§72ΜΕΝ. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν· καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.
MEN. And there are very many other virtues, so that there is no lack of difficulty in saying what virtue is; for according to each of our actions and ages, for each work, virtue exists for each of us, and in the same way, I think, Socrates, also vice.
ΣΩ. πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον.
SOC. I seem to be favored by a certain great good fortune, Meno, if, while seeking one virtue, I have found a swarm of virtues lying in your possession.
ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι;
But indeed, Meno, according to this image about the swarms, if, when I asked about the essence of a bee, what it actually is, you said they are many and manifold, what would you have answered me if I asked you: "Do you say that they are many and manifold and differing from one another in this, in being bees?
ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;
Or do they differ not at all in this, but in some other thing, such as beauty or size or some other such thing?" Speak, what would you have answered if you were asked this?
ΜΕΝ. τοῦτʼ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.
MEN. I would say this, that they differ not at all, insofar as they are bees, the one from the other.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα·
SOC.
τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων· ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι; εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;
If then I said after this: "Tell me then this very thing, Meno: that in which they differ not at all but are all the same, what do you say this is?" You would surely have had something to say to me?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. I would indeed.
ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν·
SOC.
κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν διʼ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή·
So indeed also about the virtues; even if they are many and manifold, they all have some one same form because of which they are virtues, at which it is well for the one who answers to look and to reveal to the one who asked that very thing which happens to be virtue.
ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω;
Or do you not understand what I am saying?
ΜΕΝ. δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.
MEN. I think I understand; however, I do not yet grasp the question as I wish to.
ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως;
SOC. Do you think this only about virtue, Meno, that there is one of a man, and another of a woman and the others, or is it also the same about health and size and strength?
ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός;
Does there seem to you to be one health of a man, and another of a woman?
ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ;
Or is it the same form everywhere, if indeed it is health, whether it is in a man or in anyone else whomsoever?
ΜΕΝ. ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.
MEN. It seems to me that it is the same health, of both man and woman.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς;
SOC.
ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται;
Therefore also size and strength? If indeed a woman is strong, will she be strong by the same form and the same strength?
τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί.
By "the same" I mean this: strength differs not at all with respect to being strength, whether it is in a man or in a woman.
ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;
Or does it seem to you to differ in some way?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
MEN. Not to me, indeed.
§73ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί;
SOC. And will virtue differ at all with respect to being virtue, whether it is in a child or in an old man, or in a woman or in a man?
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
MEN. It seems to me somehow, Socrates, that this is no longer like those other cases.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOC. How so?
οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;
Did you not say that the virtue of a man is to manage a city well, and of a woman a house?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. I did indeed.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;
SOC. Is it then possible to manage well either a city or a house or anything else whatsoever, if one does not manage temperately and justly?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
MEN. Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν;
SOC. Therefore, if they manage justly and temperately, will they manage with justice and temperance?
ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη.
MEN. Necessarily.
ΣΩ. τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.
SOC. Both therefore need the same things, if they are to be good, both the woman and the man: justice and temperance.
ΜΕΝ. φαίνονται.
MEN. They seem to.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης;
SOC. And what about a child and an old man?
μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο;
Could they ever become good if they were licentious and unjust?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
MEN. Certainly not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι;
SOC. But temperate and just?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. πάντες ἄρʼ ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν·
SOC.
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.
All human beings, then, are good in the same way; for by obtaining the same things they become good.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικε.
MEN. So it seems.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.
SOC. They would not, surely, be good in the same way, unless their virtue were the same.
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
MEN. Certainly not.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετʼ ἐκείνου.
SOC. Since then the virtue of all is the same, try to say and to remember what Gorgias says it is, and you with him.
ΜΕΝ. τί ἄλλο γʼ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
MEN. What else than to be capable of ruling over human beings?
εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.
If indeed you are seeking some one thing down through all.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε.
SOC. But indeed I am seeking it.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;
But is it indeed the same virtue for a child, Meno, and for a slave, to be capable of ruling over their master, and does it seem to you that the one who rules would still be a slave?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. Not at all does it seem so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει.
SOC. For it is not reasonable, my excellent friend; for consider also this further point.
ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;
You say "to be capable of ruling." Shall we not add to that "justly, and not unjustly"?
ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.
MEN. I think so indeed; for justice, Socrates, is virtue.
ΣΩ. πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις;
SOC. Is it virtue, Meno, or a certain virtue?
ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
MEN. How do you mean this?
ΣΩ. ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν.
SOC. As about anything else whatsoever.
οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα.
For example, if you wish, about roundness, I would say that it is a certain shape, not simply in this way that it is shape.
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.
And I would say so for this reason, that there are also other shapes.
ΜΕΝ. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.
MEN. You speak correctly, since I also say that there is not only justice but also other virtues.