§298ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ εἰδέναι οὐχ οἷός τε σὲ εἶναι περιμένειν μέλλοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὖν δή τι καὶ οἶμαι ἄρτι ηὐπορηκέναι.
SOCRATES: But I seem to myself, because of my desire for knowledge, unable to wait for you who are going to delay; for indeed I also think I have just found a way out.
ὅρα γάρ· εἰ ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρʼ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα;
For look: if we should say that what makes us rejoice—not indeed all pleasures, but that which is through hearing and sight—is the beautiful, how then would we contest?
οἵ τέ γέ που καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ τὰ ποικίλματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα καὶ τὰ πλάσματα τέρπει ἡμᾶς ὁρῶντας, ἃ ἂν καλὰ ᾖ· καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ σύμπασα καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ μυθολογίαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζονται, ὥστʼ εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα τῷ θρασεῖ ἐκείνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ καλόν ἐστι τὸ διʼ ἀκοῆς τε καὶ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδύ, οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν τοῦ θράσους ἐπίσχοιμεν;
For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all embroideries and paintings and sculptures delight us when we look at them, if they are beautiful; and beautiful sounds and all music, and speeches and storytelling produce this same effect, so that if we should answer that bold man, "My noble sir, the beautiful is that which is pleasant through hearing and sight," do you not think we would stop him from his boldness?
ΙΠ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ νῦν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστιν.
HIPPIAS: To me at least, Socrates, for the present, the beautiful seems to be well stated as to what it is.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἆρα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὦ Ἱππία, διʼ ἀκοῆς ἢ διʼ ὄψεως φήσομεν ἡδέα ὄντα καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἔχειν;
Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasant through hearing or through sight, or that they have some other form?
ΙΠ. ταῦτα δʼ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν παραλάθοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
HIPPIAS: These things, perhaps, Socrates, might even escape the notice of the man.
ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐχ ὅν γʼ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα αἰσχυνοίμην ληρῶν καὶ προσποιούμενός τι λέγειν μηδὲν λέγων.
SOCRATES: By the dog, Hippias, not the one before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense and pretending to say something when saying nothing.
ΙΠ. τίνα τοῦτον;
HIPPIAS: Who is this?
ΣΩ. τὸν Σωφρονίσκου, ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἐπιτρέποι ἀνερεύνητα ὄντα ῥᾳδίως λέγειν ἢ ὡς εἰδότα ἃ μὴ οἶδα.
SOCRATES: The son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things easily when they are unexamined than to pretend that I know what I do not know.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ σὺ εἶπες, δοκεῖ τι ἄλλο εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.
HIPPIAS: But indeed to me myself also, since you have said it, this matter concerning the laws seems to be something else.
ΣΩ. ἔχʼ ἡσυχῇ, ὦ Ἱππία· κινδυνεύομεν γάρ τοι, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ᾗπερ νυνδή, οἴεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Keep quiet, Hippias; for indeed we are in danger of thinking that we are in some other way out, when we have fallen into the very same difficulty about the beautiful as just now.
ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HIPPIAS: How do you mean this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι φράσω ὅ γʼ ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται, εἰ ἄρα τὶ λέγω.
SOCRATES: I will tell you what appears to me, if indeed I am speaking any sense.
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τάχʼ ἂν φανείη οὐκ ἐκτὸς ὄντα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἣ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει·
For these things concerning laws and customs might perhaps appear not to be outside the sensation which happens to be ours through hearing and sight.
ἀλλʼ ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, τὸ διὰ τούτων ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες.
But let us abide by this argument—that the pleasant through these is beautiful—without bringing anything concerning the laws into the midst.
ἀλλʼ εἰ ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο εἴτε οὗτος ὃν λέγω, εἴτε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· τί δή, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀφωρίσατε τοῦ ἡδέος τὸ ταύτῃ ἡδὺ ᾗ λέγετε καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τἀφροδίσια καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔ φατε καλὰ εἶναι;
But if either this man I speak of, or anyone else whomsoever, should ask us: "Why indeed, Hippias and Socrates, did you set apart from the pleasant that which is pleasant in the way you say is beautiful, but you do not say that what is pleasant according to the other sensations—such as food, drink, sexual matters, and all other such things—is beautiful?
ἢ οὐδὲ ἡδέα, οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φατὲ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι; τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Or do you say that there is not even anything pleasant, nor any pleasures at all in such things, nor in anything other than seeing and hearing?" What shall we say, Hippias?
ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου φήσομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλας πάνυ ἡδονὰς εἶναι.
HIPPIAS: Surely, Socrates, we shall say by all means that there are indeed very great pleasures in the other things as well.