§99ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται— τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται—ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
SOC. And indeed, that which guides correctly is only these two things, true opinion and knowledge, possessing which a human guides correctly—for things that happen correctly by some chance do not happen through human guidance—but of the things in which a human is a guide toward what is correct, these are the two, true opinion and knowledge.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.
MEN. It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;
SOC. Therefore, since it is not teachable, virtue is no longer knowledge, is it?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ φαίνεται.
MEN. It does not appear so.
ΣΩ. δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.
SOC. Of the two things, then, that are good and beneficial, one has been released, and knowledge would not be the guide in political action.
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
MEN. It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν· διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ διʼ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.
SOC. Therefore, it was not by some wisdom, nor because they were wise, that such men guided their cities—men like Themistocles and those whom Anytus here was just mentioning; which is indeed why they were not able to make others such as they themselves are, inasmuch as they were not such through knowledge.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.
MEN. It seems to be so, Socrates, as you say.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.
SOC. Therefore, if not by knowledge, it remains that it occurs indeed by right opinion; by using which political men keep their cities straight, being in no way different with respect to prudence than oracle-singers and divine prophets; for these too, being inspired, say many true things, but they know nothing of what they say.
ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.
MEN. It is likely to be so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι;
SOC. Therefore, Meno, is it not right to call these men divine, who, having no intellect, succeed in many great things in what they do and say?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρʼ ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.
SOC. Correctly then would we call divine those whom we were just speaking of, oracle-singers and prophets and all the poets; and we would say that political men are no less divine than these and are inspired, being breathed into and possessed by the god, when they succeed in saying many great things, knowing nothing of what they say.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα,
θεῖος ἀνήρ,
φασίν,
οὗτος.
SOC. And indeed, Meno, women too, I suppose, call good men divine; and the Laconians, whenever they praise some good man, say: "A divine man, this one." MEN.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
And they seem indeed, Socrates, to speak correctly.
καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.
And yet, perhaps Anytus here is annoyed with you for saying this.
§100ΣΩ. οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα·
SOC. It does not matter to me at all.
εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν.
With him, Meno, we will converse on another occasion; but if now we have searched and spoken beautifully in this whole conversation, virtue would be present neither by nature nor by being teachable, but coming to be by divine dispensation without intellect in those to whom it comes, unless there should be some such person among the political men who is able to make another also political.
εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.
And if there were, this man would be said to be almost such a one among the living as Homer said Tiresias was among the dead, saying of him that "he alone possesses consciousness among those in Hades, while the others flit as shadows." In the same way here too, such a person would be like a true reality in relation to virtue, as if among shadows.
ΜΕΝ. κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. You seem to me to speak most beautifully, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἔστιν ἀρετή.
SOC. From this reasoning then, Meno, virtue appears to come to us by divine dispensation, to those to whom it comes; but the clear truth about it we shall know then, when, before inquiring in what way virtue comes to humans, we first attempt to search for virtue itself by itself, what on earth it is.
νῦν δʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρᾳότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.
But now it is time for me to go somewhere, and you, persuade this guest Anytus of these very same things of which you yourself have been persuaded, so that he may be gentler; since if you persuade him, there is a way in which you will also benefit the Athenians.