Humanitext Reader

Plato · Protagoras §345-346

No One Errs Willingly and the Object of Simonides' Praise

Passage 21 of 33 · Greek

Summary

Socrates analyzes Simonides' poem, arguing that humans can only become bad through ignorance or misfortune, but it is impossible to be always good; therefore, the poet praises those who are in an intermediate state and do no evil willingly.

§345ΣΩ. τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα;
Socrates: 'What then is a good action regarding letters, and what makes a man good in letters?
δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις.
Clearly, the learning of these.
τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ;
And what good practice makes a good physician?
δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις.
Clearly, the learning of the treatment of the sick.
"κακὸς δὲ κακῶς" · τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο;
"And bad if poorly." Who then could become a bad physician?
δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῷ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῷ ἰατρῷ—οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο—ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός.
Clearly, he who in the first place has the capacity to be a physician, and then a good physician—for this man indeed could also become a bad one—while we, laymen in medicine, even if doing poorly, could never become either physicians or carpenters or any other such thing; and whoever could not become a physician by doing poorly, clearly could not become a bad physician either.
οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτʼ ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος— αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι—ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακός—ἔστιν γὰρ ἀεί— ἀλλʼ εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.
So also the good man could at some time become even bad, either by time, or by toil, or by disease, or by some other accident—for this alone is a bad action: to be deprived of knowledge—but the bad man could never become bad—for he is so always—but if he is to become bad, he must first become good.
ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· "ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν. " ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ᾄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ.
So that this part of the song also tends to this point, that to be a good man is not possible, continuing to be good, but to become good is possible, and indeed for this same man to become bad; "and those whom the gods love are best for the longest time." All these things, then, are said against Pittacus, and the following parts of the song show this still more.
φησὶ γάρ— " τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτʼ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός· ἐπί θʼ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω, " φησίν—οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ διʼ ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι— " πάντας δʼ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκῃ δʼ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται· " καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον.
For he says: "Therefore I shall never waste my portion of life on an empty, unaccomplished hope, seeking what cannot be, a blameless man among all of us who reap the fruit of the broad-wayed earth; if I find one, I shall report it to you," he says—so vehemently, and throughout the whole song, does he attack the saying of Pittacus—"and I praise and love all willingly, whoever does nothing shameful; but with necessity not even the gods fight." And this is said in reference to this very same point.
οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν.
For Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praised those whoever did no evil willingly, as if there were some who did evil willingly.
ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλʼ εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν·
For I hold this almost for certain, that none of the wise men believes that any human being errs willingly, or willingly performs shameful and bad deeds, but they well know that all who do shameful and bad things do them unwillingly.
καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῇ ἑκών, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἑκών.
And so indeed Simonides also does not say that he is a praiser of whoever does not do evil willingly, but he says this "willingly" in reference to himself.
§346ΣΩ. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὑτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην, οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.
Socrates: For he believed that a gentleman often forces himself to become a friend and a praiser of someone, for instance, that it often happens to a man to have an eccentric mother or father, or country, or some other such thing.
τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὥσπερ ἁσμένους ὁρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδʼ ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δʼ ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.
Now the wicked, when some such thing happens to them, see it as if with pleasure and point it out, blaming and accusing the wickedness of their parents or country, so that people may not charge them with neglecting them, nor reproach them for neglect, with the result that they blame them still more and add voluntary enmities to those that are necessary; but the good conceal it and are forced to praise, and if they are angry at all with their parents or country because they have been wronged, they comfort themselves and reconcile, forcing themselves additionally to love and praise their own.
πολλάκις δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος.
And often, I think, Simonides himself also believed that he praised and eulogized either a tyrant or some other such person not willingly, but under constraint.
ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ— " ἔμοιγʼ ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ μηδʼ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς τʼ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ· οὔ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι— " οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος— " τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα, " " πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τʼ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται. " οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμεικται—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ—ἀλλʼ ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν.
This is indeed what he says to Pittacus: "O Pittacus, I do not blame you for these things because I am fond of finding fault, since—for me it is enough, whoever is not bad nor too helpless, a sound man knowing the justice that benefits the city; him I shall not blame—" for I am not fond of blaming—"for the generation of fools is endless," "indeed all things are beautiful in which shameful things are not mixed." He does not say this as if he were saying "indeed all things are white in which black is not mixed"—for that would be ridiculous in many ways—but that he himself accepts even the intermediate things so as not to blame them.
καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, "πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί θʼ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω" · ὥστε τούτου γʼ ἕνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ ἂν ᾖ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας "φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι" —καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγων τὸ "πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκών" —ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα— "ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν" , ἄκων δʼ ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.
And "I do not seek," he said, "a blameless man among all of us who reap the fruit of the broad-wayed earth; if I find one, I shall report it to you." So for this reason I shall praise no one, but for me it is enough if he is intermediate and does no evil, as I "love and praise" all such men—and here he uses the dialect of the Mytileneans, as speaking to Pittacus: "but I praise and love all willingly"—here we must pause at "willingly" and read—"whoever does nothing shameful"; but there are some whom I praise and love unwillingly.'

Notes

  1. 345bὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός — The concluding part based on the impersonal premise that whoever does not become a physician by doing poorly cannot become a bad physician either. Syntactically, the optative with "an" from the previous clause is supplied in the ellipsis: "it is clear that he would not become a bad physician either."
  2. 345dὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ — Inside the result clause introduced by "hōste." The infinitive "epainein" depends on "phanai." The relative pronoun "hos an" is singular, while its antecedent "toutous" is plural, presenting a constructio ad sensum (synesis) referencing "anyone who."
  3. 346eἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα — The impersonal verb "dei" governs the infinitive "dialabein" (to distinguish/pause), and the accusative participle "legonta" functions as its subject of reference (the speaker or reader). "en tōi hekōn" is a prepositional phrase meaning "at the word 'willingly'," indicating where the pause in reading should be made.

Cite this passage

Plato, Protagoras §345-346. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg022.humanitext-grc2:345-346

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