§340ΣΩ. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα—
"
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν,
"
ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ.
Socrates: 'So I seem to myself to be calling upon you, just as Homer said Scamander, when besieged by Achilles, called upon Simois, saying: "Dear brother, let us both stem the strength of the man," so I too call upon you, lest Protagoras sack Simonides for us.
καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ᾗ τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά.
For indeed, the defense of Simonides requires your art of music, by which you distinguish "wishing" and "desiring" as not being the same, and many other fine things that you said just now.
καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί.
And now consider whether you agree with me.
οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Σιμωνίδης.
For Simonides does not seem to be saying things contrary to himself.
σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; —
ἄλλο νὴ Δίʼ,
ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.
For you, Prodicus, declare your opinion first: does "becoming" seem to you to be the same as "being", or different?' 'Different, by Zeus,' said Prodicus.
—οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη; —
ἀληθῆ λέγεις,
ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.
'Therefore,' I said, 'in his first words Simonides himself declared his own opinion, that for a man to become truly good is difficult?' 'You speak the truth,' said Prodicus.
—τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο.
'But Pittacus,' I said, 'he censures, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing as himself, but something else.
οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι.
For Pittacus did not say, like Simonides, that it is difficult "to become" good, but "to be" [good]; and "to be" and "to become", Protagoras, as this Prodicus here says, are not the same.
εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὑτῷ.
And if "being" is not the same as "becoming", Simonides does not say things contrary to himself.
καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καθʼ Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι—τῆς γὰρ
"ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν"
τοὺς θεοὺς
"ἱδρῶτα"
θεῖναι—ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς
"εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν"
, ἐκτῆσθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπῄνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας,
τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. ἀλλʼ οὕτως ἔχει,
ἔφη.
And perhaps this Prodicus here and many others would say, according to Hesiod, that to become good is difficult—for the gods placed "sweat before virtue"—but when someone "reaches its summit, then it is easy to possess, although it was difficult."' Now Prodicus, having heard this, praised me; but Protagoras said: 'Your defense, Socrates, contains a greater error than the one you are correcting.' And I said: 'Then a bad thing has been done by me, as it seems, Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician: in trying to cure, I make the disease greater.' 'But that is how it is,' he said.
πῶς δή;
'How so?' I said.
ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πολλὴ ἄν,
ἔφη,
ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. §341ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε.
'It would be great ignorance,' he said, 'on the part of the poet, if he says that to possess virtue is so cheap, which is the most difficult of all things, as it seems to all men.' Socrates: And I said: 'By Zeus, Prodicus here has happened to join our discussion at just the right moment.
κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα.
For the wisdom of Prodicus, Protagoras, is likely to have been some divine thing of old, either starting from Simonides, or even still older.
σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνῃ, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ·
But you, while experienced in many other things, seem to be inexperienced in this, not like me who am experienced through being a pupil of this Prodicus here.
καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ
χαλεπὸν
τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ
δεινοῦ
Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν.
And now you seem to me not to understand that perhaps Simonides did not understand this "difficult" in the same way as you do, but just as this Prodicus here admonishes me each time about "dread", whenever I, in praising either you or someone else, say that Protagoras is a wise and "dread" man, he asks if I am not ashamed to call good things dread.
τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἑκάστοτε
δεινοῦ πλούτου
οὐδὲ
δεινῆς εἰρήνης
οὐδὲ
δεινῆς ὑγιείας,
ἀλλὰ
δεινῆς νόσου
καὶ
δεινοῦ πολέμου
καὶ
δεινῆς πενίας,
ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος.
For "dread", he says, is evil; at any rate, no one ever speaks of "dread wealth" or "dread peace" or "dread health", but of "dread disease" and "dread war" and "dread poverty", since the "dread" is evil.
ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ
χαλεπὸν
αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις·
Perhaps, therefore, the Ceans and Simonides also understand "difficult" in turn as either evil or some other thing that you do not understand.
ἐρώμεθα οὖν πρόδικον—δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν—τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ
χαλεπὸν
Σιμωνίδης; κακόν,
ἔφη.
Let us therefore ask Prodicus—for it is right to ask him about the voice of Simonides—what did Simonides mean, Prodicus, by "difficult"?' 'Evil,' he said.
διὰ ταῦτʼ ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγοντα
"χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν
"ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει,
ἔφη,
λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ Πιττακῷ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος; ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε.
'For this reason, then,' I said, 'Prodicus, he censures Pittacus when he says "it is difficult to be good", just as if he had heard him saying that it is evil "to be good".' 'But what else do you think, Socrates,' he said, 'Simonides meant than this, and that he was reproaching Pittacus because, being a Lesbian and brought up in a barbarian tongue, he did not know how to distinguish words rightly?' 'You hear, Protagoras,' I said, 'this Prodicus here.
ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ,
ἔφη,
οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ
χαλεπὸν
ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν.
Do you have anything to say to this?' And Protagoras said: 'Far from it, Prodicus; but I know well that Simonides meant by "difficult" what the rest of us do, not the evil, but that which is not easy but comes about through much trouble.' 'But I too think so, Protagoras,' I said, 'that Simonides meant this, and that this Prodicus here knows it, but is playing and seems to be trying you out to see if you will be able to help your own argument.
ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι—
"
θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτʼ ἔχοι γέρας,
"
οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν
"ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
, εἶτα τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἄν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον.
Since that Simonides at least does not mean by "difficult" "evil" is immediately proved by the very next phrase; for he says that: "God alone would have this privilege," for surely he is not saying this, that it is evil "to be good", and then says that God alone would have this and assigned this privilege to God alone; for Prodicus would be calling Simonides some licentious person and in no way a Cean.'