§79ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δʼ ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.
SOC. Then the acquisition of such goods would not be any more virtue than the non-acquisition, but, as it seems, that which comes about with justice will be virtue, but that which, without all such things, is vice.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.
MEN. It seems to me to be necessary, as you say.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
SOC. Did we not say a little while ago that each of these was a part of virtue—justice, temperance, and all such things?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;
SOC. Then, Meno, are you playing with me?
ΜΕΝ. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
MEN. Why so, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθʼ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης·
SOC. Because, although I just now begged you not to break up or mince virtue, and gave patterns according to which you ought to answer, you have ignored this, and you tell me that virtue is the ability to acquire good things with justice; and this, you say, is a part of virtue?
τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι; ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.
SOC. Then it follows from what you agree that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue, this is virtue; for you say that justice, and each of these things, is a part of virtue.
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω;
Why then do I say this?
ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια.
Because, though I begged you to define virtue as a whole, you are very far from saying what it is itself, but you say that every action is virtue, provided it is performed with a part of virtue, as if you had already said what virtue is as a whole and I would already know it, even if you mince it into parts.
δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη;
It seems to me, therefore, my dear Meno, that you need the same question again from the beginning: "What is virtue?", if indeed every action accompanied by a part of virtue is to be virtue.
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν.
For this is what it means when someone says that every action with justice is virtue.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλʼ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;
Or do you not think you need the same question again, but do you think anyone can know what a part of virtue is, without knowing virtue itself?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
MEN. It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτʼ ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
SOC. For if you remember, when I answered you just now about shape, we surely rejected that kind of answer which attempts to answer by means of terms that are still being sought and are not yet agreed upon.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. And we were right to reject it, Socrates.
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις·
SOC. Do not then, my excellent friend, think that while the whole of virtue is still being sought, you will make it clear to anyone by answering by means of its parts, or by speaking of anything else in this same way; but rather that you will need the same question again—what virtue is, since you say what you say about it.
ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;
Or do I seem to you to say nothing?
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
MEN. To me you seem to speak rightly.
ΣΩ. ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς·
SOC.
τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;
Answer then again from the beginning: what do you and your companion say that virtue is?