§302ΣΩ. ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγω·
SOCRATES: "Just what I am saying.
φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδὰν τὶ δόξῃς σαυτῷ λέγειν.
For I am afraid to speak clearly to you, because you get angry with me whenever you think you are saying something yourself.
ὅμως δʼ ἔτι μοι εἰπέ· οὐχ εἷς ἡμῶν ἑκάτερός ἐστι καὶ πέπονθε τοῦτο, εἷς εἶναι; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ εἷς, καὶ περιττὸς ἂν εἴη ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν· ἢ οὐ τὸ ἓν περιττὸν ἡγῇ; ΙΠ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀμφότεροι οὖν περιττοί ἐσμεν δύο ὄντες; ΙΠ. οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρτιοί γε ἀμφότεροι· ἦ γάρ; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν, ὅτι ἀμφότεροι ἄρτιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα καὶ ἑκάτερος ἄρτιος ἡμῶν ἐστιν; ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἃ ἂν ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἑκάτερος καὶ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι. ΙΠ. οὐ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἐγὼ πρότερον ἔλεγον.
Nevertheless, tell me still: is not each of us one, and has experienced this, namely, to be one?" HIPPIAS: "Certainly." SOCRATES: "Therefore, if indeed one, each of us would also be odd; or do you not think the one is odd?" HIPPIAS: "I do." SOCRATES: "And are we both then odd, being two?" HIPPIAS: "That could not be, Socrates." SOCRATES: "But both are even, are they not?" HIPPIAS: "Certainly." SOCRATES: "Is it then the case that, because both are even, for this reason each of us also is even?" HIPPIAS: "Certainly not." SOCRATES: "So it is not by any means necessary, as you were just saying, that whatever both are, each is also, and whatever each is, both are also." HIPPIAS: "Not in such cases, but in those of the kind I was speaking of before." SOCRATES: "That is enough, Hippias; for even this is welcome, since some things appear to be this way, and others not.
ΣΩ. ἐξαρκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀγαπητὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, τὰ δʼ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, εἰ μέμνησαι ὅθεν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονὴ οὐ τούτῳ εἶεν καλαί, ὅτι τυγχάνοιεν ἑκατέρα μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι πεπονθυῖα, ἀμφότεραι δὲ μή, ἢ ἀμφότεραι μέν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἀμφότεραί τε καὶ ἑκατέρα, διότι συνεχώρεις ἀμφοτέρας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι καλὰς καὶ ἑκατέραν.
For indeed I was saying, if you remember whence this discussion was spoken, that the pleasure through sight and hearing would not be beautiful by this, namely, because each of them happens to have experienced this but both have not, or both have but each has not, but by that which both and each have, since you agreed that both of them are beautiful, and each.
τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ ᾤμην, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά ἐστι καλά, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένῃ μή· καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἴομαι.
For this very reason, I thought that if indeed both are beautiful, they must be beautiful by that reality which follows upon both of them, and not by that which is lacking in the other; and I think so still even now.
ἀλλά μοι λέγε, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἡ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ διʼ ἀκοῆς, εἴπερ ἀμφότεραί τʼ εἰσὶ καλαὶ καὶ ἑκατέρα, ἆρα καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἕπεται καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
But tell me, as if from the beginning: the pleasure through sight and the pleasure through hearing, if indeed both of them are beautiful and each is, does not also that which makes them beautiful follow upon both of them and upon each?" HIPPIAS: "Certainly." SOCRATES: "Is it then because each is a pleasure and both are, that they would be beautiful?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἑκατέρα τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφότεραι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν καλαί; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἂν οὐδὲν τούτων ἧττον εἶεν καλαί;
Or because of this, would all other pleasures also be beautiful no less than these?
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἡδοναὶ ἐφάνησαν οὖσαι, εἰ μέμνησαι. ΙΠ. μέμνημαι. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὅτι γε διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὗταί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο καλὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι. ΙΠ. καὶ ἐρρήθη οὕτως.
For they appeared to be no less pleasures, if you remember." HIPPIAS: "I remember." SOCRATES: "But because these indeed are through sight and hearing, for this reason it was said that they are beautiful." HIPPIAS: "It was indeed said so." SOCRATES: "But consider if I speak the truth.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἐλέγετο γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ μνήμης ἔχω, τοῦτʼ εἶναι καλὸν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ᾖ. ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ.
For it was said, as I have memory of it, that this pleasant thing is beautiful, not all of it, but whatever is through sight and hearing." HIPPIAS: "True." SOCRATES: "Therefore does not this very attribute follow upon both, but not upon each?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἕπεται, ἑκατέρᾳ δʼ οὔ; οὐ γάρ που ἑκάτερόν γε αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο, διʼ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἀμφότερα μὲν διʼ ἀμφοῖν, ἑκάτερον δʼ οὔ·
For surely each of them, as was said in what went before, is not through both, but both are through both, and each is not.
ἔστι ταῦτα; ΙΠ. ἔστιν.
Is this so?" HIPPIAS: "It is."