§96ΣΩ. ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,—
"
εἰ δʼ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
"
λέγει πως ὅτι—
"
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον
"
οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ—
"
οὔ ποτʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν.
SOC. But in other verses, having moved on a little,— "And if it were a thing that could be made," he says, "and a mind implanted in a man," he says somehow that— "many and great rewards would they have carried off," namely those capable of doing this, and— "never would a bad son have been born from a good father, by obeying wise counsels.
ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθόν. "
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῳ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τἀναντία λέγει;
But by teaching, you will never make the bad man good." Do you realize that he himself says the opposite to himself again about the same things?
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
MEN. It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ;
SOC. Can you then tell of any other matter whatsoever, of which those who claim to be teachers are not only not acknowledged to be teachers of others, but not even to know it themselves, but to be bad in regard to this very matter of which they claim to be teachers, while those who are themselves acknowledged to be gentlemen sometimes say it is teachable, and sometimes not?
τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;
Would you then say that those who are so confused about any matter whatsoever are teachers in the proper sense?
ΜΕΝ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
MEN. No, by Zeus, not I.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;
SOC. Therefore, if neither the sophists nor those who are themselves gentlemen are teachers of the matter, is it clear that no others, at least, would be?
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
MEN. I do not think so.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
SOC. But if there are no teachers, are there no disciples either?
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.
MEN. It seems to me to be as you say.
ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
SOC. And we have agreed, have we not, that a matter of which there are neither teachers nor disciples is not even teachable?
ΜΕΝ. ὡμολογήκαΜΕΝ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;
MEN. We have agreed. SOC. Therefore, are there nowhere apparent teachers of virtue?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
MEN. That is so.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
SOC. But if there are no teachers, are there no disciples either?
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται οὕτως.
MEN. It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;
SOC. Virtue, then, would not be teachable?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα.
MEN. It does not seem so, if indeed we have examined correctly.
ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδʼ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.
And so I wonder indeed, Socrates, whether there are ever even any good men, or what would be the manner of the generation of those who become good.
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος.
SOC. We risk, Meno, you and I, being some poor sort of men, and Gorgias not having educated you sufficiently, nor Prodicus me.
παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει· λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.
More than anything, then, we must turn our mind to ourselves, and seek whoever will make us better in some way or other; and I say this looking back to our recent inquiry, how we ridiculously failed to notice that it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that human affairs are done rightly and well, which is perhaps also why knowing in what manner good men come to be escapes us.
ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
MEN. How do you mean this, Socrates?
§97ΣΩ. ὧδε·
SOC.
ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι·
In this way: that good men must be beneficial, we correctly agreed on this point, that it could not be otherwise; is that not so?
ἦ γάρ;
MEN.
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;
SOC. And that they will be beneficial, if they guide our affairs correctly, on this too we presumably agreed well?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.
SOC. But that it is not possible to guide correctly unless one is prudent, in this we are like those who have not agreed correctly.
ΜΕΝ. πῶς δὴ λέγεις;
MEN. How indeed do you mean?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ.
SOC. I will say.
εἰ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;
If someone who knows the way to Larissa, or wherever else you wish, should walk and guide others, would he not guide correctly and well?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδʼ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;
SOC. What if someone has a correct opinion about which way it is, but has never gone there nor has knowledge of it, would he too not guide correctly?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἕως γʼ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.
SOC. And as long as he has a correct opinion about those things of which the other has knowledge, he will be no worse a guide, believing what is true but not being prudent, than the one who is prudent about this.
ΜΕΝ. οὐδὲν γάρ.
MEN. Not at all.
ΣΩ. δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως·
SOC. True opinion, therefore, is no worse a guide than prudence for correctness of action.
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.
And this is what we just now left out in our inquiry about virtue, as to what kind of thing it is, when we said that prudence alone guides right action; but after all, true opinion was also doing this.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικέ γε.
MEN. It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.
SOC. Right opinion, then, is no less beneficial than knowledge.
ΜΕΝ. τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ.
MEN. Except for this, Socrates, that the one who has knowledge would always succeed, whereas the one with right opinion would sometimes succeed, and sometimes not.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις;
SOC. How do you mean?
ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;
Would not the one who always has right opinion always succeed, as long as he has right opinions?
ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται·
MEN.
ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ διʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.
It seems necessary to me; so that I wonder, Socrates, with this being so, why indeed knowledge is ever much more precious than right opinion, and why the one is different from the other.
ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν διʼ ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;
SOC. Do you know then why you wonder, or shall I tell you?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γʼ εἰπέ.
MEN. By all means tell me.
ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδʼ ἔστιν παρʼ ὑμῖν.
SOC. Because you have not paid attention to the statues of Daedalus; but perhaps they are not even among you.
ΜΕΝ. πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;
MEN. With regard to what indeed do you say this?
ΣΩ. ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.
SOC. Because these too, if they are not tied, run away and escape, but if tied, they stay.
ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή;
MEN. What of it then?