Humanitext Reader

Plato · Hippias Major §291

The Fig-Wood Ladle and Happiness as the Beautiful

Passage 7 of 20 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues that a ladle made of fig-wood is more appropriate and beautiful than a golden one for a soup pot, forcing Hippias to agree. Hippias then proposes a new definition of the beautiful, claiming that it is always most beautiful for a wealthy, healthy, and respected man to live to old age, bury his parents, and be buried magnificently by his offspring.

§291ΣΩ. μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἱππία·
SOCRATES: He is a very troublesome fellow, Hippias.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως τί φήσομεν;
But nevertheless, what shall we say?
ποτέραν πρέπειν τοῖν τορύναιν τῷ ἔτνει καὶ τῇ χύτρᾳ;
Which of the two ladles is appropriate for the soup and the pot?
ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὴν συκίνην;
Is it not clearly the one of fig-wood?
εὐωδέστερον γάρ που τὸ ἔτνος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἅμα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἑστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν·
For indeed it makes the soup more fragrant, and at the same time, my friend, it would not break our pot, spill the soup, extinguish the fire, and make those who are about to feast be without a very splendid dish.
ἡ δὲ χρυσῆ ἐκείνη πάντα ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ὥστʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν τὴν συκίνην ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι πρέπειν ἢ τὴν χρυσῆν, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
But that golden one would do all these things, so that it seems to me at least that we should say the fig-wood one is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you say something else.
ΙΠ. πρέπει μὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον· οὐ μεντἂν ἔγωγε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτῶντι διαλεγοίμην.
HIPPIAS: For indeed, Socrates, it is more appropriate; however, I would not converse with a man who asks such things.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ φίλε·
SOCRATES: Quite right, my friend.
σοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν πρέποι τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἀναπίμπλασθαι, καλῶς μὲν οὑτωσὶ ἀμπεχομένῳ, καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένῳ, εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
For it would not be appropriate for you to be defiled with such words, you who are so beautifully dressed, beautifully shod, and famous for wisdom among all the Greeks.
ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον·
But for me, it is no trouble to be mixed up with the man.
ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἀποκρίνου.
So instruct me beforehand and answer for my sake.
εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρέπει γε μᾶλλον ἡ συκίνη τῆς χρυσῆς, φήσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλο τι καὶ καλλίων ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδήπερ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον ὡμολόγησας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ πρέποντος; ἄλλο τι ὁμολογῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία, τὴν συκίνην καλλίω τῆς χρυσῆς εἶναι;
'For if indeed,' the man will say, 'the fig-wood one is more appropriate than the golden one, would it not also be more beautiful, since indeed you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than the inappropriate?' Shall we agree to anything else, Hippias, than that the fig-wood one is more beautiful than the golden one?
ΙΠ. βούλει σοι εἴπω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ εἰπὼν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἀπαλλάξεις σαυτὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων;
HIPPIAS: Do you want me to tell you, Socrates, what you may say the beautiful is, so as to rid yourself of these many words?
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μὴ μέντοι πρότερόν γε πρὶν ἄν μοι εἴπῃς ποτέραν ἀποκρίνωμαι οἷν ἄρτι ἔλεγον τοῖν τορύναιν πρέπουσάν τε καὶ καλλίω εἶναι.
SOCRATES: By all means indeed; however, not before you tell me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I should answer is both appropriate and more beautiful.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ, εἰ βούλει, αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι ὅτι ἡ ἐκ τῆς συκῆς εἰργασμένη.
HIPPIAS: Well, if you wish, answer him that it is the one made from the fig-tree.
ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ νυνὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἔμελλες λέγειν.
SOCRATES: Now say what you were just about to say.
ταύτῃ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἂν φῶ τὸ καλὸν χρυσὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ὡς ἔοικέ μοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον ὂν χρυσὸς ἢ ξύλον σύκινον·
For by this answer, if I say that the beautiful is gold, gold will seem to be in no way more beautiful than fig-wood.
τὸ δὲ νῦν τί αὖ λέγεις τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;
But now, what do you say in turn that the beautiful is?
ΙΠ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ.
HIPPIAS: I will tell you.
ζητεῖν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ φανεῖται.
For you seem to me to seek to answer with such a beautiful thing as will never appear ugly anywhere to anyone.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
SOCRATES: Exactly so, Hippias; and you understand beautifully now.
ΙΠ. ἄκουε δή· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτο ἴσθι, ἐάν τις ἔχῃ ὅτι ἀντείπῃ, φάναι ἐμὲ μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἐπαΐειν.
HIPPIAS: Listen then; for regarding this, know well that if anyone has anything to say against it, you may say that I understand absolutely nothing.
ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ ὡς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν.
SOCRATES: Speak then, by the gods, as quickly as possible.
ΙΠ. λέγω τοίνυν ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ κάλλιστον εἶναι ἀνδρί, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀφικομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι.
HIPPIAS: I say, then, that it is always and for everyone and everywhere most beautiful for a man, being wealthy, healthy, and honored by the Greeks, having reached old age and having beautifully laid out his own parents when they have died, to be buried beautifully and magnificently by his own offspring.
ΣΩ. ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Ἱππία, ἦ θαυμασίως τε καὶ μεγαλείως καὶ ἀξίως σαυτοῦ εἴρηκας·
SOCRATES: Oh my, Hippias! How wonderfully, magnificently, and worthily of yourself you have spoken.
καὶ νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς, καθʼ ὅσον οἷός τʼ εἶ, βοηθεῖν·
And by Hera, I admire you, because you seem to me to be helping kindly as far as you are able.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν, ἀλλʼ ἡμῶν δὴ νῦν καὶ πλεῖστον καταγελάσεται, εὖ ἴσθι.
But indeed, we are not catching the man; rather, he will now laugh at us most of all, know well.

Notes

  1. 291aοὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἑστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν — Among the three predicate verbs connected by καί, ἐκχέαι is the third-person singular aorist active optative (from ἐκχέω, easily confused with the aorist infinitive due to identical spelling), which is parallel to the subsequent ἀποσβέσειεν and ποιήσειεν (both third-person singular aorist optatives). The particle ἄν is repeated twice, once near the beginning (οὐκ ἄν) and once near the end (ἄνευ ὄψου ἄν), both forming a single potential optative construction. The participle συντρίψασα is feminine nominative singular, modifying the subject 'the fig-wood ladle (ἡ συκίνη)'.
  2. 291bἄλλο τι — The idiom ἄλλο τι (or ἄλλο τι ἤ) is used to elicit agreement, meaning 'is it not the case that...?' (equivalent to Latin 'nonne'). Here it is followed by καὶ ... ἂν εἴη (potential optative) and ὁμολογῶμεν (deliberative or hortatory subjunctive) to prompt agreement from the interlocutor.
  3. 291eτοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι — The dative participle περιστείλαντι modifies the dative noun ἀνδρί and its accompanying dative participles (πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, etc.) introduced at the beginning of the sentence. On the other hand, ταφῆναι is an aorist passive infinitive, serving as the subject of κάλλιστον εἶναι (or standing in apposition to it). The logical subject of this infinitive ταφῆναι is also the dative ἀνδρί.

Cite this passage

Plato, Hippias Major §291. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:291

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