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Plato · Gorgias §449

Definition of Rhetoric and Agreement on Brief Answers

Passage 2 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Socrates gets Gorgias to admit that his art is "rhetoric" and that he should be called an "orator." Socrates then secures a promise from Gorgias to continue the discussion using brief answers (dialectics) and begins to question him about the definition of rhetoric.

§449ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα.
Socrates: Indeed.
ἀλλʼ οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς.
But no one is asking what sort of art Gorgias' is, but what it is, and what one ought to call Gorgias; just as Chaerephon put the questions to you before, and you answered him beautifully and briefly, so now too tell us in this way what the art is and what we ought to call Gorgias.
μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.
Or rather, Gorgias, tell us yourself what we ought to call you, as being knowledgeable in what art.
ΓΟΡ. τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Gorgias: Of rhetoric, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;
Socrates: Should we then call you an orator?
ΓΟΡ. ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.
Gorgias: A good one, Socrates, if indeed you wish to call me what I boast of being, as Homer said.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.
Socrates: Well, I do wish it.
ΓΟΡ. κάλει δή.
Gorgias: Call me so, then.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;
Socrates: Are we to say then that you are capable of making others so as well?
ΓΟΡ. ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.
Gorgias: I do indeed profess this, not only here but elsewhere as well.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δʼ ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι;
Socrates: Would you then be willing, Gorgias, to continue as we are now conversing, the one asking and the other answering, and to put off to another time this length of speech such as Polus also began?
ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
But do not fail in what you promise, but be willing to answer what is asked briefly.
ΓΟΡ. εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων.
Gorgias: There are indeed, Socrates, some answers that are necessary to make at length; nevertheless I will try to make them as brief as possible.
καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.
For indeed, this is also one of the things I claim, that no one can say the same things in fewer words than I.
ΣΩ. τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς αὖθις.
Socrates: Of this indeed there is need, Gorgias; and make an exhibition for me of this very thing, of brevity, and of long-windedness some other time.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.
Gorgias: Well, I will do so, and you will say that you have never heard anyone more brief.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα·
Socrates: Come then; for you say you are knowledgeable in the art of rhetoric and that you could make another an orator as well; about which of the things that are does rhetoric happen to be?
ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν·
Just as weaving is about the making of clothes, is it not?
ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
Socrates: And music, is it not about the making of songs?
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνῃ ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
Socrates: By Hera, Gorgias, I admire your answers, because you answer as briefly as possible.
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
Gorgias: For indeed, Socrates, I think I do this quite well.
ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις.
Socrates: You speak well.
ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;
Come then, answer me in this way about rhetoric too: about which of the things that are is it a knowledge?
ΓΟΡ. περὶ λόγους.
Gorgias: About speeches.
ΣΩ. ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία;
Socrates: What sort of speeches, Gorgias?
ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;
Is it those which make clear to the sick how they might become healthy by their regimen?
ΓΟΡ. οὔ.
Gorgias: No.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν.
Socrates: Then rhetoric is not about all speeches.
ΓΟΡ. οὐ δῆτα.
Gorgias: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
Socrates: But yet, it does make men capable of speaking.
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;
Socrates: And then, does it also make them think about the very things they speak about?
ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Gorgias: For how could it not?

Notes

  1. 449aὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι — The relative pronoun ὅ contains its antecedent (= τοῦτο ὅ) and serves as the predicate nominative with εἶναι. As a whole, it means "that which I boast to be," referring back to "good (ἀγαθόν)." The verb εὔχομαι here has the Homeric sense of "to boast, claim to be" rather than the classical "to pray."
  2. 449bτὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δʼ ἀποκρινόμενος — A grammatical asymmetry (anacoluthon) is observed here. While `τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν` is an articular infinitive in the neuter accusative ("on the one hand by asking"), `τὸ δʼ ἀποκρινόμενος` is a participle in the nominative ("on the other hand being the one who answers"). Both function as supplementary/predicative expressions to `διατελέσαι` ("to continue").
  3. 449eοὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; — The phrase inherits the causal construction `ποιεῖ [αὐτοὺς] δυνατούς` ("makes them capable of...") from Socrates' previous remark `ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς`. Therefore, the structure is: "Does it not then [make them capable of] thinking about the very things about which [it makes them capable of] speaking?"

Cite this passage

Plato, Gorgias §449. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:449

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