§344ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾁσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι,
"χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα
"ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως"
.
Socrates: 'But we must place "truly" as a hyperbaton in the song, presupposing the saying of Pittacus in some such way, just as if we should suppose Pittacus himself speaking and Simonides answering and saying: "O men, it is difficult to be good," and the other replying: "O Pittacus, you do not speak the truth; for it is not to be, but to become indeed a man 'good in hands and feet and mind, four-square, fashioned without blame, that is truly difficult.'" In this way the "mén" appears to have been inserted with reason, and the "truly" to have been correctly placed at the end.
οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται.
And all the following parts bear witness to this, that it was spoken in this way.
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ᾁσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται—πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει—ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.
For there are many things that can be demonstrated about each of the things said in the song, showing how well it has been made—for it is very elegant and carefully written—but it would be long to go through it in this way; rather, let us go through its whole outline and intention, showing that through the whole song it is, more than anything else, a refutation of the saying of Pittacus.
λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,
"
ἄνδρα δʼ οὐκ
ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ. "
τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ;
For after this, having gone through a few things, he speaks as if he were saying in argument: that to become indeed a good man is truly difficult, yet possible at least for some time; but having become so, to remain in this state and to be a good man, as you say, O Pittacus, is impossible and not human, but a god alone could have this privilege: "and it is not possible for a man not to be bad, whom irresistible misfortune pulls down." Whom then does irresistible misfortune pull down in the command of a ship?
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθῄρηται.
Clearly not the layman; for the layman is always pulled down.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα.
Just as one could not throw down one who is already lying down, but could throw down one who is standing so as to make him lie down, but not one who is already lying down, so also irresistible misfortune could pull down one who is resourceful at some time, but not one who is always without resources; and a great storm falling upon a helmsman would make him helpless, and a harsh season coming upon a farmer would make him helpless, and the same things for a physician.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρʼ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος—
"
αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δʼ ἐσθλός· "
τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη.
For to the good man it is possible to become bad, as is also witnessed by another poet who said: "but a good man is sometimes bad, and at other times good"; but to the bad man it is not possible to become bad, but he must always be so.
ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ,
"οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι"
· σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πιττακέ,
"χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
· τὸ δʼ ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον· "
πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δʼ εἰ κακῶς. "
So that when irresistible misfortune pulls down the resourceful, wise, and good man, "it is not possible not to be bad." But you say, O Pittacus, "it is difficult to be good"; but it is difficult, yet possible, to become good, but to be so is impossible: "for having done well, every man is good, but bad if poorly."'