§88ΣΩ. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν·
SOC. And do we say that these same things sometimes also harm?
ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως;
Or do you say otherwise, or thus?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
MEN. No, but thus.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει;
SOC. Examine indeed: when what guides each of these, does it benefit us, and when what, does it harm?
ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;
Is it not when right use guides, it benefits, but when not, it harms?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα.
SOC. Still further, then, let us also examine the things concerning the soul.
σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
Do you call something temperance, and justice, and courage, and quickness at learning, and memory, and magnificence, and all such things?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. I do.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ;
SOC. Examine indeed, whichever of these seem to you not to be knowledge but other than knowledge, whether they do not sometimes harm, and sometimes benefit?
οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλʼ οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
For example, courage, if courage is not wisdom but like a certain boldness; is it not that when a human being is bold without mind, he is harmed, but when with mind, he is benefited?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία·
SOC.
μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;
Therefore, also temperance in the same way, and quickness at learning; when learned and prepared with mind they are useful, but without mind, harmful?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ σφόδρα.
MEN. Very much so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον;
SOC. Therefore, in short, all the undertakings and endurance of the soul, when wisdom guides, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite?
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν.
MEN. It seems so.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.
SOC. If therefore virtue is something of those in the soul, and it is necessary for it to be useful, it must be wisdom, since indeed all the things concerning the soul are in themselves neither useful nor harmful, but by the addition of wisdom or folly they become harmful and useful.
κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τινʼ εἶναι.
According to this argument, then, virtue being indeed useful must be a certain wisdom.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
MEN. It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;
SOC. And indeed also the other things which we were just now mentioning, wealth and such things, that they are sometimes good and sometimes harmful, is it not that just as wisdom, guiding the rest of the soul, made the things of the soul useful, and folly made them harmful, so again also for these things, the soul, by using and guiding them rightly, makes them useful, but by not doing so, harmful?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δʼ ἡ ἄφρων;
SOC. And the wise soul guides rightly, but the foolish one, erroneously?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
MEN. That is so.
§89ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι·
SOC.
καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον·
Therefore, indeed, one can speak thus concerning all things: for a human being all other things depend on the soul, but those of the soul itself on wisdom, if they are to be good; and by this argument wisdom would be the useful thing.
φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;
But we say that virtue is useful?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;
SOC. We say then that virtue is wisdom, either the whole of it or some part?
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.
MEN. What is said, Socrates, seems to me to be well said.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.
SOC. Therefore, if these things are so, the good would not be good by nature.
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
MEN. It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδʼ ἦν·
SOC.
εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι.
For indeed this too would presumably have been the case: if the good became so by nature, we would presumably have had those who recognized the good natures among the young, whom we, having taken over after they had shown them, would have guarded in the Acropolis, sealing them far more than gold, so that no one might corrupt them, but when they arrived at the proper age, they might become useful to the cities.
ΜΕΝ. εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. It is likely indeed, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, ἆρα μαθήσει;
SOC. Is it then that since the good do not become good by nature, do they become so by learning?
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.
MEN. It seems to me now to be necessary; and it is clear, Socrates, according to the hypothesis, if indeed virtue is knowledge, that it is teachable.
ΣΩ. ἴσως νὴ Δία·
SOC. Perhaps, by Zeus!
ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;
But was this not well agreed by us?
ΜΕΝ. καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
MEN. And yet it seemed just now to be well said.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.
SOC. But it must not only just now seem to be well said, but also now and hereafter, if there is to be anything sound in it.
ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή;
MEN. What indeed?
πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή;
Looking to what do you dislike it and doubt that virtue is knowledge?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων.
SOC. I will tell you, Meno.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν.
That it is teachable, if indeed it is knowledge, I do not retract that this is well said; but that it is not knowledge, examine whether I seem to you to doubt with good reason.
τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;
For tell me this: if any thing whatsoever is teachable, not only virtue, is it not necessary that there be both teachers and learners of it?
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
MEN. It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
SOC. Therefore, on the contrary, of what there are neither teachers nor learners, would we not be guessing well in guessing that it is not teachable?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα·
MEN.
ἀλλʼ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι;
That is so; but do you not think there are teachers of virtue?