§220ἢ ὧδέ πως ἔχει· πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἕνεκά του παρασκευαζομένοις, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα παρασκευάζεται.
Or is it somehow like this: all such earnestness is not bestowed upon these things, namely those which are prepared for the sake of something else, but upon that for the sake of which all such things are prepared.
οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν ὡς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα, ὃ ἂν φανῇ ὄν, ὅτου ἕνεκα καὶ χρυσίον καὶ πάντα τὰ παρασκευαζόμενα παρασκευάζεται.
It is not that we often say we highly value gold and silver; but rather, lest the truth be not at all in this way, but rather that that thing is what we value above all, which should appear to be that for the sake of which both gold and all prepared things are prepared.
ἆρʼ οὕτως φήσομεν; —
πάνυ γε. —οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φίλου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος;
Shall we say so?— "Certainly." —"Then is not the same argument true also of the friend?
ὅσα γάρ φαμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινὸς ἑτέρου, ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν. —
κινδυνεύει οὕτως,
ἔφη,
ἔχειν. —οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα φίλον ἐστίν; —
ἀληθῆ. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀπήλλακται, μὴ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα τὸ φίλον φίλον εἶναι·
For as many things as we say are friends to us for the sake of some other friend, we seem to say so in word only; and that which is truly a friend is likely to be that very thing, in which all these so-called friendships terminate."— "It is likely," he said, "to be so." —"Then that which is truly a friend is not a friend for the sake of some other friend?"— "True." "This, then, is set aside—that the friend is a friend for the sake of some other friend.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν φίλον; —
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —ἆρʼ οὖν διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖται, καὶ ἔχει ὧδε· εἰ τριῶν ὄντων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ μήτε ἀγαθοῦ μήτε κακοῦ, τὰ δύο λειφθείη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκποδὼν ἀπέλθοι καὶ μηδενὸς ἐφάπτοιτο μήτε σώματος μήτε ψυχῆς μήτε τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ δή φαμεν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ οὔτε κακὰ εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθά, ἆρα τότε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν χρήσιμον εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἄχρηστον ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη;
But is the good a friend?"— "It seems so to me." —"Is it then because of the bad that the good is loved, and is it thus: if, of the three things we were just now mentioning—the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad—two were left, while the bad were to depart out of the way and touch nothing of either body or soul or any of the other things which we say are in themselves neither bad nor good, would the good then be of no use to us, but would have become useless?
εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἔτι βλάπτοι, οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δεοίμεθα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἂν τότε γένοιτο κατάδηλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τἀγαθὸν ἠγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς φάρμακον ὂν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα· νοσήματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν δεῖ φαρμάκου.
For if nothing were to harm us any longer, we should have no need of any benefit, and so it would then become clear that it was because of the bad that we valued and loved the good, as the good is a medicine for the bad, and the bad is a sickness; but when there is no sickness, there is no need of medicine.
ἆρʼ οὕτω πέφυκέ τε καὶ φιλεῖται τἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ κακὸν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν, τῶν μεταξὺ ὄντων τοῦ κακοῦ τε καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸ δʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρείαν ἔχει; —
ἔοικεν,
ἦ δʼ ὅς,
οὕτως ἔχειν. —τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα —ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα—οὐδὲν τούτοις ἔοικεν.
Is it then thus by nature, and is the good loved by us, who are between the bad and the good, because of the bad, while of itself it has no use?"— "It seems," he said, "to be so." —"Therefore, that friend of ours, in which all the other things terminated —which we said were friends for the sake of another friend—is not at all like them.
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ φίλου ἕνεκα φίλα κέκληται, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοὐναντίον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὂν ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐχθρὸν ἀπέλθοι, οὐκέτι, ὡς ἔοικʼ, ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν φίλον. —
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ,
ἔφη,
ὥς γε νῦν λέγεται. —
For those are called friends for the sake of a friend, but that which is truly a friend appears to be by nature entirely the opposite of this; for it has appeared to be a friend to us because of an enemy, and if the enemy were to go away, it seems it is no longer a friend to us."— "It does not seem so to me," he said, "at least as it is now being said." —