§218οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐστὶν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐκ ἦν. —
οὐ γὰρ οὖν. —διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαῖμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδʼ αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν.
For it is no longer either bad or good, but bad; and we agreed that the bad is not a friend to the good."— "Indeed not." —"For these reasons, then, we should say that those who are already wise no longer philosophize, whether they are gods or men; nor, on the other hand, do those philosophize who are so ignorant as to be bad; for no one who is bad and ignorant philosophizes.
λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν.
There remain, then, those who have this evil, ignorance, but have not yet been made by it senseless or ignorant, but still believe that they do not know what they do not know.
διὸ δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοί πω ὄντες, ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου οὔτε τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου φίλον ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις.
Therefore, those who are not yet either good or bad philosophize, while those who are bad do not, nor do those who are good; for neither has the opposite been shown to be a friend of the opposite, nor the like of the like, in our previous arguments.
ἢ οὐ μέμνησθε; —
πάνυ γε,
ἐφάτην. —νῦν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξηυρήκαμεν ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον καὶ οὔ.
Or do you not remember?"— "Very much so," they both said. —"Now then," I said, "Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered beyond all doubt what is a friend and what is not.
φαμὲν γὰρ αὐτό, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι. —παντάπασιν ἐφάτην τε καὶ συνεχωρείτην οὕτω τοῦτʼ ἔχειν.
For we say, both in respect to the soul and to the body and everywhere, that that which is neither bad nor good is, because of the presence of an evil, a friend of the good."— They both entirely agreed that this was so.
καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάνυ ἔχαιρον, ὥσπερ θηρευτής τις, ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς ὃ ἐθηρευόμην.
And indeed, I myself was very glad, like a hunter, happily holding what I had been hunting.
κἄπειτʼ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὁπόθεν μοι ἀτοπωτάτη τις ὑποψία εἰσῆλθεν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ εἴη τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀχθεσθεὶς εἶπον· βαβαῖ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, κινδυνεύομεν ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι.
And then, I do not know from where, a most strange suspicion came over me that our agreements were not true, and immediately, being distressed, I said: "Alas, Lysis and Menexenus, we seem to have become rich in a dream!
τί μάλιστα; ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος.
""Why so?" said Menexenus.
φοβοῦμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζόσιν λόγοις τισὶν τοιούτοις ἐντετυχήκαμεν περὶ τοῦ φίλου. πῶς δή; ἔφη.
"I am afraid," I said, "that we have met with some such arguments about the friend as if they were boastful men." "How so?" he said.
ὧδε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, σκοπῶμεν·
"Let us consider it in this way," I said.
φίλος ὃς ἂν εἴη, πότερόν ἐστίν τῳ φίλος ἢ οὔ; —
ἀνάγκη,
ἔφη. —πότερον οὖν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα καὶ διʼ οὐδέν, ἢ ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι; —
ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι. —πότερον φίλου ὄντος ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, οὗ ἕνεκα φίλος ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἢ οὔτε φίλου οὔτε ἐχθροῦ; —
οὐ πάνυ,
ἔφη,
ἕπομαι. —εἰκότως γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ ὧδε ἴσως ἀκολουθήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ μᾶλλον εἴσομαι ὅτι λέγω.
"Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?"— "Necessarily," he said. —"Is he so, then, for the sake of nothing and because of nothing, or for the sake of something and because of something?"— "For the sake of something and because of something." —"Is that thing, for the sake of which the friend is a friend to the friend, itself a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?"— "I do not quite," he said, "follow." —"Naturally," I said; "but in this way perhaps you will follow, and I think I too shall understand better what I am saying.
ὁ κάμνων, νυνδὴ ἔφαμεν, τοῦ ἰατροῦ φίλος· οὐχ οὕτως; —
ναί. —οὐκοῦν διὰ νόσον ἕνεκα ὑγιείας τοῦ ἰατροῦ φίλος; —
ναί. —ἡ δέ γε νόσος κακόν; —
πῶς δʼ οὔ; —τί δὲ ὑγίεια; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
The sick man, we said just now, is a friend of the doctor; is it not so?"— "Yes." —"Is he then a friend of the doctor because of sickness, for the sake of health?"— "Yes." —"And sickness is indeed an evil?"— "How could it not be?" —"But what about health?" I said.
ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερα; — §219ἀγαθόν,
ἔφη. —ἐλέγομεν δʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν ὄν, διὰ τὴν νόσον, τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ κακόν, τῆς ἰατρικῆς φίλον ἐστίν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἰατρική· ἕνεκα δὲ τῆς ὑγιείας τὴν φιλίαν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀνῄρηται, ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν.
"Is it a good, an evil, or neither?"— "A good," he said. —"And we were saying, as it seems, that the body, being neither good nor bad, is because of sickness—that is, because of an evil—a friend of medicine, and medicine is a good; and for the sake of health, medicine has been taken up in friendship, and health is a good.
ἦ γάρ; —
ναί. —φίλον δὲ ἢ οὐ φίλον ἡ ὑγίεια; —
φίλον. —ἡ δὲ νόσος ἐχθρόν. —
πάνυ γε. —τὸ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἐχθρὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον ἐστὶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου. —
φαίνεται. —ἕνεκα ἄρα τοῦ φίλου τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν. —
ἔοικεν. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἥκομεν, ὦ παῖδες, πρόσσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν.
Is that not so?"— "Yes." —"And is health a friend or not a friend?"— "A friend." —"And sickness is an enemy?"— "Certainly." —"Then that which is neither bad nor good is, because of the bad and the enemy, a friend of the good, for the sake of the good and the friend."— "So it appears." —"Therefore, for the sake of the friend, that which is a friend is a friend, because of the enemy."— "It seems so." "Well then," I said, "since we have come to this point, boys, let us pay attention, lest we be deceived.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν, ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου γε τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον γίγνεται, ὅ φαμεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.
For that the friend has become a friend of the friend, I let pass, and also that the like becomes a friend of the like, which we said is impossible; but nevertheless let us consider this, lest what is now being said should deceive us.
ἡ ἰατρική, φαμέν, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγιείας φίλον. —
ναί. —οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια φίλον; —
πάνυ γε. —εἰ ἄρα φίλον, ἕνεκά του. —
ναί. —φίλου γέ τινος δή, εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ. —
πάνυ γε. —οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκεῖνο φίλον αὖ ἔσται ἕνεκα φίλου; —
ναί. —ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας ἢ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπί τινα ἀρχήν, ἣ οὐκέτʼ ἐπανοίσει ἐπʼ ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλʼ ἥξει ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνο ὅ ἐστιν πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαμὲν πάντα φίλα εἶναι; —
ἀνάγκη. —τοῦτο δή ἐστιν ὃ λέγω, μὴ ἡμᾶς τἆλλα πάντα ἃ εἴπομεν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα φίλα εἶναι, ὥσπερ εἴδωλα ἄττα ὄντα αὐτοῦ, ἐξαπατᾷ, ᾖ δʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστι φίλον.
Medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health."— "Yes." —"Is then health also a friend?"— "Certainly." —"If then it is a friend, it is for the sake of something?"— "Yes." —"For the sake of some friend indeed, if it is to follow our previous agreement."— "Certainly." —"Then will that other thing also be a friend for the sake of a friend?"— "Yes." —"Is it not then necessary for us either to go on like this to exhaustion, or to arrive at some principle which will no longer refer back to another friend, but will reach that which is the first friend, for the sake of which we say all other things are friends?"— "Necessarily." —"This then is what I mean: lest all those other things which we said are friends for the sake of that one, being like so many phantoms of it, should deceive us, while that first one is that which is truly a friend.
ἐννοήσωμεν γὰρ οὑτωσί· ὅταν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται, οἷόνπερ ἐνίοτε πατὴρ ὑὸν ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων προτιμᾷ, ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος ἕνεκα τοῦ τὸν ὑὸν περὶ παντὸς ἡγεῖσθαι ἆρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτο;
For let us consider it in this way: whenever someone values something highly—just as sometimes a father values his son above all other possessions—would such a person, for the sake of holding his son above everything, also value some other thing highly?
οἷον εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο αὐτὸν κώνειον πεπωκότα, ἆρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτʼ ἂν οἶνον, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἡγοῖτο τὸν ὑὸν σώσειν; —
τί μήν; ἔφη. —οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ οἶνος ἐνείη; —
πάνυ γε. —ἆρʼ οὖν τότε οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, κύλικα κεραμέαν ἢ τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τρεῖς κοτύλας οἴνου ἢ τὸν ὑόν;
For instance, if he should perceive that his son had drunk hemlock, would he value wine highly, if he believed that this would save his son?"— "Of course," he said. —"And also the vessel in which the wine is contained?"— "Certainly." —"Is it then the case that at that time he does not value a clay cup more than his own son, nor three kotyles of wine more than his son?"