§221πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πρὸς Διός, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων;
"Is it," I said, "by Zeus, if the bad perishes, will there no longer be even hungering or thirsting, or any other such thing?
ἢ πείνη μὲν ἔσται, ἐάνπερ ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα ᾖ, οὐ μέντοι βλαβερά γε;
Or will hunger exist, if indeed humans and other animals exist, yet not be harmful?
καὶ δίψα δὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακαί, ἅτε τοῦ κακοῦ ἀπολωλότος;
And thirst indeed and the other desires, but not bad, since the bad has perished?
ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται;
Or is the question ridiculous, what will or will not be then?
τίς γὰρ οἶδεν;
For who knows?
ἀλλʼ οὖν τόδε γʼ ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν πεινῶντα βλάπτεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι.
But at any rate, we know this, that even now it is possible for one who is hungry to be harmed, and it is also possible to be benefited.
ἦ γάρ; —
πάνυ γε. —οὐκοῦν καὶ διψῶντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλαβερῶς, ἐνίοτε δὲ μηδέτερα; —
σφόδρα γε. —οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ἀπολλύηται τὰ κακά, ἅ γε μὴ τυγχάνει ὄντα κακά, τί προσήκει τοῖς κακοῖς συναπόλλυσθαι; —
οὐδέν. —ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ μήτε ἀγαθαὶ μήτε κακαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά. —
φαίνεται. —οἷόν τε οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρῶντα τούτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν; —
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀπολομένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, φίλʼ ἄττα. —
ναί. —οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τούτου ἀπολομένου φίλον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ.
Is it not so?"— "Certainly." —"Therefore also for one who is thirsty and desiring all other such things, is it possible sometimes to desire beneficially, sometimes harmfully, and sometimes in neither way?"— "Very much so." —"Therefore, if the bad things are being destroyed, why should those things which do not happen to be bad perish along with the bad?"— "None." —"Therefore those desires which are neither good nor bad will exist even if the bad things perish."— "It appears so." —"Is it then possible for one who desires and loves not to love that which he desires and loves?"— "It does not seem so to me." —"Therefore, it seems, even if the bad things are destroyed, there will still be some things that are loved."— "Yes." —"If indeed the bad were the cause of something being loved, there could not be, if this perished, any friend to another.
αἰτίας γὰρ ἀπολομένης ἀδύνατόν που ἦν ἔτʼ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ αἰτία. —
ὀρθῶς λέγεις. —οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν τὸ φίλον φιλεῖν τι καὶ διά τι·
For if the cause is destroyed, it would, I suppose, be impossible for that still to exist of which this was the cause."— "You speak correctly." —"Then, has it been agreed by us that what is loved loves something and because of something?
καὶ ᾠήθημεν τότε γε διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν; —
ἀληθῆ. — νῦν δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίνεται ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι. —
ἔοικεν. —ἆρʼ οὖν τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τότε ὅταν ἐπιθυμῇ, ὃ δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν φίλον εἶναι, ὕθλος τις ἦν, ὥσπερ ποίημα μακρὸν συγκείμενον; —
κινδυνεύει,
ἔφη. —ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ.
And did we think at that time indeed that it is because of the bad that what is neither good nor bad loves the good?"— "True." — "But now indeed, as it seems, there appears to be some other cause of loving and being loved."— "It seems so." —"Is then in truth, as we were just saying, desire the cause of friendship, and is that which desires a friend to that which it desires and at that time when it desires, while that which we previously said was a friend was some nonsense, like a long poem put together?"— "It is likely," he said. —"But indeed," I said, "that which desires, desires that of which it may be in need.
ἦ γάρ; —
ναί. —τὸ δʼ ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλον ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ; —
δοκεῖ μοι. —ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἄν τι ἀφαιρῆται. —
πῶς δʼ οὔ; —τοῦ οἰκείου δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὖσα, ὡς φαίνεται, ὦ Μενέξενέ τε καὶ Λύσι. —συνεφάτην. —ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστὸν ἀλλήλοις, φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοί ἐσθʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς. —
κομιδῇ,
ἐφάτην. —
Is it not so?"— "Yes." —"And is that which is in need then a friend to that of which it may be in need?"— "It seems so to me." —"And one becomes in need of that of which something is taken away?"— "Of course." —"Therefore, it seems, love, friendship, and desire happen to be for what is one's own, as it appears, O Menexenus and Lysis."— They both agreed. —"Therefore, if you two are friends to each other, you are in some way by nature suited to each other."— "Absolutely," they both said.—