§297ΣΩ. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα αἴτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν.
SOCRATES: Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.
ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.
HIPPIAS: For it is so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε αἴτιον, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ οὗ ἂν αἴτιον ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, ἄλλο ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου αἴτιον ἂν εἴη.
SOCRATES: But indeed, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different; for surely the cause would not be the cause of a cause.
ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐ τὸ αἴτιον ποιοῦν ἐφάνη;
Look at it this way: did not the cause appear to be that which produces?
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖται οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ ποιοῦν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, by that which produces, is nothing else produced than that which comes into being, but not that which produces?
ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
HIPPIAS: That is so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, is that which comes into being one thing, and that which produces another?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIPPIAS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τό γʼ αἴτιον αἴτιον αἰτίου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the cause is not the cause of a cause, but of that which comes into being by its agency.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλόν ἐστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικε, σπουδάζομεν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστι, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὑρίσκομεν ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
SOCRATES: If then the beautiful is the cause of the good, the good would come into being by the agency of the beautiful; and for this reason, as it seems, we earnestly pursue both wisdom and all other beautiful things, because their work and offspring, which is the good, is worthy of pursuit, and it is likely, from what we are finding, that the beautiful is in the position of a father, as it were, to the good.
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
HIPPIAS: Quite so indeed; for you speak well, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καλῶς λέγω, ὅτι οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ ὑός ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ ὑὸς πατήρ;
SOCRATES: Then do I also speak well in this: that neither is the father a son, nor is the son a father?
ΙΠ. καλῶς μέντοι.
HIPPIAS: Well indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed is the cause that which comes into being, nor again is that which comes into being the cause.
ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
HIPPIAS: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν·
SOCRATES: By Zeus, my excellent friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful.
ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων;
Or does it seem possible to you from what has been said?
ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔ μοι φαίνεται.
HIPPIAS: No, by Zeus, it does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν;
SOCRATES: Does it please us then, and would we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?
ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει.
HIPPIAS: No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.
ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἱππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων ἥκιστα ἀρέσκει ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λόγων.
SOCRATES: Indeed by Zeus, Hippias; and for my part, of all the arguments we have spoken, this pleases me least.
ΙΠ. ἔοικε γὰρ οὕτως.
HIPPIAS: For so it seems.
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει ἄρα ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐφαίνετο κάλλιστος εἶναι τῶν λόγων τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι γελοιότερος τῶν πρώτων, ἐν οἷς τήν τε παρθένον ᾠόμεθα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων.
SOCRATES: Then it is likely for us that, not as it seemed just now to be the most beautiful of arguments—that the beneficial, the useful, and the capable of doing some good is the beautiful—not so is the case, but, if it is possible, this is even more ridiculous than those first arguments, in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each one of the things mentioned before.
ΙΠ. ἔοικεν.
HIPPIAS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέν γε οὐκ ἔτι ἔχω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅποι τράπωμαι, ἀλλʼ ἀπορῶ·
SOCRATES: And for my part, Hippias, I no longer know which way to turn, but I am at a loss.
σὺ δὲ ἔχεις τι λέγειν;
Do you have anything to say?
ΙΠ. οὐκ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, σκεψάμενος εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι εὑρήσω.
HIPPIAS: Not at the present moment, but, as I was just saying, after looking into it, I know well that I shall find it.