§520ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε·
CALLICLES: Yes, I do.
ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;
But what would you say about men of no worth?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης;
SOCRATES: And what would you say about those who, claiming to stand at the head of the city and to take care that it shall be as good as possible, in turn accuse it, when it so happens, of being most wicked?
οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων;
Do you think these differ at all from those?
ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριʼ, ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς.
It is the same thing, my blessed friend, sophist and rhetorician, or something very close and similar, just as I was saying to Polus; but you, through ignorance, think the one, rhetoric, is something utterly beautiful, while you despise the other.
τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς· μόνοις δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν.
But in truth, sophistic is more beautiful than rhetoric by as much as legislation is than the judicial art, and gymnastics than medicine; and I, for my part, thought that to popular orators and sophists alone it is not open to complain of this very thing which they themselves educate, claiming that it is wicked towards them, or, by this same argument, to accuse themselves at the same time of having in no way benefited those whom they claim to benefit.
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Quite so.
ΣΩ. καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.
SOCRATES: And surely, to bestow benefit beforehand without a fee, as is reasonable, was open to these alone, if they were speaking the truth.
ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον·
For if someone received another kind of benefit, such as becoming fast through a physical trainer, he might perhaps withhold the gratitude if the trainer bestowed it beforehand on him, and did not make an agreement with him for a fee to receive the money as nearly as possible at the same time as he imparted the speed.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῆτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλʼ ἀδικίᾳ· ἦ γάρ;
For it is not, I suppose, by slowness that men do injustice, but by injustice, is it not?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if someone removes this very thing, namely injustice, there is no danger of his ever being wronged, but for him alone is it safe to bestow this benefit beforehand, if indeed one could in reality make men good.
οὐχ οὕτω;
Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
CALLICLES: I agree.
ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
SOCRATES: For this reason, then, as it seems, there is nothing shameful in giving other kinds of advice and taking money for it, such as about building or the other arts.
ΚΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε.
CALLICLES: So it seems.
ΣΩ. περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντινʼ ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ.
SOCRATES: But regarding this activity, namely how one might be as good as possible and manage his own house or city best, it has been deemed shameful to refuse to give advice unless someone gives him money.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντʼ εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ.
SOCRATES: For it is clear that this is the cause, that this alone of benefits makes the one who has received it desire to do good in return, so that it seems to be a good sign if, having bestowed this benefit, one will be treated well in return; but if not, not.
ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;
Is this how things stand?
§521ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.
CALLICLES: It is.
ΣΩ. ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι·
SOCRATES: To which of these two ways of caring for the city do you invite me, then?
τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα;
Distinguish for me: that of struggling with the Athenians so that they will be as good as possible, like a doctor, or like one who will serve them and converse to please them?
τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις·
Tell me the truth, Callicles; for you are right, just as you began to speak frankly to me, to continue saying what you think.
δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.
And now speak well and generously.
ΚΑΛ. λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.
CALLICLES: I say, then, that it is as one who will serve.
ΣΩ. κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.
SOCRATES: You invite me, then, my most noble friend, to be a flatterer.
ΚΑΛ. εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις—
ΣΩ. μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδʼ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι ἀλλʼ ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.
CALLICLES: If it is more pleasing to you to call it a Mysian, Socrates; since if you do not do these things— SOCRATES: Do not say what you have often said, that anyone who wishes will kill me, lest I, in turn, say that a wicked man will kill a good man; nor that he will take away whatever I have, lest I, in turn, say that, having taken it, he will not have anything to use it for, but just as he took it from me unjustly, so also, having received it, he will use it unjustly, and if unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly.
ΚΑΛ. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδʼ ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.
CALLICLES: How confident you seem to me, Socrates, that you would not suffer even one of these things, as if you lived out of the way and could not be brought into court by some perhaps utterly wretched and worthless man.
ΣΩ. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν.
SOCRATES: Foolish indeed I must be, Callicles, in truth, if I do not think that in this city anyone whatever might suffer whatever happens to turn up.
τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μʼ ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντʼ ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι—καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι.
This, however, I know well, that if I enter court in danger regarding any of these things which you mention, it will be some wicked man who brings me in—for no good man would bring in a man who does no wrong—and it would be nothing strange if I were put to death.
βούλει σοι εἴπω διʼ ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;
Do you wish me to tell you why I expect this?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Quite so.
ΣΩ. οἶμαι μετʼ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν·
SOCRATES: I think that I, with a few other Athenians—not to say alone—attempt the truly political art, and that I alone of men today practice politics.
ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ.
Since, therefore, the speeches I make on each occasion are not directed to please, but to what is best, not to what is most pleasant, and since I am unwilling to do those clever things which you advise, I shall have nothing to say in court.
ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.
And the same comparison occurs to me that I spoke of to Polus; for I shall be judged as a doctor would be judged among children, with a cook as his accuser.