§286ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔχεις· ὥστʼ ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοι χαίρουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότι, καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως μυθολογῆσαι.
SOCRATES: You speak the truth, but I did not realize that you possess a memory-art; so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they use you just as children use old women for the sake of hearing stories agreeably.
ΙΠ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι ηὐδοκίμησα διεξιὼν ἃ χρὴ τὸν νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν.
HIPPIAS: And by Zeus, Socrates, just recently I won high acclaim there by expounding on beautiful pursuits, what a young man ought to pursue.
ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκείμενος, καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι· πρόσχημα δέ μοί ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις τοῦ λόγου.
For I have a speech about them beautifully composed, and in other respects well-arranged in its words; and its introduction and beginning is something like this.
ἐπειδὴ ἡ Τροία ἥλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος Νέστορα ἔροιτο ποῖά ἐστι καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὢν εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο·
When Troy was captured, the story says that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what kind of beautiful pursuits they are, which, if a young man practiced, he would become most highly acclaimed.
μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα.
After this, Nestor is speaking and suggesting to him very many and beautiful customs.
τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ ἐνθάδε μέλλω ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου διδασκαλείῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς· ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὔδικος ὁ Ἀπημάντου.
This I displayed there, and here I am going to display it the day after tomorrow, in the school of Phidostratus, along with many other things worthy of hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, requested it of me.
ἀλλʼ ὅπως παρέσῃ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα.
But mind that you attend yourself and bring others who are capable, having heard, of judging what is said.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, ὦ Ἱππία.
SOCRATES: That shall be so, if God wills, Hippias.
νυνὶ μέντοι βραχύ τί μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπόκριναι· καὶ γάρ με εἰς καλὸν ὑπέμνησας.
For now, however, answer me a brief question about it; for you have reminded me in the nick of time.
ἔναγχος γάρ τις, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰς ἀπορίαν με κατέβαλεν ἐν λόγοις τισὶ τὰ μὲν ψέγοντα ὡς αἰσχρά, τὰ δʼ ἐπαινοῦντα ὡς καλά, οὕτω πως ἐρόμενος καὶ μάλα ὑβριστικῶς· πόθεν δέ μοι σύ,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα ὁποῖα καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά;
For recently, my excellent friend, someone threw me into perplexity in some discussions, when I was censuring some things as ugly and praising others as beautiful, by asking me in some such way, and very insultingly: 'Socrates, from where do you know what sort of things are beautiful and ugly?
ἐπεὶ φέρε, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν; καὶ ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε καὶ οὐκ εἶχον αὐτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι·
Come now, could you say what the beautiful is?' And I, because of my worthlessness, was perplexed and was not able to answer him properly.
ἀπιὼν οὖν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῷ τε ὠργιζόμην καὶ ὠνείδιζον, καὶ ἠπείλουν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ὑμῶν τῳ τῶν σοφῶν ἐντύχοιμι, ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν καὶ ἐκμελετήσας ἰέναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα, ἀναμαχούμενος τὸν λόγον.
Going away, therefore, from the gathering, I was angry with myself and reproached myself, and threatened that as soon as I should meet one of you wise men, I would listen, learn, and practice thoroughly, and then go back to the questioner to fight the battle of the argument again.
νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω, εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις, καί με δίδαξον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ἐστί, καὶ πειρῶ μοι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον αὖθις γέλωτα ὄφλω.
Now, therefore, as I say, you have come in the nick of time, so teach me sufficiently what the beautiful itself is, and try to answer me as accurately as possible, lest I be refuted a second time and incur ridicule again.
οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου σαφῶς, καὶ σμικρόν που τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη μάθημα ὧν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.
For you surely know it clearly, and this would be a small lesson among the many you understand.
ΙΠ. σμικρὸν μέντοι νὴ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.
HIPPIAS: Small indeed, by Zeus, Socrates, and of no value, so to speak.
ΣΩ. ῥᾳδίως ἄρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδείς με ἐξελέγξει ἔτι.
SOCRATES: Easily then I shall learn it, and no one will refute me anymore.
§287ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς μέντοι· φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.
HIPPIAS: No one indeed; for otherwise my business would be paltry and unprofessional.
ΣΩ. εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰ χειρωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα.
SOCRATES: By Hera, you speak well, Hippias, if we are to master the man.
ἀτὰρ μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον, ἐὰν σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι τῶν λόγων, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστά με ἐκμελετήσῃς;
But does it prevent anything if I, mimicking him, object to your arguments while you are answering, so that you may train me as much as possible?
σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῶν ἀντιλήψεων.
For I am pretty much experienced in objections.
εἰ οὖν μή τί σοι διαφέρει, βούλομαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἵνʼ ἐρρωμενέστερον μάθω.
If, then, it makes no difference to you, I wish to object, so that I may learn more robustly.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ ἀντιλαμβάνου.
HIPPIAS: Well, object then.
καὶ γάρ, ὃ νυνδὴ εἶπον, οὐ μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγώ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδένα ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαί σε ἐξελέγχειν.
For, as I said just now, the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer far more difficult questions than this, so that no human being would be able to refute you.
ΣΩ. φεῦ ὡς εὖ λέγεις·
SOCRATES: Oh, how well you speak!
ἀλλʼ ἄγʼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ κελεύεις, φέρε ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος γενόμενος πειρῶμαί σε ἐρωτᾶν.
But come, since you also bid it, let me try to question you by becoming him as much as possible.
εἰ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐπιδείξαις ὃν φῄς, τὸν περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀκούσας, ἐπειδὴ παύσαιο λέγων, ἔροιτʼ ἂν οὐ περὶ ἄλλου πρότερον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ—ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτʼ ἔχει—καὶ εἴποι ἄν· ὦ ξένε Ἠλεῖε, ἆρʼ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι; ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἐκείνου ἐρωτῶντος.
For if you were to display this speech of yours to him which you mention, about beautiful pursuits, having heard it, when you stopped speaking, he would ask about nothing else first than about the beautiful—for he has some such habit—and he would say: 'O stranger of Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just?' Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning.
ΙΠ. ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι δικαιοσύνῃ.
HIPPIAS: I will answer that it is by justice.
ΣΩ.
οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἡ δικαιοσύνη;
SOCRATES: Then this is something, namely justice?
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIPPIAS: Quite so.
ΣΩ.
οὐκοῦν καὶ σοφίᾳ οἱ σοφοί εἰσι σοφοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἀγαθά;
SOCRATES: Then also by wisdom the wise are wise, and by the good all good things are good?
ΙΠ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
HIPPIAS: How indeed could they not be?
ΣΩ.
οὖσί γέ τισι τούτοις·
SOCRATES: These being indeed something?
οὐ γὰρ δήπου μὴ οὖσί γε.
For surely they are not non-existent.
ΙΠ. οὖσι μέντοι.
HIPPIAS: Being indeed.
ΣΩ.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἐστι καλά;
SOCRATES: Are not then also all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?
ΙΠ. ναί, τῷ καλῷ.
HIPPIAS: Yes, by the beautiful.
ΣΩ.
ὄντι γέ τινι τούτῳ;
SOCRATES: This being indeed something?
ΙΠ. ὄντι· ἀλλὰ τί γὰρ μέλλει;
HIPPIAS: Being indeed; for what else could it be?
ΣΩ.
εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ξένε,
φήσει,
τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν; ΙΠ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται πυθέσθαι τί ἐστι καλόν;
SOCRATES: 'Say then, stranger,' he will say, 'what is this, the beautiful?' HIPPIAS: Is it anything else, Socrates, that the one asking this wants to learn than what is beautiful?
ΣΩ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.
SOCRATES: It does not seem so to me, but what the beautiful itself is, Hippias.
ΙΠ. καὶ τί διαφέρει τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου;
HIPPIAS: And how does this differ from that?
ΣΩ. οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ;
SOCRATES: Does it seem to you to differ in no way?
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.
HIPPIAS: No, for it differs in no way.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι σὺ κάλλιον οἶσθα.
SOCRATES: But indeed it is clear that you know better.
ὅμως δέ, ὠγαθέ, ἄθρει· ἐρωτᾷ γάρ σε οὐ τί ἐστι καλόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.
Nevertheless, my good friend, look closely; for he is not asking you what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.
ΙΠ. μανθάνω, ὠγαθέ, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γε αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ.
HIPPIAS: I understand, my good friend, and I will indeed answer him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be refuted.
ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.
For, Socrates, know well, if the truth must be told, a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.