§472ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν.
SOCRATES: My dear friend, for you are attempting to refute me rhetorically, just like those who believe they refute in the law courts.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα.
For there too, one party seems to refute the other whenever they produce many reputable witnesses for the statements they make, while the one who says the opposite produces only some single witness or none at all.
οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι.
But this refutation is worth nothing in relation to the truth; for sometimes someone might even be falsely witnessed against by many people who appear to be of some consequence.
καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατʼ ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω·
And now, concerning what you say, almost everyone—both Athenians and foreigners—will agree with you in this, if you wish to produce witnesses against me to show that I do not speak the truth.
μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετʼ αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι.
They will bear witness for you: if you wish, Nicias the son of Niceratus and his brothers with him, whose tripods are standing in a row in the Dionysium; and if you wish, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, whose beautiful offering this in turn is in the Pythium; and if you wish, the whole house of Pericles or any other family you might wish to choose from those here.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατʼ ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
But I, being only one, do not agree with you; for you do not compel me, but by producing many false witnesses against me, you attempt to cast me out of my property and the truth.
ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς.
But as for me, if I do not produce you yourself, being only one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, I think I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention concerning the things about which our discussion may be; and I think the same is true for you, unless I alone bear witness for you, and you let all these other go.
ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.
Now, on the one hand, this is one kind of refutation, as you and many others think; but on the other hand, there is also another, which I in turn believe in.
παραβαλόντες οὖν παρʼ ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων.
Let us then compare them with one another and consider whether they will differ from each other in any way.
καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μή.
For indeed, the things about which we dispute happen to be not at all small, but are pretty much those things which it is finest to know and most shameful not to know; for the sum of them is either to recognize or to be ignorant of who is happy and who is not.
αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῇ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ.
To take the first instance, about which our discussion now is: you believe that it is possible for a man who acts unjustly and is unjust to be happy, since indeed you think Archelaus is unjust but happy.
ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;
Are we to understand that this is your opinion?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον.
SOCRATES: But I say it is impossible.
ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν.
This is one point we dispute.
εἶεν·
Very well.
ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρʼ, ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;
But will the wrongdoer indeed be happy if he happens to meet with justice and punishment?
ΠΩΛ. ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γʼ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.
POLUS: Not in the least, since in that way he would be most miserable.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;
SOCRATES: But if the wrongdoer does not meet with justice, will he be happy according to your argument?
ΠΩΛ. φημί.
POLUS: I say so.
ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
SOCRATES: But according to my view, Polus, the wrongdoer and the unjust man are miserable in any case, but they are more miserable if they do not pay the penalty and do not meet with punishment for their wrongdoing, and less miserable if they pay the penalty and meet with justice from both gods and men.