλος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός;
SO. Who, then, becomes false about calculation, Hippias, other than the good man?
ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ καὶ δυνατός· οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἀληθής.
For the same man is also capable; and this is also the truthful man.
ΙΠ. φαίνεται.
HIP. It seems so.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀμείνων ὁ ἀληθὴς τοῦ ψευδοῦς;
SO. Do you see, then, that the same person is both false and truthful about these things, and the truthful is no better than the false?
ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ δήπου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα ἔχει, ὥσπερ σὺ ᾤου ἄρτι.
For he is surely the same person and does not have the most opposite character, as you thought just now.
ΙΠ. οὐ φαίνεται ἐνταῦθά γε.
HIP. It does not seem so, at least in this case.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν σκεψώμεθα καὶ ἄλλοθι;
SO. Do you wish us, then, to look into other matters as well?
ΙΠ. εἰ γε σὺ βούλει.
HIP. If you indeed wish.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειρος εἶ;
SO. Are you not, then, also skilled in geometry?
ΙΠ. ἔγωγε.
HIP. Indeed I am.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SO. What then?
οὐ καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ οὕτως ἔχει· ὁ αὐτὸς δυνατώτατος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων, ὁ γεωμετρικός;
Is it not also so in geometry: the same person, the geometer, is most capable of lying and of speaking the truth about diagrams?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. περὶ ταῦτα οὖν ἀγαθὸς ἄλλος τις ἢ οὗτος;
SO. Is anyone else, then, good in these matters except this man?
ΙΠ. οὐκ ἄλλος.
HIP. No one else.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς γεωμέτρης δυνατώτατός γε ἀμφότερα;
SO. Therefore, is not the good and wise geometer most capable of both?
καὶ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ψευδὴς περὶ διαγράμματα, οὗτος ἂν εἴη, ὁ ἀγαθός;
And if indeed anyone else is false about diagrams, would it not be this man, the good one?
οὗτος γὰρ δυνατός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀδύνατος ἦν ψεύδεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδὴς ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι, ὡς ὡμολόγηται.
For he is capable, whereas the bad man was incapable of lying; so that the one who is unable to lie could not become false, as has been agreed.
ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
HIP. That is so.