§359ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἱππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει—μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν·
Socrates: "These things being so laid down," I said, "Prodicus and Hippias, let our friend Protagoras here defend how what he answered at first is correct—not his very first answer, to be sure; for then he said that of the five parts of virtue, none was like any other, but each had its own distinct power.
ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν.
But I do not mean those, but what he said later.
τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μʼ ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε· εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ᾧ γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθʼ ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον.
For later he said that four of them were reasonably close to one another, but that the one, courage, differed very greatly from the others, and he said I would know it by this proof: 'For you will find, Socrates, men who are most impious, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant, but yet most courageous; by which you will know that courage differs greatly from the other parts of virtue.' And I at that very moment was greatly astonished by this answer, and still more so now since I have gone through these things with you.
ἠρόμην δʼ οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὁ δέ,
καὶ ἴτας γʼ,
ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; —ὡμολόγει. —ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους;
At any rate, I asked him whether he called the courageous confident; and he said, 'And indeed ready to charge.' Protagoras, do you remember answering this?" —He agreed. —"Come then," I said, "tell us, toward what do you say the courageous are ready to charge?
ἦ ἐφʼ ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί; —οὐκ ἔφη. —οὐκοῦν ἐφʼ ἕτερα. —
ναί,
ἦ δʼ ὅς. —πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; —
λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. —ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους;
Is it toward the same things as the cowardly?" —He said not. —"Then toward other things." —"Yes," he said. —"Do the cowardly go toward confident things, while the courageous go toward terrible things?" —"That, Socrates, is indeed what is said by people." —"You speak the truth," I said, "but that is not what I am asking; rather, toward what do you say the courageous are ready to charge?
ἆρʼ ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; —
ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γʼ,
ἔφη,
ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον. —καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις·
Is it toward terrible things, believing them to be terrible, or toward what is not?" —"But this, at least," he said, "was just shown to be impossible in the arguments you were speaking." —"This too," I said, "you speak truly.
ὥστʼ εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα. —ὡμολόγει. —ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ γε θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτῃ γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. —
ἀλλὰ μέντοι,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.
So if this was correctly shown, no one goes toward what he believes to be terrible, since being overcome by oneself was found to be ignorance." —He agreed. —"But surely toward what they are confident about, all people go again, both cowardly and courageous, and in this respect both the cowardly and the courageous go toward the same things." —"But indeed, Socrates," he said, "what the cowardly and the courageous go toward is entirely opposite.
αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. —πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὂν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; —
καλόν,
ἔφη. —οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν. —
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. —
For instance, into war, the ones are willing to go, but the others are not willing." —"Is going," I said, "beautiful or shameful?" —"Beautiful," he said. —"Then if it is beautiful, it is also good, as we agreed before; for we agreed that all beautiful actions are good." —"You speak the truth, and it always seems so to me."