Plato · Hippias Major §288

Objections Based on a Mare, a Lyre, and a Pot

Passage 5 of 20 · Greek

Summary

Socrates begins a simulated dialogue with his imaginary interlocutor using Hippias' definition of the beautiful maiden, showing how the interlocutor would challenge them with other beautiful objects such as a mare, a lyre, and eventually a soup-pot.

§288ΣΩ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Ἱππία, νὴ τὸν κύνα καὶ εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω.

SOCRATES: Splendidly indeed, Hippias, by the dog, and with high reputation have you answered.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, τὸ ἐρωτώμενόν τε ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ;

Is it then anything else than that, if I answer this, I shall have answered what is asked, and correctly, and shall never be refuted?

ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐλεγχθείης, ὅ γε πᾶσιν δοκεῖ καὶ πάντες σοι μαρτυρήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεις;

HIPPIAS: For how indeed, Socrates, could you be refuted, since this at least seems so to everyone and all who hear will bear witness to you that you speak correctly?

ΣΩ. εἶεν· πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

SOCRATES: Very well; by all means.

φέρε δή, ὦ Ἱππία, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις.

Come now, Hippias, let me take up for myself what you say.

ὁ μὲν ἐρήσεταί με οὑτωσί πως· ἴθι μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῂς καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καλά; ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν, ἔστι διʼ ὃ ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καλά;

He will ask me in some such way: 'Go on, Socrates, answer me: all these things which you say are beautiful, if the beautiful itself is something, would these be beautiful?' And I indeed shall say that if a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing, is there that by which these things would be beautiful?

ΙΠ. οἴει οὖν ἔτι αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν σε ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ καλόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθαι;

HIPPIAS: Do you think then that he will still attempt to refute you, as if what you say were not beautiful, or if he does attempt, that he will not be ridiculous?

ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει, ὦ θαυμάσιε, εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει.

SOCRATES: That he will attempt, my wonderful friend, I know well; but whether, having attempted, he will be ridiculous, the thing itself will show.

ἃ μέντοι ἐρεῖ, ἐθέλω σοι λέγειν.

However, what he will say, I am willing to tell you.

ΙΠ. λέγε δή.

HIPPIAS: Tell me then.

ΣΩ. ὡς γλυκὺς εἶ, φήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

SOCRATES: 'How sweet you are,' he will say, 'Socrates!

θήλεια δὲ ἵππος καλὴ οὐ καλόν, ἣν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ ἐπῄνεσεν; τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;

But is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing, which even the god praised in the oracle?' What shall we say, Hippias?

ἄλλο τι ἢ φῶμεν καὶ τὴν ἵππον καλὸν εἶναι, τήν γε καλήν;

Is it anything else than that we should assert that the mare also is a beautiful thing, at least the beautiful one?

πῶς γὰρ ἂν τολμῷμεν ἔξαρνοι εἶναι τὸ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;

For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful is beautiful?

ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεί τοι καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν· πάγκαλαι γὰρ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἵπποι γίγνονται.

HIPPIAS: You speak the truth, Socrates; since indeed the god also said this correctly; for extremely beautiful mares are bred among us.

ΣΩ. εἶεν, φήσει δή· τί δὲ λύρα καλή;

SOCRATES: 'Very well,' he will surely say; 'but what of a beautiful lyre?

οὐ καλόν; φῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;

Is it not a beautiful thing?' Shall we say so, Hippias?

ΙΠ. ναί.

HIPPIAS: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἐρεῖ τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐκεῖνος, σχεδόν τι εὖ οἶδα ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τεκμαιρόμενος· ὦ βέλτιστε σύ, τί δὲ χύτρα καλή;

SOCRATES: Then after this he will say, I am pretty much sure, judging from his character: 'O you best of men, but what of a beautiful soup-pot?

οὐ καλὸν ἄρα; ΙΠ. ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;

Is it not then a beautiful thing?' HIPPIAS: Socrates, who is this man?

ὡς ἀπαίδευτός τις ὃς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα ὀνομάζειν τολμᾷ ἐν σεμνῷ πράγματι.

How uneducated someone must be, who dares to utter such vulgar words in a solemn matter!

ΣΩ. τοιοῦτός τις, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός, οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἀποκριτέον τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι·

SOCRATES: He is such a one, Hippias, not elegant but vulgar, caring for nothing else than the truth.

εἴπερ ἡ χύτρα κεκεραμευμένη εἴη ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ κεραμέως λεία καὶ στρογγύλη καὶ καλῶς ὠπτημένη, οἷαι τῶν καλῶν χυτρῶν εἰσί τινες δίωτοι, τῶν ἓξ χοᾶς χωρουσῶν, πάγκαλαι, εἰ τοιαύτην ἐρωτῴη χύτραν, καλὴν ὁμολογητέον εἶναι.

But nevertheless, the man must be answered, and I for my part declare beforehand: if the pot should have been made by a good potter, smooth and round and well-baked, like some of the beautiful pots with two handles, of those holding six choes, which are extremely beautiful—if he should ask about such a pot, we must agree that it is beautiful.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν καλὸν ὂν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;

For how could we say that what is beautiful is not beautiful?

ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

HIPPIAS: By no means, Socrates.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ χύτρα, φήσει, καλὴ καλόν; ἀποκρίνου.

SOCRATES: 'Therefore is not also,' he will say, 'a beautiful pot a beautiful thing?

ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχει, οἶμαι· καλὸν μὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σκεῦός ἐστι καλῶς εἰργασμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον κρίνειν ὡς ὂν καλὸν πρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ παρθένον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά.

Answer!' HIPPIAS: Well, so it is, Socrates, I think; this vessel also, when well-crafted, is indeed a beautiful thing, but as a whole, this is not worthy to be judged as being beautiful in comparison with both a mare and a maiden and all other beautiful things.

Notes

288aἄλλο τι οὖν — The idiom ἄλλο τι ἤ or simply ἄλλο τι is used at the beginning of a sentence to introduce a question expecting an affirmative answer, meaning 'is it not the case that...?' or 'is it anything else than...?' In this instance, the conjunction ἤ is omitted.
288aἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι — This is a periphrastic future perfect construction, combining the future tense auxiliary verb ἔσομαι with the perfect participle ἀποκεκριμένος. It emphasizes that a state of having completed an action will exist at a future point in time.
288aεἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καλά; — The conjunction εἰ introduces a conditional clause, and τί is an indefinite pronoun ('something', 'some reality') rather than an interrogative pronoun. This refers back to the agreement in the preceding section (287c-d) that the beautiful itself is 'some reality' (ὄντι γέ τινι). Thus, it translates to: 'if the beautiful itself is indeed something, would these things be beautiful?'
288bοὐ καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθαι — This is an accusative and infinitive construction dependent on the main verb οἴει ('do you think?'). The implicit subject of the infinitive ἔσεσθαι is the same as the previous sentence's αὐτόν ('him'), meaning '(do you think) that he himself will not be ridiculous?'
288cἔξαρνοι εἶναι — The adjective ἔξαρνος combined with εἰμί forms a phrasal verb meaning 'to deny', which takes an infinitive. Following the rule of negative redundancy in Greek, a redundant negative particle μή is added to the dependent infinitive (μὴ καλὸν εἶναι), so the expression translates to 'to deny that the beautiful is beautiful' (i.e., admitting that it is indeed beautiful).
288eπρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ παρθένον — The preposition πρός followed by the accusative case indicates a standard of comparison, meaning 'in comparison with' or 'relative to'. It sets up the contrast between the beauty of a common household vessel (a pot) and higher-order beauties such as a mare or a maiden.

Cite this passage

Plato, Hippias Major §288. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:288

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