§289ΣΩ. εἶεν· μανθάνω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἄρα χρὴ ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὸν ταῦτα ἐρωτῶντα τάδε· ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἄρα
πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν,
καὶ χυτρῶν ἡ καλλίστη αἰσχρὰ παρθένων γένει συμβάλλειν, ὥς φησιν Ἱππίας ὁ σοφός.
SOCRATES: Very well; I understand, Hippias, how then we must answer in reply to the one who asks these things: 'My good man, are you ignorant that Heraclitus' saying is correct, that indeed "the most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared to the class of humans," and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared to the class of maidens,' as Hippias the wise says?
οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ Ἱππία;
Is it not so, Hippias?
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω.
HIPPIAS: By all means indeed, Socrates, you have answered correctly.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή.
SOCRATES: Listen then.
μετὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι φήσει· τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες;
For after this I know well that he will say: 'What then, Socrates?
τὸ τῶν παρθένων γένος θεῶν γένει ἄν τις συμβάλλῃ, οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσεται ὅπερ τὸ τῶν χυτρῶν τῷ τῶν παρθένων συμβαλλόμενον;
If one compares the class of maidens to the class of gods, will it not suffer the same thing as the class of pots compared with that of maidens?
οὐχ ἡ καλλίστη παρθένος αἰσχρὰ φανεῖται;
Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly?
ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγει, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγῃ, ὅτι
ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν; ὁμολογήσωμεν, Ἱππία, τὴν καλλίστην παρθένον πρὸς θεῶν γένος αἰσχρὰν εἶναι;
Or does not Heraclitus himself say this very thing, whom you bring in, that "the wisest of men will appear a monkey compared to a god, both in wisdom and beauty and in all other things"?' Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly compared to the class of gods?
ΙΠ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀντείποι τούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HIPPIAS: For who could speak against this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἂν τοίνυν ταῦτα ὁμολογήσωμεν, γελάσεταί τε καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ Σώκρατες, μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἠρωτήθης; ἔγωγε, φήσω, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν. ἔπειτα,
φήσει,
ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνῃ ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, ὡς αὐτὸς φῄς, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν; ἔοικε, φήσω· ἢ τί μοι συμβουλεύεις, ὦ φίλε, φάναι; ΙΠ. τοῦτο ἔγωγε· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πρός γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖ.
SOCRATES: If then we agree to these things, he will both laugh and say: 'Socrates, do you remember then what you were asked?' 'I do indeed,' I shall say, 'what the beautiful itself is.' 'Then,' he will say, 'having been asked about the beautiful, do you answer what happens to be, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly?' 'It seems so,' I shall say; 'or what do you advise me, my friend, to say?' HIPPIAS: This is what I advise; for indeed compared with gods, he will speak the truth that the human race is not beautiful.
ΣΩ.
εἰ δέ σε ἠρόμην,
φήσει,
ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ἐστι καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἅπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο;
SOCRATES: 'But if I had asked you,' he will say, 'from the beginning what is beautiful and ugly, if you answered me what you have now answered, would you not have answered correctly?
ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτʼ εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα; ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ τοῦτό γε ζητεῖ, πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῷ τί ἐστι τὸ καλὸν ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται.
And does the beautiful itself, by which all other things are adorned and appear beautiful when that form is added, still seem to you to be a maiden or a horse or a lyre?' HIPPIAS: But indeed, Socrates, if he seeks this, it is the easiest of all things to answer him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and, when it is added, appear beautiful.
εὐηθέστατος οὖν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει περὶ καλῶν κτημάτων.
Therefore the man is extremely simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions.
ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐρωτᾷ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χρυσός, ἀπορήσει καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσει σε ἐλέγχειν.
For if you answer him that this beautiful which he asks about is nothing other than gold, he will be at a loss and will not attempt to refute you.
ἴσμεν γάρ που πάντες ὅτι ὅπου ἂν τοῦτο προσγένηται, κἂν πρότερον αἰσχρὸν φαίνηται, καλὸν φανεῖται χρυσῷ γε κοσμηθέν.
For we all know, I suppose, that wherever this is added, even if it appeared ugly before, it will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
ΣΩ. ἄπειρος εἶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς σχέτλιός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ῥᾳδίως ἀποδεχόμενος.
SOCRATES: You are inexperienced with the man, Hippias, how troublesome he is and accepting nothing easily.
§290ΙΠ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HIPPIAS: What of it, Socrates?
τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢ μὴ ἀποδεχομένῳ καταγελάστῳ εἶναι.
For what is correctly said he must accept, or not accepting it, be ridiculous.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ ταύτην γε τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ πάνυ με καὶ τωθάσεται, καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ, Φειδίαν οἴει κακὸν εἶναι δημιουργόν; καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἐρῶ ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν. ΙΠ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
SOCRATES: And indeed this answer, my best of friends, he will not only not accept, but he will mock me thoroughly and say: 'You puffed-up fool, do you think Phidias was a bad craftsman?' And I think I shall say: 'Not in the least.' HIPPIAS: And you will speak correctly indeed, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι.
SOCRATES: Correctly indeed.
τοιγάρτοι ἐκεῖνος, ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δημιουργὸν τὸν Φειδίαν,
εἶτα,
φήσει,
οἴει τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὃ σὺ λέγεις ἠγνόει Φειδίας; καὶ ἐγώ· τί μάλιστα; φήσω.
Therefore he, when I agree that Phidias is a good craftsman, 'Then,' he will say, 'do you think Phidias was ignorant of this beautiful which you speak of?' And I: 'Why especially?' I shall say.
ὅτι,
ἐρεῖ,
τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὂν κάλλιστον ἔμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐλεφάντινον·
'Because,' he will say, 'he did not make the eyes of Athena of gold, nor the rest of the face, nor the feet, nor the hands—if indeed being of gold would have made them appear most beautiful—but of ivory.
δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξήμαρτεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι χρυσὸς ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται. ταῦτα οὖν λέγοντι τί ἀποκρινώμεθα, ὦ Ἱππία;
Clearly he erred in this through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold that makes all things beautiful wherever it is added.' What then shall we answer him when he says these things, Hippias?
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν χαλεπόν· ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθῶς ἐποίησε.
HIPPIAS: Nothing difficult; for we shall say that he did correctly.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλεφάντινον οἶμαι καλόν ἐστιν.
For the ivory also, I think, is beautiful.
ΣΩ.
τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα,
φήσει,
οὐ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλεφάντινα ἠργάσατο, ἀλλὰ λίθινα, ὡς οἷόν τʼ ἦν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λίθου τῷ ἐλέφαντι ἐξευρών;
SOCRATES: 'For what reason then,' he will say, 'did he not also work the middle of the eyes in ivory, but of stone, having found out the likeness of the stone to ivory as much as possible?
ἢ καὶ ὁ λίθος ὁ καλὸς καλόν ἐστι; φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Or is a beautiful stone also a beautiful thing?' Shall we say so, Hippias?
ΙΠ. φήσομεν μέντοι, ὅταν γε πρέπων ᾖ.
HIPPIAS: We shall indeed say so, at least when it is appropriate.
ΣΩ.
ὅταν δὲ μὴ πρέπων, αἰσχρόν; ὁμολογῶ ἢ μή;
SOCRATES: 'But when it is not appropriate, is it ugly?' Shall I agree or not?
ΙΠ. ὁμολόγει, ὅταν γε μὴ πρέπῃ.
HIPPIAS: Agree, at least when it is not appropriate.
ΣΩ.
τί δὲ δή; ὁ ἐλέφας καὶ ὁ χρυσός,
φήσει,
ὦ σοφὲ σύ, οὐχ ὅταν μὲν πρέπῃ, καλὰ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ μή, αἰσχρά; ἔξαρνοι ἐσόμεθα ἢ ὁμολογήσομεν αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτόν;
SOCRATES: 'What then?' he will say, 'you wise man, do not ivory and gold, when they are appropriate, make things appear beautiful, but when not, ugly?' Shall we deny it or agree with him that he speaks correctly?
ΙΠ. ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πρέπῃ ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον.
HIPPIAS: We shall agree to this indeed, that whatever is appropriate to each makes each beautiful.
ΣΩ.
πότερον οὖν πρέπει,
φήσει,
ὅταν τις τὴν χύτραν ἣν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὴν καλήν, ἕψῃ ἔτνους καλοῦ μεστήν, χρυσῆ τορύνη αὐτῇ ἢ συκίνη; ΙΠ. Ἡράκλεις, οἷον λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
SOCRATES: 'Which of the two then is appropriate,' he will say, 'when someone cooks that beautiful pot which we were just speaking of, full of good soup—a golden ladle or one of fig-wood?' HIPPIAS: Heracles! What a kind of man you speak of, Socrates.
οὐ βούλει μοι εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν;
Will you not tell me who he is?
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἴ σοι εἴποιμι τοὔνομα.
SOCRATES: For you would not know if I told you his name.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε γιγνώσκω, ὅτι ἀμαθής τίς ἐστιν.
HIPPIAS: But even now indeed I know that he is some unlearned fellow.