§486ΚΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι
ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει τινὶ διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτʼ εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις, οὔθʼ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο.
CALLICLES: Indeed, some such things come to my mind to say to you, just as that character said to his brother, that "you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to care for, and you warp a naturally noble soul by some boyish shape, and you could neither rightly present a speech in the councils of justice, nor grasp what is plausible and persuasive, nor devise any vigorous counsel on behalf of another." And yet, my dear Socrates—and do not be at all annoyed with me, for I speak out of goodwill to you—does it not seem shameful to you to be in this state, in which I think you are, and others who always push far into philosophy?
καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλʼ ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
For now, if someone should seize you or any other of such people and drag you to prison, claiming that you are doing wrong when you are doing no wrong, you know that you would not know what to do with yourself, but you would be dizzy and gape, not knowing what to say; and when you went up to the court, even if you met with a very petty and wretched accuser, you would die, if he wished to assess death as your penalty.
καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
"ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα"
, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδʼ ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει;
And yet, how is this wise, Socrates, "a skill which, taking a gifted man, makes him worse," capable neither of helping himself nor of saving himself or anyone else from the greatest dangers, but being stripped of all his property by his enemies, and living altogether without honor in the city?
τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην.
Such a person, even if it is somewhat rustic to say so, one may strike on the cheek without paying any penalty.
ἀλλʼ ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου,
"παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δʼ εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει"
, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
"ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς"
, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας,
"ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις"
· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.
But, my good friend, listen to me, "cease refuting, and practice the harmony of affairs," and practice where you will seem to be wise, "leaving these clever things to others," whether they should be called nonsense or babble, "from which you will dwell in empty houses"; emulating not men who refute these small things, but those who have both livelihood and reputation and many other good things.
ΣΩ. εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἅσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;
SOCRATES: If I happened to have a golden soul, Callicles, do you not think I would gladly find one of those stones with which they test gold, the best one, to which I was going to bring it, and if it agreed with me that my soul had been well cared for, I would know well that I am in a sufficient state and need no other test?
ΚΑΛ. πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
CALLICLES: For what purpose indeed do you ask this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ·
SOCRATES: I will tell you.
νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.
Now I think that in meeting you, I have met with such a godsend.
ΚΑΛ. τί δή;
CALLICLES: How so?
§487ΣΩ. εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, ἅν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτʼ ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ.
SOCRATES: I know well that whatever you agree with me about what my soul opines, these things must already be the very truth.
ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν.
For I perceive that he who is to test a soul sufficiently about whether it lives rightly or not must have three things, all of which you have: knowledge, goodwill, and frankness.
ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος·
For I meet many who are not able to test me because they are not wise like you; others are wise indeed, but they do not wish to tell me the truth because they do not care for me like you; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise and my friends, but they are lacking in frankness and are more bashful than is proper.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
For how could they not be?
ὥ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων.
Since they have arrived at such a degree of shame that, because they are ashamed, each of them dares to say things contrary to himself in front of many people, and that on the most important matters.
σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους.
But you have all these things which the others do not have; for you have been sufficiently educated, as many of the Athenians would say, and you are well-disposed toward me.
τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι;
What evidence do I use?
ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ.
I will tell you.
οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα·
I know you, Callicles, as four people who have become partners in wisdom: you, Teisander of Aphidnae, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholargus.
καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.
And once I overheard you consulting up to what point wisdom ought to be practiced, and I know that some such opinion prevailed among you, not to be eager to philosophize to the point of precision, but you exhorted one another to be careful lest, having become wiser than is proper, you should ruin yourselves without realizing it.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ.
Since therefore I hear you advising me the very same things which you advised your closest companions, it is a sufficient evidence for me that you are truly well-disposed to me.
καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι.
And indeed, that you are of a character to speak frankly and not be ashamed, you yourself say and the speech which you spoke a little earlier agrees with you.
ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτʼ ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπʼ ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν.
It is clear that this is how it stands regarding these matters now: if you agree with me on anything in our discussions, that will already have been sufficiently tested by both me and you, and it will no longer be necessary to refer it to another test.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτʼ αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ, οὐδʼ αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῄς.
For you would never have conceded it either through lack of wisdom or through excess of shame, nor again would you concede it to deceive me; for you are my friend, as you yourself say.
τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας.
Truly, therefore, my agreement and yours will already have the end of truth.