§300ΣΩ.
οὐδέ γʼ αὖ ἡ διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι διʼ ἀκοῆς ἐστι, διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλή· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὖ ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καλὴ ἦν· οὔκουν ἔστι γε διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή. ἀληθῆ φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν τὸν ἄνδρα ταῦτα λέγοντα;
SOCRATES: "Nor, again, does the pleasure through hearing happen to be beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would never be beautiful, since indeed it is not a pleasure through hearing." Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says these things says what is true?
ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότεραί γʼ εἰσὶ καλαί, ὡς φατέ. φαμὲν γάρ;
HIPPIAS: "True." SOCRATES: "But indeed, both of them are beautiful, as you say." For we do say so, do we not?
ΙΠ. φαμέν. ΣΩ.
ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἄλλως ἀμφότεραί γε καλαὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἑκατέρα. ἀποκρίνου ἐμοὶ ὡς ἐκείνῳ.
HIPPIAS: "We do." SOCRATES: "They have, then, some identical thing which makes them beautiful, this common property which belongs to both of them in common and to each individually; for otherwise both of them and each would surely not be beautiful." Answer me as if you were answering him.
ΙΠ. ἀποκρίνομαι, καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις. ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τι αὗται αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν τούτῳ γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί. ΙΠ. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδετέρας πεπονθυίας τι τῶν ὄντων ὁτιοῦν, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ μηδετέρα πέπονθεν, ἀμφοτέρας πεπονθέναι; ΣΩ. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΙΠ. πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν μʼ ἔχοι ἀπειρία καὶ τῆς τούτων φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων.
HIPPIAS: "I answer, and it seems to me to be as you say." SOCRATES: "If, then, both of these pleasures have some attribute, but each individually does not, they would not be beautiful by this attribute." HIPPIAS: "And how could this be, Socrates, when neither of them has experienced any entity whatsoever, then both have this attribute which neither has experienced?" SOCRATES: "Does it not seem so to you?" HIPPIAS: "For great would be my ignorance both of the nature of these things and of the language of our present discussions." SOCRATES: "How pleasant, Hippias!
ΣΩ. ἡδέως γε, ὦ Ἱππία. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἴσως κινδυνεύω δοκεῖν μέν τι ὁρᾶν οὕτως ἔχον ὡς σὺ φῂς ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ὁρῶ δʼ οὐδέν. ΙΠ. οὐ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἑτοίμως παρορᾷς. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πολλά γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται, ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἐμοὶ δέ, ὃς οὐδὲν πώποτε ἠργασάμην.
But indeed I am probably in danger of seeming to see something which is as you say is impossible, while actually seeing nothing." HIPPIAS: "You are not in danger, Socrates, but you are very readily looking past the mark." SOCRATES: "And yet many such things appear before my soul, but I distrust them, because they do not appear to you, a man who has made the most money for wisdom of anyone now alive, whereas they appear to me, who have never made any money at all.
καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ παίζῃς πρός με καὶ ἑκὼν ἐξαπατᾷς· οὕτως μοι σφόδρα καὶ πολλὰ φαίνεται. ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς σοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον εἴσεται εἴτε παίζω εἴτε μή, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃς λέγειν τὰ προφαινόμενά σοι ταῦτα· φανήσῃ γὰρ οὐδὲν λέγων.
And I am considering, my friend, whether you are playing with me and deceiving me on purpose, so strongly and in such numbers do they appear to me." HIPPIAS: "No one will know better than you, Socrates, whether I am playing or not, if you will attempt to state these things that appear to you; for you will be shown to be talking nonsense.
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε εὕρῃς, ὃ μήτʼ ἐγὼ πέπονθα μήτε σύ, τοῦτʼ ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς πεπονθότας. ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία;
For you will never find that what neither I have experienced nor you have, this both of us have experienced." SOCRATES: "How do you mean, Hippias?
ἴσως μὲν τὶ λέγεις, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ μανθάνω· ἀλλά μου σαφέστερον ἄκουσον ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν.
Perhaps you are saying something reasonable, but I do not understand; but hear from me more clearly what I want to say.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὃ μήτʼ ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτʼ εἰμὶ μηδʼ αὖ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτο ἀμφοτέρους πεπονθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι· ἕτερα δʼ αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν.
For it seems to me that what neither I have as an attribute to be nor am, nor again you are, this both of us can have as an attribute; and on the other hand, things which both of us have as an attribute to be, these neither of us is."