§299ΣΩ.
τί οὖν,
φήσει,
ἡδονὰς οὔσας οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ καὶ ἐκείνας ἀφαιρεῖσθε τοῦτο τοὔνομα καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε τοῦ καλὰς εἶναι; ὅτι, φήσομεν, καταγελῴη ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὔ, εἰ φαῖμεν μὴ ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ ὄζειν ἡδὺ μὴ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν·
SOCRATES: "Then," he will say, "since they are pleasures no less than those others, why do you take away this name from them and deprive them of being beautiful?" "Because," we shall say, "there is no one who would not laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but beautiful, and that smelling sweet is not pleasant but beautiful.
τὰ δέ που περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια πάντες ἂν ἡμῖν μάχοιντο ὡς ἥδιστον ὄν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτό, ἐάν τις καὶ πράττῃ, οὕτω πράττειν ὥστε μηδένα ὁρᾶν, ὡς αἴσχιστον ὂν ὁρᾶσθαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ὦ Ἱππία,
μανθάνω,
ἂν ἴσως φαίη,
καὶ ἐγὼ ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἠρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἔστιν. ἐροῦμεν δὴ οἶμαι ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα, ὅτι
τοῦθʼ ἡμεῖς γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον, καλὸν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἔχεις ἔτι τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἤ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
And as for the matters of sex, surely everyone would fight against us, holding that it is most pleasant, but that, if one does perform it, one must do so in such a way that no one sees, on the ground that it is most shameful to be seen." When we say these things, Hippias, "I too understand," he would perhaps say, "that you have long been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because it does not seem so to people; but I did not ask this, what seems beautiful to the many, but what actually is so." Then I think we shall state what we hypothesized: "We at least say that this part of the pleasant, which arises in connection with sight and hearing, is beautiful." But do you still have any way to employ the argument, or shall we say something else, Hippias?
ΙΠ. ἀνάγκη πρός γε τὰ εἰρημένα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα ἢ ταῦτα λέγειν. ΣΩ.
καλῶς δὴ λέγετε,
φήσει.
HIPPIAS: "In view of what has been said, Socrates, we must of necessity say nothing other than this." SOCRATES: "You speak well," he will say.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη; ὁμολογήσομεν;
"Therefore, if indeed that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, is it not clear that whatever among pleasant things does not happen to be this, would not be beautiful?" Shall we agree?
ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ.
ἦ οὖν τὸ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδύ,
φήσει,
διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἐστιν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ διʼ ἀκοῆς καὶ διʼ ὄψεώς ἐστιν ἡδύ; οὐδαμῶς, φήσομεν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὂν τοῦτο διʼ ἀμφοτέρων εἴη ἄν—τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν λέγειν—ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον τούτων αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ τῶν ἡδέων καλὸν εἴη, καὶ ἀμφότερα. οὐχ οὕτως ἀποκρινούμεθα;
HIPPIAS: "Yes." SOCRATES: "Is then that which is pleasant through sight," he will say, "pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing, pleasant through hearing and sight?" "By no means," we shall say, "could that which is through one of them be through both—for this is what you seem to us to mean—but we were saying that each of these pleasant things, itself by itself, is beautiful, and also both together." Shall we not answer thus?
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ.
ἆρʼ οὖν,
φήσει,
ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὁτιοῦν ὁτουοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ, τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι;
HIPPIAS: "By all means." SOCRATES: "Does then," he will say, "any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any other pleasant thing whatsoever in this, namely, in being pleasant?
μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἡδονή, τῶν ἡδονῶν; οὐχ ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖ· οὐ γάρ;
For I do not ask if one pleasure is greater or smaller, or more or less, but if any of the pleasures differs in this very thing: in one being a pleasure and another not being a pleasure?" It does not seem so to us, does it?
ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δοκεῖ. ΣΩ.
οὐκοῦν,
φήσει,
διʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι ἡδοναί εἰσι προείλεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, τοιοῦτόν τι ὁρῶντες ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέποντες καλάς φατε αὐτὰς εἶναι;
HIPPIAS: "No, indeed it does not." SOCRATES: "Therefore," he will say, "it is for some other reason than that they are pleasures that you have selected these pleasures from the other pleasures, seeing some such thing in both, that they have something different from the others, looking to which you say they are beautiful?
οὐ γάρ που διὰ τοῦτο καλή ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι διʼ ὄψεώς ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἦν τὸ αἴτιον καλῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καλή· οὔκουν ἔστι γε διʼ ὄψεως ἡδονή.
For surely the pleasure through sight is not beautiful because it is through sight; for if this were the cause of its being beautiful, the other, the one through hearing, would never be beautiful, since indeed it is not a pleasure through sight." "You speak the truth," shall we say?
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φήσομεν; ΙΠ. φήσομεν γάρ.
HIPPIAS: "For we shall indeed say so."