§87ΣΩ. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι
οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε· εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν.
SOC. I mean "from a hypothesis" in this way, just as geometers often examine when someone asks them, for example about an area, whether it is possible for this area to be inscribed in this circle as a triangle, a geometer would say: "I do not yet know whether this area is of such a kind, but I think I have, as it were, a certain hypothesis useful for the matter, as follows: if this area is of such a kind that, when one applies it along its given line, it falls short by an area of such a kind as the applied figure itself is, one consequence seems to me to follow, and another, again, if it is impossible for these things to happen.
ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθʼ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν;
Having hypothesized, therefore, I am willing to tell you what follows concerning its inscription in the circle, whether it is impossible or not." Thus, then, let us also do concerning virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what sort of thing it is; let us examine it by hypothesizing whether it is teachable or not teachable, speaking as follows: if virtue is what sort of thing among those existing in the soul, would it be teachable or not teachable?
πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα—ἀλλʼ ἆρα διδακτόν;
First, indeed, if it is other than of such a kind as knowledge, is it teachable or not, or, as we were just now saying, recollectable?—let it make no difference to us which of the two names we use—but is it teachable?
ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;
Or is this at least clear to everyone, that a human being is taught nothing else than knowledge?
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
MEN. It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.
SOC. But if indeed virtue is a certain knowledge, it is clear that it would be teachable.
ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
MEN. How could it not be?
ΣΩ. τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δʼ οὔ.
SOC. From this indeed we have quickly got rid of, that if it is of this kind it is teachable, but if of that kind, not.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
SOC. After this indeed, as it seems, we must examine whether virtue is knowledge or other than knowledge.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.
MEN. It seems to me too that this is what must be examined after this.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή;
SOC. What indeed?
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;
Do we say that virtue itself is something good, and does this hypothesis remain for us, that it is something good?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
MEN. By all means.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τινʼ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιΜΕΝ.
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
SOC. Therefore, if indeed there is some good that is also other than and separated from knowledge, virtue might perhaps not be a certain knowledge; but if there is no good which knowledge does not encompass, we would be suspecting correctly in suspecting it to be a certain knowledge. MEN. That is so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γʼ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;
SOC. And indeed, is it by virtue that we are good?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα.
SOC. And if good, useful; for all good things are useful.
οὐχί;
Is it not so?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;
SOC. And so virtue indeed is something useful?
ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.
MEN. It is necessary from what has been agreed.
ΣΩ. σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ.
SOC. Let us then examine, taking up each one, what sort of things they are that benefit us.
ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.
Health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and indeed wealth; we say these and such things are useful.
οὐχί;
Is it not so?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.