§352ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τῇδέ πῃ καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο;
Socrates: "Well then," I said, "might it become manifest to us in some such way as this?
ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι· ἴθι δή μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον,
καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν·
Just as if someone, examining a man from his appearance either with respect to health or with respect to some other of the body's functions, having seen his face and his hands' extremities, should say: 'Come now, uncover for me also your chest and show me your back, so that I may examine more clearly,' I too desire something of this sort for our inquiry.
θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς φῄς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον·
Having observed that you are disposed in this way toward the good and the pleasant as you say, I need to say something of this sort: 'Come now, Protagoras, uncover for me also this part of your mind: how are you disposed toward knowledge?
πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως;
Does this also seem to you as it does to the majority of men, or otherwise?
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδʼ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδʼ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλʼ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.
The majority think of knowledge as something of this sort, that it is not strong, nor leading, nor ruling; nor do they think of it as being of such a kind, but rather that while knowledge is often present in a man, it is not knowledge that rules him but something else—sometimes passion, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, sometimes love, and often fear, simply thinking of knowledge as if it were a slave, dragged about by all other things.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλʼ ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἃν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλʼ ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; καὶ δοκεῖ,
ἔφη,
ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ.
Does it then seem to you also to be something of this sort, or that knowledge is a beautiful thing and capable of ruling a man, and if indeed one knows good and bad things, he would not be overcome by anything so as to do anything other than what knowledge commands, but that wisdom is sufficient to help a man?" "It does indeed seem," he said, "just as you say, Socrates, and at the same time, if to anyone else, it is shameful also for me not to say that wisdom and knowledge are the strongest of all human things." "You speak well," I said, "and truly.
οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν·
Do you know, then, that the majority of men do not believe you and me, but say that many who know what is best are not willing to do it, though it is possible for them, but do other things?
καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. §353ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά.
And as many as I have asked what on earth is the cause of this, they say that those who do these things do them because they are overcome by pleasure or pain, or ruled by one of those things I just mentioned." "Yes, Socrates," he said, "I think that in many other ways too men speak incorrectly." Socrates: "Come then, with me attempt to persuade and teach men what this experience of theirs is, which they say is being overcome by pleasures, and because of this not doing what is best, though they know it.
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντʼ ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι;
For perhaps, if we say 'You do not speak correctly, men, but you are lying,' they might ask us: 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure, what on earth is it, and what do you say it is?
εἴπατον ἡμῖν. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; οἶμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτʼ ἔχει.
Tell us.' ""But why, Socrates, must we examine the opinion of the majority of men, who say whatever happens to come into their minds?" "I think," I said, "that this is of some use to us for finding out about courage, how it stands in relation to the other parts of virtue.
εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἕπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν. ἀλλʼ,
ἔφη,
ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω. πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· Ἀκούετε δή· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι.
If then it seems good to you to abide by what we just decided, that I should lead in the way I think it would become most clearly manifest, follow; but if you do not wish, if it is pleasing to you, I let it go." "But," he said, "you speak correctly; and finish as you began." "Again then," I said, "if they should ask us: 'What then do you say this is, which we were calling being weaker than pleasures?' I for my part would say to them as follows: 'Listen then; for Protagoras and I will try to explain to you.
ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν; —φαῖεν ἄν.
For is it anything else, men, that you say happens to you in these circumstances, as when often being mastered by foods and drinks and sex, which are pleasant, though you know they are bad, you nevertheless do them?' They would say so.
—οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι;
Therefore you and I would ask them again: 'But in what way do you say they are bad?
πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει;
Is it because they provide this pleasure at the moment and each of them is pleasant, or because in the future they produce diseases and poverty and prepare many other such things?
ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δʼ ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν; ἆρʼ οἰόμεθʼ ἂν αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τἆλλα. —
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι,
ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. —οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ;
Or even if they prepare none of these things for the future, but only make one enjoy, would they nevertheless be bad, because they make one enjoy in any way whatsoever?' Do we think, Protagoras, they would answer anything else than that they are not bad because of the working of the pleasure itself at the moment, but because of the things that happen later, diseases and the rest?" "I think," Protagoras said, "the majority would answer these things." "Therefore, by producing diseases do they produce pains, and by producing poverty do they produce pains?
Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. —συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. —
They would agree, I think." Protagoras agreed.