Humanitext Reader

Plato · Meno §86

Immortality of the Soul and Inquiry by Hypothesis

Passage 11 of 20 · Greek

Summary

Socrates derives the immortality of the soul from the fact that truth is always in it, asserting the importance of inquiring into what one does not know. Yielding to Meno's insistence, he agrees to examine whether virtue is teachable by using a hypothesis, without first defining what virtue is.

§86ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;
SOC. But if he did not acquire it in this present life, is it not already clear that he possessed it and had learned it in some other time?
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
MEN. It appears so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ὅτʼ οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος;
SOC. Then is this not the time when he was not a human being?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ὅν τʼ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ;
SOC. If, then, both during the time when he is a human being and when he is not, there are true opinions in him which, when awakened by questioning, become knowledge, will his soul not have been in a state of having learned for all time?
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
For it is clear that for all time he either is or is not a human being.
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
MEN. It appears so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος—ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι;
SOC. Therefore, if the truth of reality is always in our soul, the soul must be immortal, so that one should take courage and try to seek and recollect what one does not happen to know now—that is, what one does not remember?
ΜΕΝ. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως.
MEN. You seem to me to speak well, Socrates, though I do not know how.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων.
SOC. I think so too of myself, Meno.
καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δʼ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.
And while I would not confidentially assert the other points on behalf of the argument, yet that we would be better, more courageous, and less idle if we believe that one must inquire into what one does not know, rather than if we should think that what we do not know is neither possible to find nor necessary to inquire into—about this I would fight to the end, if I were able, both in word and in deed.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. In this too, Socrates, you seem to me to speak well.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀρετή;
SOC. Do you wish then, since we agree that we must inquire into what one does not know, that we should attempt to inquire together into what virtue actually is?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
MEN. By all means.
οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Not that indeed, Socrates, but I would most gladly examine and hear about that which I asked at the very beginning: whether we should set about it as something teachable, or as coming by nature, or in whatever way virtue comes to human beings.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδʼ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι—τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; —ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν.
SOC. But if I ruled, Meno, not only myself but also you, we would not have examined whether virtue is teachable or not teachable, before we had first inquired into what it actually is; but since you do not even attempt to rule yourself, in order that you may be free, but do attempt to rule me and actually rule me, I shall yield to you—for what else can one do?—and so it seems we must examine what sort of thing it is, when we do not yet know what it is.
εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν.
If nothing else, then, slacken your rule over me just a little, and allow it to be examined from a hypothesis, whether it is teachable or whatever.

Notes

  1. 86aεἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών — The aorist participle `λαβών` forms a conditional clause with `εἰ δὲ μή`, referring back to the previous context (such as §85e `εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη`) to mean "but if he did not acquire it in this present life."
  2. 86aμεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται — The combination of the perfect active participle feminine singular `μεμαθηκυῖα` and the future third person singular of `εἰμί` (`ἔσται`) forms a periphrastic future perfect, indicating that the subject, the soul (`ἡ ψυχὴ`), "will have been in a state of having learned" for all time.
  3. 86bὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος— — `τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος` employs the construction of `τυγχάνω` + participle, meaning "what you do not happen to know now." In `ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος`, the copula (here the second person singular `εἶ`) is omitted after the perfect participle `μεμνημένος`, meaning "what you do not remember."
  4. 86dἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον... οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα — A counterfactual conditional construction expressing a present contrary-to-fact situation. The protasis consists of `εἰ` + imperfect indicative (`ἦρχον`), and the apodosis consists of `ἄν` + aorist indicative (`ἐσκεψάμεθα`), meaning "if I ruled (now)... we would not have examined (before)."
  5. 86eεἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλά — An idiomatic expression meaning "if nothing else, at least" or "if otherwise impossible, at least." It serves to emphasize the following `σμικρόν γε` ("just a little"), highlighting the context where Socrates, while yielding to Meno's demand, asks for a minimal compromise.

Cite this passage

Plato, Meno §86. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg024.humanitext-grc2:86

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