Plato · Hippias Major §296

Refining the Beautiful from Useful to the Beneficial

Passage 12 of 20 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Hippias realize that defining the beautiful simply as the capable and the useful leads to the contradiction of making the power to do evil beautiful; they therefore redefine the beautiful as what is useful for producing good, namely the beneficial (ὠφέλιμον).

§296ΙΠ. σφόδρα γε.

HIPPIAS: Very much so.

τά τε γοῦν ἄλλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τὰ πολιτικά· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τε καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει τὸ μὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι πάντων κάλλιστον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντων αἴσχιστον.

At any rate other things, Socrates, testify for us that this is so, and especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one's own city, to be capable is the most beautiful of all, and to be incapable is the ugliest of all.

ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις.

SOCRATES: Well said.

ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς θεῶν, Ἱππία, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ σοφία πάντων κάλλιστον, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία πάντων αἴσχιστον;

Is it then, by the gods, Hippias, because of these things that wisdom also is the most beautiful of all, and ignorance the ugliest of all?

ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

HIPPIAS: But what else indeed, Socrates?

ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ ἠρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε· ὡς φοβοῦμαι τί ποτʼ αὖ λέγομεν.

SOCRATES: Hold on quietly, my dear friend; for I fear what on earth we are saying again.

ΙΠ. τί δʼ αὖ φοβῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι ὁ λόγος παγκάλως προβέβηκε;

HIPPIAS: But why are you afraid again, Socrates, since this time at least your argument has proceeded beautifully?

ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἆρʼ ἄν τίς τι ποιήσειεν ὃ μήτʼ ἐπίσταιτο μήτε τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο;

SOCRATES: I should like that, but examine this with me: would anyone do anything which they neither knew how to do nor were capable of doing at all?

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε μὴ δύναιτο;

HIPPIAS: In no way; for how could one do what they are not capable of?

ΣΩ. οἱ οὖν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοί τε καὶ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες, ἄλλο τι οὗτοι, εἰ μὴ ἐδύναντο ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐποίουν;

SOCRATES: Then those who make mistakes and work and do bad things unwillingly, would they ever have done them if they were not capable of doing them?

ΙΠ. δῆλον δή.

HIPPIAS: Clearly indeed.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δυνάμει γε δύνανται οἱ δυνάμενοι· οὐ γάρ που ἀδυναμίᾳ γε.

SOCRATES: But indeed, those who are capable are capable by power surely, not by lack of power.

ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.

HIPPIAS: Indeed not.

ΣΩ. δύνανται δέ γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιοῦντες ἃ ποιοῦσιν;

SOCRATES: And do all who do what they do have the power to do it?

ΙΠ. ναί.

HIPPIAS: Yes.

ΣΩ. κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων, καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες.

SOCRATES: But all human beings, starting from childhood, do far more bad things than good, and make mistakes unwillingly.

ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

HIPPIAS: That is so.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν;

SOCRATES: What then?

ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ ἂν ᾖ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν τι ἐργάζεσθαι χρήσιμα, ἆρα φήσομεν ταῦτα εἶναι καλά, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;

This power and these useful things, which are useful for working some bad—shall we say that these are beautiful, or is that far from being the case?

ΙΠ. πολλοῦ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

HIPPIAS: Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.

SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, it seems that the capable and the useful is not the beautiful for us.

ΙΠ. ἐάν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγαθὰ δύνηται καὶ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμον ᾖ.

HIPPIAS: If, Socrates, it is capable of good things and useful for such things.

ΣΩ. ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἁπλῶς εἶναι καλόν·

SOCRATES: Then that definition—that the capable and useful simply is beautiful—is gone.

ἀλλʼ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἦν ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἱππία, ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν;

But, Hippias, was this what our soul wished to say: that the useful and the capable for doing some good, this is the beautiful?

ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

HIPPIAS: So it seems to me.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES: But this indeed is beneficial, is it not?

ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.

HIPPIAS: Certainly.

ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ καλὰ νόμιμα καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα καλά ἐστιν, ὅτι ὠφέλιμα.

SOCRATES: In this way indeed, beautiful bodies, beautiful institutions, wisdom, and all the beautiful things we were just mentioning are beautiful because they are beneficial.

ΙΠ. δῆλον ὅτι.

HIPPIAS: Clearly so.

ΣΩ. τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἄρα ἔοικεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.

SOCRATES: Therefore, the beneficial seems to be the beautiful for us, Hippias.

ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

HIPPIAS: Certainly indeed, Socrates.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.

SOCRATES: But indeed, the beneficial is that which produces good.

ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.

HIPPIAS: For it is so.

ΣΩ. τὸ ποιοῦν δέ γʼ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αἴτιον· ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES: And that which produces is nothing other than the cause; is it not?

ΙΠ. οὕτως.

HIPPIAS: So it is.

Notes

296bἄλλο τι — An idiomatic expression where the conjunction ἤ is omitted from ἄλλο τι ἤ (meaning "is it not the case that...?", equivalent to Latin nonne). Combined with the conditional clause and the negative verb "οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐποίουν," it introduces a strong affirmative question: "would they not have done them...?"
296dπολλοῦ δεῖ — An idiomatic use of the impersonal verb δεῖ, literally meaning "it lacks by much," hence expressing a strong denial: "far from it" or "by no means." The genitive πολλοῦ functions as a genitive of degree of difference.
296dὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι... — A construction where the ὅτι-clause acts in apposition to the relative pronoun ὃ, explaining its content: "that which our soul wished to say, namely, that..."

Cite this passage

Plato, Hippias Major §296. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:296

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