§336ΣΩ. νῦν δʼ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι, εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλʼ εἴ τι δέῃ θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι·
Socrates: "But now it is just as if you were to ask me to keep up with Crison, the runner from Himera in his prime, or to run along and keep up with one of the long-distance runners or day-runners; I would say to you that I myself much more than you wish that I could follow these men in running, but I cannot.
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως.
But if you want to behold me and Crison running in the same place, ask him to slacken his pace; for I cannot run fast, but he can run slowly.
εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι·
If, therefore, you desire to hear me and Protagoras, ask him, just as he answered me at first briefly and to the very questions asked, so to answer now too.
εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων;
Otherwise, what will be the manner of our dialogues?
χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγʼ ᾤμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. ἀλλʼ—ὁρᾷς; —ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὑτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης,
οὐ καλῶς λέγεις,
ἔφη,
ὦ Καλλία·
For I for my part thought that being together and conversing with one another is different from public speaking.""But, Socrates," Callias said, "Protagoras seems to speak justly when he claims that he should be allowed to converse as he pleases, and you as you in turn please."Then Alcibiades interrupted and said:"You do not speak well, Callias.
Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τʼ εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ.
For Socrates here admits that he has no share in long speaking and yields to Protagoras, but as for conversing, and knowing how to give and receive an argument, I should be surprised if he yields to any man.
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφʼ ἑκάστῃ ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων·
If, therefore, Protagoras also admits that he is inferior to Socrates in conversing, that is enough for Socrates; but if he contests it, let him converse by asking and answering, not spinning out a long speech at each question, evading the arguments and being unwilling to give an answer, but drawing it out until most of the listeners forget what the question was about.
ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι.
For I guarantee that Socrates will not forget, despite his playful claim that he is forgetful.
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ·
To me, therefore, Socrates seems to speak more reasonably; for each of us ought to declare his own opinion."After Alcibiades, I think, Critias was the one who spoke:"Prodicus and Hippias, Callias seems to me to be very much on Protagoras' side, while Alcibiades is always combative towards whatever he sets his mind on.
ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν. §337ΣΩ. εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος,
καλῶς μοι,
ἔφη,
δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία·
But we ought not to join in being combative on either Socrates' or Protagoras' side, but to ask both of them in common not to break up the gathering in the middle." When he had said this, Prodicus said:"You seem to me to speak well, Critias.
χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν·
For those who are present at such discussions ought to be common listeners to both of the interlocutors, but not equal ones; for these are not the same.
κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον.
For it is necessary to listen to both in common, but not to distribute equally to each, but more to the wiser and less to the more ignorant.
ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή—ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ διʼ εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο·
I myself, Protagoras and Socrates, ask you to yield to one another, and to dispute about the arguments indeed, but not to wrangle; for friends dispute with friends out of goodwill, but adversaries and enemies wrangle with one another. And in this way our gathering would become most beautiful.
ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστʼ ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων— ἡμεῖς τʼ αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστʼ ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεσθα—εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο·
For you who speak would thus gain the highest esteem among us who listen, and not mere praise; for to be esteemed occurs in the souls of the listeners without deception, but to be praised in words often occurs contrary to true opinion among those who lie. And we in turn who listen would thus be most gratified, not pleased; for to be gratified is to learn something and to partake of wisdom in the mind itself, but to be pleased is to eat something or to experience some other pleasant thing in the body itself."When Prodicus had said this, very many of those present approved.
μετὰ δὲ τὸν πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν,
ὦ ἄνδρες,
ἔφη,
οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι— φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ·
After Prodicus, Hippias the wise said:"O men present, I consider you all to be kinsmen, associates, and citizens— by nature, not by law.
τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
For like is akin to like by nature, but law, being a tyrant of humans, forces many things contrary to nature. It is therefore shameful for us to know the nature of things, and being the wisest of the Greeks, and having met for this very reason in this very city, which is the prytaneum of wisdom in Greece, and in this greatest and wealthiest house of the city itself, to show nothing worthy of this dignity, but to dispute with one another like the meanest of humans."