§338ΣΩ.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτʼ αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν.
Socrates: 'Therefore, Protagoras and Socrates, I both request and advise you to come to an agreement, as if under our mediation as arbiters bringing you to a middle ground, and that you, Socrates, should not seek this precise form of dialogue that is too brief, if it is not pleasant to Protagoras, but should let go and slacken the reins on your words, so that they may appear to us more magnificent and dignified; nor on the other hand should Protagoras, spreading out every cable and yielding to the favorable wind, flee into the open sea of words, losing sight of land, but both of you should cut a middle course.
ὣς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου. ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην.
Do so then, and obey me by choosing an officer, a supervisor, and a president, who will guard for you the moderate length of each person's speech.' This pleased those present, and everyone approved; Callias said he would not let me go, and they requested that a supervisor be chosen.
εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων.
So I said that it would be shameful to choose an arbiter for our words.
εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδʼ οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ᾑρήσεται.
For if the one chosen is inferior to us, it would not be right for the inferior to supervise the better; and if he is equal, it is not right either, for someone equal to us will do things equal to us, so that he will have been chosen in vain.
ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε.
But then you will choose someone better than us.
τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει.
In truth, as I believe, it is impossible for you to choose anyone wiser than Protagoras here; and if you choose someone who is not at all better, but claim that he is, this too is shameful for him, like choosing a supervisor for an ordinary man, since for my part it makes no difference to me.
ἀλλʼ οὑτωσὶ ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵνʼ ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι·
But I am willing to do it in this way, so that the gathering and dialogues which you desire may take place for us: if Protagoras does not wish to answer, let him ask and I will answer, and at the same time I will try to show him how I say an answerer ought to answer.
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπόσʼ ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως.
And when I have answered as many questions as he wishes to ask, let him in turn submit to giving an account to me in the same way.
ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε.
If, therefore, he does not seem eager to answer the very question asked, both I and you will in common request of him what you requested of me, not to ruin the gathering; and for this purpose there is no need for one supervisor to be appointed, but you will all supervise in common.
ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι·
It seemed to everyone that it should be done this way.
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.
And Protagoras was not at all willing, but nevertheless he was forced to agree to ask questions, and when he had asked enough, to submit in turn to giving an account by answering briefly.
§339ΣΩ. ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως· —
ἡγοῦμαι,
ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τʼ εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι.
Socrates: He began, then, to ask in some such way as this: 'I consider, Socrates,' he said, 'that for a man of education, the greatest part is to be skilled in poetry; and this means being able to understand what is said by the poets, both what is rightly composed and what is not, and to know how to distinguish them and to give an account when asked.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δʼ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει.
And indeed, the question now will be about the very same subject that you and I are now discussing, namely virtue, but transferred into poetry; it will differ only by so much.
λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι—
"
ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
τετυγμένον. "
τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος. εὖ,
ἔφη,
λέγεις.
For Simonides says somewhere to Scopas, the son of Creon the Thessalian, that— ¦339b "For a man to become truly good is difficult, square in hands and feet and mind, fashioned without blame." Do you know this song, or shall I go through the whole of it for you?' And I said: 'There is no need; for I know it, and it happens that I have paid very close attention to this song.' 'Well said,' he said.
πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ; —πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.
'Does it seem to you to be finely and rightly composed, or not?' 'Very finely and rightly,' I said.
—
δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ ποιητής; —οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
'But does it seem to you to be finely composed, if the poet himself says things contrary to himself?' 'Not finely', I said.
—
ὅρα δή,
ἔφη,
βέλτιον. —ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς. —
οἶσθα οὖν,
ἔφη,
ὅτι προιόντος τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που—
"
οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτʼ ἐσθλὸν
ἔμμεναι. "
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἔμπροσθεν; —οἶδα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
'Look then,' he said, 'more carefully.' 'But, my good friend, I have examined it sufficiently.' 'Do you know then,' he said, 'that as the song goes on, he says somewhere: "Nor does the saying of Pittacus harmonize with me, though spoken by a wise man: he said it is difficult to be good." Are you aware that this same person says both these things and those earlier ones?' 'I know,' I said.
—
δοκεῖ οὖν σοι,
ἔφη,
ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; —φαίνεται ἔμοιγε (καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι) ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται; —
πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι
"χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι"
, τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος;
'Does it seem to you then,' he said, 'that these agree with those?' 'It seems so to me' (and at the same time, however, I was afraid lest he might be onto something), 'but,' I said, 'does it not seem so to you?' 'For how indeed could anyone who says both these things appear to agree with himself, since first he himself assumed that it is difficult for a man to become truly good, and then, having gone forward only a little in the poem, he forgot, and censures Pittacus, who says the very same thing as himself—namely, "it is difficult to be good"—and says he does not accept Pittacus' saying the very same things as himself?
καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὑτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων·
And yet, when he censures the one who says the very same things as himself, it is clear that he also censures himself, so that either the former or the latter statement is not rightly made.' When he had said this, he caused an uproar and praise from many of the listeners.
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων·
And I, at first, as if struck by a good boxer, was blinded and grew dizzy when he said this and the others cheered.
ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί.
But then—to tell you the truth, so that time might be gained for me to consider what the poet meant—I turned to Prodicus, and calling him, I said: 'Prodicus, Simonides is indeed your fellow citizen; you have a duty to help the man.'