§365ΙΠ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἁπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν Λιταῖς, ἡνίκα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιεῖ αὐτοὺς διαλεγομένους, λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα—
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διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχανʼ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν,
ὥσπερ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀίω· ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,
"
"
ὅς χʼ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.
HIP. Not at all, Socrates; rather, he is made most simple and most truthful. For in the Prayers, when the poet makes them converse with one another, Achilles says to Odysseus— "Scion of Zeus, son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices, I must indeed speak my word outright, just as I intend to accomplish it, and as I think it will be fulfilled; for hateful to me as the gates of Hades is that man, "" who hides one thing in his heart and says another.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται.
But as for me, I will speak as it shall indeed be fulfilled.
"
ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν τὸν πρότον ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα λέγοντα ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη.
"In these verses, he makes clear the character of each of the two men, that Achilles is truthful and simple, while Odysseus is wily and false; for he makes Achilles say these verses to Odysseus.
ΣΩ. νῦν ἤδη, ὦ Ἱππία, κινδυνεύω μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις·
SO. Now at last, Hippias, I think I understand what you mean.
τὸν πολύτροπον ψευδῆ λέγεις, ὥς γε φαίνεται.
You call the wily person false, as it seems.
ΙΠ. μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες·
HIP.
τοιοῦτον γὰρ πεποίηκεν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ.
Exactly, Socrates; for Homer has made Odysseus such a character in many places, both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey.
ΣΩ. ἐδόκει ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.
SO. It seemed, then, as it appears, to Homer that the truthful man is one, and the false man another, and not the same.
ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HIP. How could it be otherwise, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἱππία;
SO. And does it seem so to you yourself, Hippias?
ΙΠ. πάντων μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ μή.
HIP. Most certainly; for indeed it would be strange if it did not.
ΣΩ. τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη·
SO.
σὺ δʼ ἐπειδὴ φαίνῃ ἀναδεχόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ ταῦτα ἅπερ φῂς Ὅμηρον λέγειν, ἀπόκριναι κοινῇ ὑπὲρ Ὁμήρου τε καὶ σαυτοῦ.
Then let us leave Homer aside, since indeed it is impossible to ask him further what he had in mind when he made these verses; but since you appear to take up the responsibility, and you agree with what you say Homer means, answer for both Homer and yourself in common.
ΙΠ. ἔσται ταῦτα·
HIP.
ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα ἔμβραχυ ὅτι βούλει.
So be it; but ask briefly whatever you wish.
ΣΩ. τοὺς ψευδεῖς λέγεις οἷον ἀδυνάτους τι ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντας, ἢ δυνατούς τι ποιεῖν;
SO. Do you say that the false are, as it were, incapable of doing anything, like the sick, or capable of doing something?
ΙΠ. δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν ἀνθρώπους.
HIP. Capable, indeed, and very much so, both of doing many other things and especially of deceiving people.
ΣΩ. δυνατοὶ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον καὶ πολύτροποι· ἦ γάρ;
SO. They are indeed, as it seems, capable according to your account, and wily; is that not so?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. πολύτροποι δʼ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπατεῶνες ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητος καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἢ ὑπὸ πανουργίας καὶ φρονήσεώς τινος;
SO. And are they wily and deceivers through foolishness and lack of sense, or through roguery and a certain wisdom?
ΙΠ. ὑπὸ πανουργίας πάντων μάλιστα καὶ φρονήσεως.
HIP. Through roguery, most certainly, and wisdom.
ΣΩ. φρόνιμοι μὲν ἄρα εἰσίν, ὡς ἔοικεν.
SO. They are wise, then, as it seems.
ΙΠ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, λίαν γε.
HIP. Yes, by Zeus, all too much so.
ΣΩ. φρόνιμοι δὲ ὄντες οὐκ ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν, ἢ ἐπίστανται;
SO. And being wise, do they not know what they are doing, or do they know?
ΙΠ. καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἐπίστανται· διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κακουργοῦσιν.
HIP. They know indeed, and very well; that is why they also do evil.
ΣΩ. ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ ἐπίστανται πότερον ἀμαθεῖς εἰσιν ἢ σοφοί;
SO. And knowing these things which they know, are they ignorant or wise?
§366ΙΠ. σοφοὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτά γε ταῦτα, ἐξαπατᾶν.
HIP. Wise, indeed, in this very thing, deceiving.
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή·
SO.
ἀναμνησθῶμεν τί ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις.
Hold on, then; let us recall what you are saying.
τοὺς ψευδεῖς φῂς εἶναι δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονίμους καὶ ἐπιστήμονας καὶ σοφοὺς εἰς ἅπερ ψευδεῖς;
Do you say that the false are capable, wise, knowing, and intelligent in those very things in which they are false?
ΙΠ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
HIP. Yes, indeed, I do.
ΣΩ. ἄλλους δὲ τοὺς ἀληθεῖς τε καὶ ψευδεῖς, καὶ ἐναντιωτάτους ἀλλήλοις;
SO. And that the truthful and the false are different from each other, and most opposite to each other?
ΙΠ. λέγω ταῦτα.
HIP. I do say so.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή·
SO.
τῶν μὲν δυνατῶν τινες καὶ σοφῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶν οἱ ψευδεῖς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
Come then; among the capable and wise, as it seems, some are the false, according to your account.
ΙΠ. μάλιστά γε.
HIP. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ λέγῃς δυνατοὺς καὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ψευδεῖς εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πότερον λέγεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, ἢ ἀδυνάτους εἰς ταῦτα ἅπερ ψεύδονται;
SO. But when you say that the false are capable and wise in these very things, do you mean they are capable of lying if they wish, or incapable in those things in which they lie?
ΙΠ. δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε.
HIP. Capable, indeed.
ΣΩ. ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἄρα εἰρῆσθαι, οἱ ψευδεῖς εἰσιν οἱ σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι.
SO. To state it in sum, then, the false are those who are wise and capable of lying.
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀδύνατος ἄρα ψεύδεσθαι ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀμαθὴς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψευδής.
SO. Therefore, a man incapable of lying and ignorant would not be false.
ΙΠ. ἔχει οὕτως.
HIP. That is so.
ΣΩ. δυνατὸς δέ γʼ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται· οὐχ ὑπὸ νόσου λέγω ἐξειργόμενον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ σὺ δυνατὸς εἶ γράψαι τοὐμὸν ὄνομα ὅταν βούλῃ, οὕτω λέγω.
SO. And is not each person capable who does what he wishes when he wishes, I do not mean when prevented by disease or such things, but just as you are capable of writing my name when you wish, that is how I mean.
ἢ οὐχ, ὃς ἂν οὕτως ἔχῃ, καλεῖς σὺ δυνατόν;
Or do you not call him capable who is in such a state?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ σὺ μέντοι ἔμπειρος εἶ λογισμῶν καὶ λογιστικῆς;
SO. Tell me then, Hippias, are you not indeed skilled in calculations and the art of calculation?
ΙΠ. πάντων μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIP. Most certainly, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ καί τίς σε ἔροιτο τὰ τρὶς ἑπτακόσια ὁπόσος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός, εἰ βούλοιο, πάντων τάχιστα καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴποις τἀληθῆ περὶ τούτου;
SO. Therefore, if someone should ask you how much three times seven hundred is, if you wished, would you not say the truth about this quickest and most of all?
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIP. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὅτι δυνατώτατός τε εἶ καὶ σοφώτατος κατὰ ταῦτα;
SO. Is it because you are most capable and wisest in these matters?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP. Yes.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοφώτατός τε εἶ καὶ δυνατώτατος μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἄριστος ταῦτα ἅπερ δυνατώτατός τε καὶ σοφώτατος, τὰ λογιστικά;
SO. Are you, then, only the wisest and most capable, or also the best in these things in which you are most capable and wisest, namely calculations?
ΙΠ. καὶ ἄριστος δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIP. Also the best, surely, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀληθῆ σὺ ἂν δυνατώτατα εἴποις περὶ τούτων· ἦ γάρ;
SO. You, then, would speak the truth most capably about these things; is that not so?
ΙΠ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
HIP. I think so, indeed.