Humanitext Reader

Plato · Euthydemus §287-288

Refutation of Infallibility and Resumption of Inquiry

Passage 12 of 25 · Greek

Summary

Socrates points out that if making mistakes is impossible, teaching virtue is also impossible, exposing Dionysodorus' contradiction. Socrates then calms Ctesippus down and, together with Cleinias, resumes their joint inquiry into the kind of knowledge that benefits life (philosophy).

§287ΣΩ. ὅρα δέ· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστιν μήτε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῆ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδʼ ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι πράττη;
SOCRATES: "But consider: if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to have a false opinion, nor to be ignorant, is there anything else than that it is not even possible to make a mistake when anyone does anything?
πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ πράττει·
For in doing it, it is not possible to mistake that which he does.
οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
Is this not what you say?" "Quite so," he said.
τοῦτό ἐστιν ἤδη, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἐρώτημα.
"This indeed is," I said, "now that vulgar question.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἁμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἥκετε;
For if we do not make mistakes, either in doing or in speaking or in thinking, by Zeus, if this is so, what have you come to be teachers of?
ἢ οὐκ ἄρτι ἔφατε ἀρετὴν κάλλιστʼ ἂν παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλοντι μανθάνειν; εἶτʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβών, οὕτως εἶ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμνῄσκῃ, καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθήσῃ, τοῖς δʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις οὐχ ἕξεις ὅτι χρῇ; καὶ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποί εἰσιν πάνυ—εἰκότως· παρὰ σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται—ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ παγχάλεπον χρήσασθαί ἐστιν, ᾧ λέγεις.
Or did you not just now say that you would transmit virtue most finely to anyone among human beings who is willing to learn?" Then Dionysodorus, breaking in, said, "Are you, Socrates, such a Chronus that you now remember what we said at first, and if I said something last year, you will remember it now, but you will not know what to do with what is being said in the present?" "Indeed," I said, "they are very difficult—and with good reason, for they are spoken by wise men—since even this last thing you say is extremely difficult to deal with.
τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρῶμαι τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε;
For what on earth do you mean, Dionysodorus, by 'I do not know what to do with'?
ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν;
Or is it clear that you mean I do not know how to refute it?
ἐπεὶ εἰπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι τοῖς λόγοις ; ἀλλʼ ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ ἀπόκριναι. πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε;
Since tell me, what else does this phrase mean to you, 'I do not know what to do with the arguments'?" "But as to what you say," he said, "answer instead." "Before you answer, Dionysodorus?" I said.
οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ἔφη.
"Won't you answer?" he said.
ἦ καὶ δίκαιον; δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη.
"Is that indeed just?" "Just indeed," he said.
κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"By what argument?" I said.
ἢ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε, ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφῖξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ οἶσθα ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή;
"Or is it clear that it is by this one: that you have now come to us as someone all-wise about arguments, and you know when it is necessary to answer and when it is not?
καὶ νῦν οὐδʼ ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρίνῃ, ἅτε γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ; λαλεῖς, ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι·
And now you will not answer anything at all, inasmuch as you know that you ought not to?" "You babble," he said, "neglecting to answer.
ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, πείθου καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι. πειστέον τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν· σὺ γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα.
But, my good man, obey and answer, since you even agree that I am wise." "I must obey then," I said, "and it is necessary, as it seems; for you rule.
πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα; τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα. οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥῆμα ψυχὴν ἔχον; μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε. τί οὖν ἄρτι ἤρου ὅτι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα; τί ἄλλο γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν;
Go on and ask." "Do those things that think have a soul, or do soulless things think too?" "Those that have a soul." "Do you know then," he said, "any phrase that has a soul?" "By Zeus, not I." "Why then did you just now ask what the phrase meant to me?" "What else," I said, "than that I made a mistake through my stupidity?
ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα;
Or did I not make a mistake, but spoke this also correctly, in saying that phrases think?
πότερα φῂς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὔ; §288ΣΩ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὤν, οὐδʼ ἔχεις ὅτι χρῇ τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δʼ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδʼ οὕτως ὀρθῶς λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
Do you say that I make a mistake or not?" SOCRATES: "For if I did not make a mistake, neither will you refute me, wise though you are, nor do you know what to do with the argument; but if I did make a mistake, not even in this case do you speak correctly in claiming that it is not possible to make a mistake.
καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς ἃ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω.
And I am not saying these things against what you said last year.
ἀλλὰ ἔοικεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταὐτῷ μένειν καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρῆσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα οὑτωσὶ θαυμαστῆς οὔσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν λόγων. καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμάσιά γε λέγετʼ, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθʼ ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι· ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν. καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς μὴ λοιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπράυνον τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νυνδὴ ἃ πρὸς Κλεινίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγω, ὅτι οὐ γιγνώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι θαυμασία ἐστίν.
But," I said, "Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, this argument seems to remain in the same place, and still as of old, having thrown itself down, to fall; and how not to suffer this has not yet been discovered even by your art, and that too when it is so wonderful for the precision of its arguments." And Ctesippus said, "Wonderful things you say, men of Thurii, or of Chios, or from wherever and in whatever way you delight in being named; since you care nothing about talking nonsense." And I, fearing lest it should become an insult, again appeased Ctesippus and said, "Ctesippus, what I said just now to Cleinias, I say these same things to you also: that you do not recognize the wisdom of the strangers, how wonderful it is.
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.
But they are unwilling to show it to us in earnest, but they imitate Proteus, the Egyptian sophist, playing tricks on us.
ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῆτον ἐφʼ ᾧ αὐτὼ σπουδάζετον· οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξωνται σπουδάζειν.
So let us imitate Menelaus, and not let the two men go until they reveal to us what they are earnest about; for I think something beautiful will appear in them, once they begin to be in earnest.
ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώμεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι.
Let us then beg and persuade and pray to them to reveal it.
ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν ὑφηγήσασθαι οἵω προσεύχομαι αὐτὼ φανῆναί μοι· ὅθεν γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἑξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντέ με καὶ οἰκτίραντε συντεταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτὼ σπουδάσητον.
I think then that I myself should again lead the way to show how I pray for them to appear to me; for from where I left off before, I will try to go through the next part of the argument as best as I can, if in some way I might call them out, so that, taking pity and compassion on me, strained and in earnest, they too may become in earnest.
σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν με πόθεν τότʼ ἀπελίπομεν.
And you, Cleinias," I said, "remind me from where we left off then.
ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐγᾦμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν.
Now as I think, it was somewhere here.
φιλοσοφητέον ὡμολογήσαμεν τελευτῶντες· ἦ γάρ; — ναί, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
We agreed in the end that one must philosophize; is that not so?" "Yes," he said.
—ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως; ἔφην.
"And philosophy indeed is the acquisition of knowledge; is it not so?" I said.
— ναί, ἔφη.
"Yes," he said.
—τίνα ποτʼ οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς κτησαίμεθα;
"What knowledge then, by acquiring it, would we acquire rightly?
ἆρʼ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἥτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει; — πάνυ γʼ , ἔφη.
Is this not simple: that which will benefit us?" "Quite so," he said.
—ἆρʼ οὖν ἄν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ ἐπισταίμεθα γιγνώσκειν περιιόντες ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίον πλεῖστον κατορώρυκται; — ἴσως, ἔφη.
"Would it then benefit us at all, if we knew how to recognize, by going around, where on earth the most gold is buried?" "Perhaps," he said.

Notes

  1. 287aἄλλο τι — An idiomatic expression for a rhetorical question (ἄλλο τι ἤ), meaning "is it not the case that...?" or "is there anything else than that...?", leading to a strong affirmative statement.
  2. 287bὥστε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμνῄσκῃ — The conjunction ὥστε with the indicative verbs (ἀναμιμνῄσκῃ, ἀναμνησθήσῃ, οὐχ ἕξεις) expresses an actual result ("with the result that..."). It correlates with the preceding οὕτως ("so, to such an extent").
  3. 287cοὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι — χρήσωμαι is a deliberative subjunctive, meaning "what I should do with" or "how I should treat." It forms an indirect question clause serving as the object of οὐκ ἔχω ("I do not have/know").
  4. 288aὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρῆσθαι — Part of the accusative and infinitive construction governed by the verb ἔοικεν ("it seems"). The subject is the noun phrase ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν ("how not to suffer this").

Cite this passage

Plato, Euthydemus §287-288. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg021.humanitext-grc2:287-288

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