§98ΣΩ. τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον —οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν.
SOC. To possess one of his works untied is not worth any great value, just like a runaway slave—for it does not stay—but tied it is worth a lot; for the works are very beautiful.
πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα;
With regard to what indeed do I say this?
πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς.
With regard to true opinions.
καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντʼ ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ.
For true opinions too, as long as they stay, are a beautiful thing and do all good things; but they do not wish to stay for a long time, but run away from the soul of a human, so that they are not worth much, until someone ties them down by the calculation of the cause.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται.
And this, companion Meno, is recollection, as has been agreed by us in the previous parts.
ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.
But when they are tied, first they become knowledges, and then permanent; and indeed for these reasons knowledge is more precious than right opinion, and knowledge differs from right opinion by a bond.
ΜΕΝ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.
MEN. By Zeus, Socrates, it seems like something of this sort.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δʼ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.
SOC. And indeed I too speak as one who does not know, but guessing; but that right opinion and knowledge are indeed something different, I do not think I am entirely guessing this, but if indeed I would say that I know any other thing—and I would say but few—this too is one of those things I would place among what I know.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.
MEN. And you speak indeed correctly, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOC. What then?
τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη;
Is this not correct, that true opinion when guiding achieves the work of each action no worse than knowledge?
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
MEN. In this too you seem to me to speak the truth.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.
SOC. Right opinion, therefore, will be no worse nor less beneficial for actions than knowledge, nor will the man who has right opinion be worse than the one who has knowledge.
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
MEN. That is so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.
SOC. And indeed the good man has been agreed by us to be beneficial.
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον διʼ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, οὔτʼ ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;
SOC. Since, therefore, it is not only through knowledge that men would be good and beneficial to their cities, if indeed they were, but also through right opinion, and neither of these two is by nature present in humans, neither knowledge nor true opinion, nor acquired—or does either of them seem to you to be by nature?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
MEN. Not to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.
SOC. Therefore, since they are not by nature, the good would not be by nature either.
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
MEN. Certainly not.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.
SOC. And since indeed they are not by nature, we examined after this whether it is teachable.
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή;
SOC. Therefore, did it seem to be teachable, if virtue is prudence?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι;
SOC. And if indeed it were teachable, would it be prudence?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;
SOC. And if indeed there were teachers, would it be teachable, but with none existing, not teachable?
ΜΕΝ. οὕτω.
MEN. So.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους;
SOC. But indeed we agreed that there are no teachers of it?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
MEN. That is so.
ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;
SOC. Did we agree, then, that it is neither teachable nor is it prudence?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;
SOC. But indeed we agree that it is a good thing?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον;
SOC. And that what guides correctly is beneficial and good?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.