§505ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.
CALLICLES: Let it be so.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς.
SOCRATES: For I do not think it is beneficial for a human being to live with a bad condition of the body; for in that case it is necessary to live badly too.
ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
Or is it not so?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτʼ ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ;
SOCRATES: Then, as for satisfying desires, such as eating as much as one wants when hungry, or drinking when thirsty, do doctors usually allow this when a person is healthy, but when one is sick, they almost never, so to speak, allow them to satisfy themselves with what they desire?
συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;
Do you agree to this at least?
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
CALLICLES: Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος;
SOCRATES: And about the soul, my excellent friend, is it not the same way?
ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλʼ ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφʼ ὧν βελτίων ἔσται·
As long as it is bad, being foolish, undisciplined, unjust, and impious, one must keep it away from its desires and not permit it to do anything else except that by which it will become better.
φῂς ἢ οὔ;
Do you say so or not?
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
CALLICLES: I say so.
ΣΩ. οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;
SOCRATES: For is this not, I suppose, better for the soul itself?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφʼ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;
SOCRATES: And is keeping it away from what it desires called disciplining it?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.
SOCRATES: Then being disciplined is better for the soul than undisciplined indulgence, just as you thought just now.
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.
CALLICLES: I do not know what you are saying, Socrates; ask someone else.
ΣΩ. οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.
SOCRATES: This man cannot bear to be benefited, and to undergo himself the very thing our discussion is about—being disciplined.
ΚΑΛ. οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.
CALLICLES: And indeed I do not care at all about anything you say, and I answered these things for you only for the sake of Gorgias.
ΣΩ. εἶεν·
SOCRATES: Well, then; what shall we do?
τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;
Do we break off the discussion in the middle?
ΚΑΛ. αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.
CALLICLES: You will decide that yourself.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλʼ ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίῃ.
SOCRATES: But they say it is not lawful to leave even myths in the middle, but to put a head on them, so that they may not go about without a head.
ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.
Answer the rest, then, so that our discussion may receive a head.
ΚΑΛ. ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CALLICLES: How violent you are, Socrates!
ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξῃ.
But if you will listen to me, you will let this discussion go, or converse with someone else.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει;
SOCRATES: Who else then is willing?
μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.
For let us not indeed leave the discussion incomplete.
ΚΑΛ. αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;
CALLICLES: Could you not go through the discussion yourself, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?
ΣΩ. ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ
πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον,
εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως.
SOCRATES: So that Epicharmus' saying may apply to me: "What two men used to speak before, I, being one, become sufficient for." Yet it seems that this is most necessary.
εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό.
If, however, we do this, I think we all ought to be eager to know what is true about what we are saying and what is false; for it is a common good for it to become manifest to everyone.
§506ΣΩ. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν·
SOCRATES: I will go through the discussion, then, as it seems to me to be.
ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν.
But if I seem to any of you to agree with myself on what is not the fact, you must take me up and refute me.
οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθʼ ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι.
For indeed, I do not speak what I speak as one who knows, but I seek in common with you, so that if the person disputing with me seems to say something, I will be the first to agree.
λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.
I say these things, however, if it seems that the discussion ought to be completed; but if you do not wish it, let us let it go now and depart.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν.
GORGIAS: But it does not seem to me, Socrates, that we ought to depart yet, but that you should go through the discussion; and it seems to me that the others think so too.
βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.
For I myself wish to hear you go through the rest by yourself.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου·
SOCRATES: Well indeed, Gorgias, I myself would have gladly continued to converse with this Callicles, until I had paid him back the speech of Amphion in return for that of Zethus.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλʼ οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.
But since you, Callicles, are not willing to help complete the discussion, at least listen to me and take me up if I seem to you to speak not well.
καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρʼ ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ.
And if you refute me, I shall not be vexed with you as you were with me, but you will be recorded as my greatest benefactor.
ΚΑΛ. λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.
CALLICLES: Speak on, good man, yourself, and finish it.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον.
SOCRATES: Listen then to me taking up the discussion from the beginning.
ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; —οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. —πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; —τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. —ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; —πάνυ γε. —ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσʼ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; —ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. —ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν·
Is the pleasant and the good the same? — Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed. — And should we do the pleasant for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? — The pleasant for the sake of the good. — And is the pleasant that by whose arrival we are pleased, and the good that by whose presence we are good? — Yes, indeed. — And indeed, are we and all other things that are good, good by the arrival of some virtue? — It seems to me to be necessary, Callicles. — And indeed, does the virtue of each thing, whether of an implement, of a body, of a soul again, and of every animal, not arrive most beautifully by chance, but by the order, correctness, and art that is assigned to each of them?
ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα; —ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. — τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου; —φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. —κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; —ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; —ἀνάγκη. —ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; —πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; —
Is this so? — For I say so. — Then is the virtue of each thing that which is ordered and organized by order? — I should say so. — Does a certain order, then, arising in each thing, which is appropriate to each, make each of existing things good? — It seems so to me. — Then is a soul that has its own order better than one that is disordered? — Of necessity. — And indeed, is the one that has order orderly? — How could it not be so?