§80ΜΕΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν·
MEN. Socrates, even before I met you, I used to hear that you do nothing else than being perplexed yourself and making others perplexed.
καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι.
And now, as it seems to me at least, you are bewitching me and drugging me and down-right casting a spell on me, so that I have become full of perplexity.
καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι,·
And you seem to me, if I may make a jest, to be entirely like, both in appearance and in other respects, that flat sea-torpedo; for it makes anyone who comes near and touches it numb, and you seem to me to have done something like that to me now.
ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι.
For in truth, I am numb both in soul and in mouth, and I do not know what to answer you.
καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
And yet a thousand times I have spoken many arguments about virtue and to many people, and very well too, as I thought; but now I cannot even say at all what it is.
καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδʼ ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχʼ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης.
And you seem to me to be well-advised in not sailing away from here or traveling abroad; for if you, a foreigner, did such things in another city, you might quickly be led away as a sorcerer.
ΣΩ. πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.
SOC. You are a rogue, Meno, and you almost deceived me.
ΜΕΝ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
MEN. How so, Socrates?
ΣΩ. γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ᾔκασας.
SOC. I know for what reason you made an image of me.
ΜΕΝ. τίνος δὴ οἴει;
MEN. For what reason do you think?
ΣΩ. ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω.
SOC. In order that I might make an image of you in return.
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες—ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε.
But I know this about all beautiful people, that they rejoice in being imaged—for it is to their advantage, since I think the images of beautiful people are beautiful too—but I will not make an image of you.
ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ.
As for me, if the torpedo is itself numb while making others numb, then I am like it; but if not, I am not.
οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν.
For it is not from being clear myself that I make others perplexed, but being myself perplexed above all, I likewise make others perplexed.
καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι.
And now about virtue, what it is, I do not know, but you perhaps knew before you touched me, though now you are like one who does not know.
ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν.
Nevertheless, I am willing to examine with you and search together what on earth it is.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν;
MEN. And in what way will you search, Socrates, for that which you do not know at all what it is?
ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις;
For which of the things you do not know will you set before yourself and search for?
ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα;
Or even if you should happen upon it ever so much, how will you know that this is that which you did not know?
ΣΩ. μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων.
SOC. I understand what sort of thing you want to say, Meno.
ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε;
Do you see what a disputatious argument you are bringing down, that indeed it is not possible for a human being to search either for what he knows or for what he does not know?
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ—οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως—οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει.
For he would not search for what he knows—for he knows it, and there is no need of search for such a person—nor for what he does not know—for he does not even know what he is to search for.