§286ΣΩ.
τί οὖν; ἦ δʼ ὅς·
SOCRATES: "'What then?' he said.
εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; —
πάνυ γε. —
οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν; ὡς ἔστιν. —
εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι,
ἔφη,
ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. —
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;
'Are there accounts for each of the things that are?' 'Certainly.' 'Is it as each thing is, or as it is not?' 'As it is.' 'For if you remember, Ctesippus,' he said, 'we also demonstrated just now that no one speaks as it is not; for no one was shown to speak that which is not.' 'What of this then?' said Ctesippus.
ἦ δʼ ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος· ἧττόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ; —
πότερον οὖν,
ἦ δʼ ὅς,
ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταὐτὰ λέγοιμεν;
'Do you and I contradict each other any the less?' 'Would we then,' he said, 'contradict if we both spoke the account of the same thing?
—συνεχώρει. —
ἀλλʼ ὅταν μηδέτερος,
ἔφη,
τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἄν;
Or in that case would we surely say the same things?' —He agreed.— 'But when neither of us,' he said, 'speaks the account of the thing, would we then contradict?
ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδʼ ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; —καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει. —
ἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν;
Or in that case would neither of us have mentioned the thing at all?' —To this also he agreed.— 'But then, when I speak the account of the thing, and you speak another account of something else, do we then contradict?
ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις τὸ παράπαν;
Or do I speak the thing, while you do not even speak at all?
ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς ἂν ἀντιλέγοι; καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐσίγησεν·
And how could he who does not speak contradict him who speaks?' And Ctesippus fell silent.
ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν λόγον, πῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις;
But I, wondering at the argument, said, 'Dionysodorus, how do you mean?
οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν —οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι.
For indeed I always wonder at this very argument, having heard it from many people and many times—for the followers of Protagoras used it a great deal, and those even older; and to me it always seems to be something wonderful, both overturning others and itself as well—and I think I shall learn the truth of it best from you.
ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;
Is it not that to speak falsely does not exist?
—τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἦ γάρ;
For this is what the argument can do, is it not?
—ἀλλʼ ἢ λέγοντʼ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν; συνεχώρει.
And that he who speaks must either speak the truth or not speak?' He agreed.
πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι ἔστιν; οὐδὲ δοξάζειν,
ἔφη.
'Is it then that to speak falsely is not possible, but to have a false opinion is possible?' 'Not even to have a false opinion,' he said.
οὐδʼ ἄρα ψευδής, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν.
'Then there is no false opinion at all,' I said.
οὐκ
ἔφη.
'No,' he said.
οὐδʼ ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδʼ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων;
'Nor then is there ignorance or ignorant men?
πάνυ γε,
ἔφη.
Or would not this be ignorance, if indeed there were such, to be deceived about things?' 'Certainly,' he said.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
'But this does not exist,' I said.
οὐκ
ἔφη.
'No,' he said.
λόγου ἕνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι ἀμαθὴς ἀνθρώπων; ἀλλὰ σύ,
ἔφη,
ἔλεγξον. ἦ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι, μηδενὸς ψευδομένου; οὐκ ἔστιν,
ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.
'Do you say this argument for the sake of argument, Dionysodorus, so that you may say something strange, or does it really seem to you that no one among human beings is ignorant?' 'But you,' he said, 'refute it.' 'Is it indeed possible, according to your argument, to refute, if no one speaks falsely?' 'It is not,' said Euthydemus.
οὐδʼ ἄρα ἐκέλευεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, νυνδὴ Διονυσόδωρος ἐξελέγξαι;
'Then Dionysodorus just now was not bidding me to refute?' I said.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν πῶς ἄν τις κελεύσαι;
'For how could anyone bid that which is not?
σὺ δὲ κελεύεις; ὅτι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μανθάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως ἐννοῶ.
But do you bid me?' 'Because, Euthydemus,' I said, 'I do not quite understand these wise and fine things, but I grasp them in a rather dull way.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν φορτικώτερόν τι ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκε.
Perhaps then I shall ask something rather vulgar, but forgive me.'"