§217τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄρα τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνῳ μόνον συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι φίλον.
Then it happens that only to the good is that which is neither good nor bad a friend.
—
ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ὑφηγεῖται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον;
— "So it seems, of necessity." "Does then," I said, "boys, what is now being said guide us well?
εἰ γοῦν θέλοιμεν ἐννοῆσαι τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖται οὐδὲ ὠφελίας· ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἔχει, ὥστε ὑγιαίνων οὐδεὶς ἰατρῷ φίλος διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν.
If, for instance, we should choose to consider the healthy body, it has no need of medicine or benefit; for it is in a sufficient state, so that no healthy person is a friend to a doctor because of health.
ἦ γάρ; —
οὐδείς. —ἀλλʼ ὁ κάμνων οἶμαι διὰ τὴν νόσον. —
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; —νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν, ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν. —
ναί. —σῶμα δέ γέ που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. —
οὕτως. —ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν. —
δοκεῖ μοι. —τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. —
ἔοικεν. —δῆλον δέ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὗ ἔχει.
Is that not so?"— "No one." —"But the sick man, I suppose, does so because of his sickness."— "For how could he not?" —"Sickness indeed is an evil, but medicine is useful and good."— "Yes." —"But a body, surely, insofar as it is a body, is neither good nor bad."— "That is so." —"And yet the body is compelled because of sickness to welcome and love medicine."— "So it seems to me." —"Then that which is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of an evil."— "It seems so." —"And clearly, to be sure, before it has itself become bad by the evil which it has.
οὐ γὰρ δή γε κακὸν γεγονὸς ἔτι ἄν τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμοῖ καὶ φίλον εἴη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔφαμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι. —
ἀδύνατον γάρ. —σκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω.
For surely when it has become bad, it would no longer desire the good or be its friend; for we said it is impossible for the bad to be a friend to the good."— "For it is impossible." —"Consider then what I say.
λέγω γὰρ ὅτι ἔνια μέν, οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, ἔνια δὲ οὔ.
For I say that some things, whatever the present thing may be, become of such a character themselves, and some do not.
ὥσπερ εἰ ἐθέλοι τις χρώματί τῳ ὁτιοῦν ἀλεῖψαι, πάρεστίν που τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν. —
πάνυ γε. —ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοιοῦτον τὴν χρόαν τὸ ἀλειφθέν, οἷον τὸ ἐπόν;
Just as if someone should wish to smear anything with any color, the smeared substance surely has present to it that which is smeared on."— "By all means." —"Is then the smeared substance at that time of such a color as that which is on it?
—
οὐ μανθάνω,
ἦ δʼ ὅς. —ἀλλʼ ὧδε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
"— "I do not understand," he said. —"But in this way," I said.
εἴ τίς σου ξανθὰς οὔσας τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν, πότερον τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνοιντʼ ἄν; —
φαίνοιντʼ ἄν,
ἦ δʼ ὅς. —καὶ μὴν παρείη γʼ ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης. —
ναί. —ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἂν εἶεν λευκαί πω, ἀλλὰ παρούσης λευκότητος οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν. —
ἀληθῆ. —ἀλλʼ ὅταν δή, ὦ φίλε, τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο οἷόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσίᾳ λευκαί. —
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; —τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δή, εἰ ᾧ ἄν τι παρῇ, τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ ἔχον οἷον τὸ παρόν· ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατά τινα τρόπον παρῇ, ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὔ; —
οὕτω μᾶλλον,
ἔφη. —καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν ἐνίοτε κακοῦ παρόντος οὔπω κακόν ἐστιν, ἔστιν δʼ ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. —
πάνυ γε. —οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ᾖ κακοῦ παρόντος, αὕτη μὲν ἡ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἡ δὲ κακὸν ποιοῦσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
"If someone should smear your hair, which is yellow, with white lead, would it then be white or would it only appear so?"— "It would appear so," he said. —"And yet whiteness would indeed be present to it."— "Yes." —"But nevertheless it would be none the more white for all that, but though whiteness is present, it is neither white nor black."— "True." —"But when, my friend, old age brings on them this very same color, then they become such as that which is present, white by the presence of whiteness."— "For how could they not?" —"This then is what I was asking just now: whether that to which anything is present will be of such a character as that which is present; or if it is present in a certain way, it will be, but if not, not?"— "Rather in this latter way," he said. —"And so that which is neither bad nor good, though evil is present, is sometimes not yet bad, but sometimes it has already become so."— "By all means." —"Therefore when it is not yet bad, although evil is present, this presence makes it desire the good; but the presence which makes it bad deprives it of both its desire and its friendship for the good."