§358ΣΩ. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν·
Socrates: "That would have been our answer to the many.
ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε (κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος) πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. —ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. —ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν.
But now I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, along with Protagoras—for let the discussion be common to you all—whether you think I am speaking the truth or lying." —What had been said seemed to all to be extraordinarily true. —"Do you agree, then," I said, "that the pleasant is good and the painful is bad?
τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι. —γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. —τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε;
But I beg off from the verbal distinctions of Prodicus here; for whether you call it 'pleasant' or 'delightful' or 'enjoyable,' or from whatever source and in whatever way you please to name such things, my excellent Prodicus, answer me with respect to what I want." —Then Prodicus laughed and agreed, as did the others. —"What about this, then, gentlemen?" I said.
αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρʼ οὐ καλαί;
"Are not all actions directed toward this end, namely, living without pain and pleasantly, beautiful?
καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον; —συνεδόκει. —εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ ἃ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω·
And is not the beautiful deed both good and advantageous?" —They agreed. —"If, then," I said, "the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or believes that other things are better than those he is doing, and that they are possible, then does those things when it is possible to do the better.
οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὑτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. —συνεδόκει πᾶσιν. —τί δὲ δή;
Nor is being overcome by oneself anything other than ignorance, nor is being master of oneself anything other than wisdom." —They all agreed. —"What about this?
ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων; —καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. —ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον; —ἅπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. —τί οὖν;
Do you call ignorance something like this: having a false opinion and being mistaken about matters of great value?" —This too was agreed by all. —"Then," I said, "no one goes willingly toward bad things or toward what he believes to be bad, nor is it, as it seems, in human nature to wish to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of toward good things; and when one is forced to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when it is possible to choose the less." —All of these things were agreed by all of us. —"What then?" I said.
ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον;
"Do you call something 'dread' and 'fear'?
καὶ ἆρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε).
And is it the same as what I mean? (I am speaking to you, Prodicus).
προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. —ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρᾳ μὲν καὶ Ἱππίᾳ δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δʼ οὔ. —ἀλλʼ οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἆρά τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή;
I call this a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread." —It seemed to Protagoras and Hippias that this was both dread and fear, but to Prodicus that it was dread, but not fear. —"But that makes no difference, Prodicus," I said, "but rather this: if the foregoing is true, will any human being wish to go toward those things which he dreads, when it is possible to go toward those which he does not?
ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων;
Or is it impossible from what has been agreed?
ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα. —ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.
For what he dreads, it has been agreed he considers to be bad; and what he considers bad, no one either goes toward or accepts willingly." —This too was agreed by all.