§303ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τούτῳ γε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐστι καλόν, ὃ μὴ ἕπεται ἑκατέρῳ (τὸ γὰρ ἀμφότερον ἑκατέρῳ οὐχ ἕπεται) ὥστε ἀμφότερα μὲν αὐτὰ φάναι καλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔξεστιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ οὐκ ἔξεστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;
SOCRATES: "Therefore, each of them is not beautiful by that which does not follow upon each (for 'being both' does not follow upon each), so that it is possible to say they are both beautiful according to the hypothesis, but it is not possible to say each is; or how do we say?
οὐκ ἀνάγκη; ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. φῶμεν οὖν ἀμφότερα μὲν καλὰ εἶναι, ἑκάτερον δὲ μὴ φῶμεν; ΙΠ. τί γὰρ κωλύει; ΣΩ. τόδε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ φίλε, κωλύειν, ὅτι ἦν που ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἑκάστοις, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροις ἐπιγίγνοιτο, καὶ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ εἴπερ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις, ἅπαντα ὅσα σὺ διῆλθες· ἦ γάρ; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἃ δέ γε αὖ ἐγὼ διῆλθον, οὔ· ὧν δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφότερον.
Is it not necessary?" HIPPIAS: "So it appears." SOCRATES: "Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but say that each is not?" HIPPIAS: "For what prevents it?" SOCRATES: "This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it: that on the one hand there were for us some things which so occurred to each that if they occurred to both they occurred also to each, and if to each, also to both—all those things which you went through; is it not so?" HIPPIAS: "Yes." SOCRATES: "But on the other hand, the things I went through were not so; among which indeed were 'each' itself and 'both'.
ἔστιν οὕτως; ΙΠ. ἔστιν. ΣΩ. ποτέρων οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, δοκεῖ σοι τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;
Is it so?" HIPPIAS: "It is." SOCRATES: "To which of the two classes, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong?
πότερον ὧν σὺ ἔλεγες· εἴπερ ἐγὼ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ δίκαιος καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος· οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ καλὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος;
To those which you were speaking of—if indeed I am strong and you are, both are, and if indeed I am just and you are, both are, and if indeed both, each also; so indeed if I am beautiful and you are, both are, and if indeed both, each also?
ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἀρτίων ὄντων τινῶν ἀμφοτέρων τάχα μὲν ἑκάτερα περιττὰ εἶναι, τάχα δʼ ἄρτια, καὶ αὖ ἀρρήτων ἑκατέρων ὄντων τάχα μὲν ῥητὰ τὰ συναμφότερα εἶναι, τάχα δʼ ἄρρητα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἐμοὶ προφαίνεσθαι;
Or does nothing prevent it from being like cases where both being even, perhaps each of them is odd, or perhaps even, and again, each being irrational, perhaps both together are rational, or perhaps irrational, and countless other such things which indeed I said appeared to me?
ποτέρων δὴ τιθεῖς τὸ καλόν;
In which class do you place the beautiful?
ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καταφαίνεται, καὶ σοί;
Or does it appear to you concerning it just as it does to me?
πολλὴ γὰρ ἀλογία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι καλούς, ἑκάτερον δὲ μή, ἢ ἑκάτερον μέν, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ μή, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων.
For it seems to me a great absurdity that both of us should be beautiful, but each not, or each beautiful, but both not, or any other such thing.
οὕτως αἱρῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἢ ʼκείνως; ΙΠ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, ἵνα καὶ ἀπαλλαγῶμεν πλείονος ζητήσεως·
Do you choose this way, as I do, or that way?" HIPPIAS: "This way indeed I do, Socrates." SOCRATES: "You do well, Hippias, so that we may also be released from further inquiry.
εἰ γὰρ τούτων γʼ ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν.
For if the beautiful is of these things, the pleasure through sight and hearing would no longer be beautiful.
ἀμφότερα μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ καλὰ τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς, ἑκάτερον δʼ οὔ· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία. ΙΠ. ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ. ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε καλὸν γιγνόμενον τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται. ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ.
λέγετε δὴ πάλιν,
φήσει,
ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐπειδὴ τούτου διημάρτετε· τί φατε εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διʼ ὅτι ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τιμήσαντες καλὰς ὠνομάσατε; ἀνάγκη δή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσι καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἑκατέρα· ἢ σύ τι ἔχεις λέγειν ἄλλο ᾧ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων; ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ βέλτισταί εἰσιν. ΣΩ.
τοῦτʼ ἄρα,
φήσει,
λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον; ἐοίκαμεν, φήσω ἔγωγε·
For the pleasure through sight and hearing makes both beautiful, but each not; and this was impossible, as you and I indeed agree, Hippias." HIPPIAS: "Yes, for we agree." SOCRATES: "Therefore, it is impossible for the pleasant through sight and hearing to be beautiful, since indeed in becoming beautiful it presents something impossible." HIPPIAS: "That is so." SOCRATES: "'Speak then again,' he will say, 'from the beginning, since you failed in this: what do you say this beautiful thing is, which is upon both these pleasures, on account of which you honored them before the others and named them beautiful?' It seems indeed necessary to me, Hippias, to say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both together and each; or do you have something else to say by which they differ from the others?" HIPPIAS: "By no means; for in reality they are the best." SOCRATES: "'Is this then,' he will say, 'what you say the beautiful is, namely, beneficial pleasure?' 'We seem to,' I shall say.
σὺ δέ; ΙΠ. καὶ ἐγώ.
What about you?" HIPPIAS: "I also."