§216τροφὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι.
For the opposite is nourishment for the opposite; since like could derive no benefit from like.
καὶ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ κομψὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι ταῦτα λέγων· εὖ γὰρ ἔλεγεν.
And indeed, my friend, he seemed to be clever in saying these things; for he spoke well.
ὑμῖν δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν; —
εὖ γε,
ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος,
ὥς γε οὑτωσὶ ἀκοῦσαι. —φῶμεν ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ μάλιστα φίλον εἶναι;
But to you," I said, "how does he seem to speak?"— "Very well," said Menexenus, "at least to hear it thus." —"Shall we say then that the opposite is most of all a friend to the opposite?"— "By all means." —"Very well," I said.
—
πάνυ γε. —εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον, ὦ Μενέξενε;
"But is it not strange, Menexenus?
καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἅσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλίᾳ;
And those all-wise men, the disputants, will immediately leap upon us with joy, and will ask whether enmity is not the most opposite thing to friendship?
οἷς τί ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν; —
ἀνάγκη.
What shall we reply to them?
—ἆρʼ οὖν, φήσουσιν, τὸ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φίλῳ φίλον ἢ τὸ φίλον τῷ ἐχθρῷ; —
οὐδέτερα,
ἔφη. —ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ, ἢ τὸ σῶφρον τῷ ἀκολάστῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ; —
οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. —ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἴπερ γε κατὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητά τί τῳ φίλον ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα φίλα εἶναι. —
ἀνάγκη. —οὔτε ἄρα τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον. —
οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον οὕτω ποτὲ γιγνόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. —
πῶς,
ἦ δʼ ὅς,
λέγεις; —ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐκ οἶδα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸς εἰλιγγιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας, καὶ κινδυνεύει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν τὸ καλὸν φίλον εἶναι.
Or must we not necessarily agree that they speak the truth?"— "Necessarily." —"Will they not then ask," I said, "whether the enemy is friend to the friend, or the friend to the enemy?"— "Neither," he said. —"Then is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?"— "I do not think it could be so." —"But yet," I said, "if indeed anything is a friend to anything by reason of contrariety, these also must necessarily be friends."— "Necessarily." —"Then neither is like friend to like, nor opposite to opposite."— "It seems not." "But let us also look at this further, whether it escapes us even more that the truly friend is none of these, but that which is neither good nor bad somehow becomes a friend to the good."— "How," he said, "do you mean?" —"But by Zeus," I said, "I do not know, but in truth I am dizzy myself under the difficulty of the argument, and it is likely, according to the ancient proverb, that the beautiful is friendly.
ἔοικε γοῦν μαλακῷ τινι καὶ λείῳ καὶ λιπαρῷ· διὸ καὶ ἴσως ῥᾳδίως διολισθαίνει καὶ διαδύεται ἡμᾶς, ἅτε τοιοῦτον ὄν.
At least it seems like something soft and smooth and sleek; wherefore also perhaps it easily slips through and escapes us, being of such a nature.
λέγω γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι· σὺ δʼ οὐκ οἴει; —
ἔγωγε. —λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν·
For I say the good is beautiful; don't you think so?"— "I do." —"I say then, divining as it were, that the friend of the beautiful and good is that which is neither good nor bad.
πρὸς ἃ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι, ἄκουσον.
But listen to what I mean by this divination.
δοκεῖ μοι ὡσπερεὶ τρία ἄττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δʼ οὔτʼ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· τί δὲ σοί; —
καὶ ἐμοί,
ἔφη.
It seems to me as if there were three classes: the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad.
—καὶ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τἀγαθῷ οὔτε τὸ κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ φίλον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ὁ ἔμπροσθεν λόγος ἐᾷ·
What is your view?"— "I agree," he said. —"And neither is the good friend to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the bad, just as our previous argument does not allow.
λείπεται δή, εἴπερ τῴ τί ἐστιν φίλον, τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου οἷον αὐτό ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν που τῷ κακῷ φίλον ἄν τι γένοιτο. —
ἀληθῆ.
There remains then, if indeed anything is a friend to anything, that which is neither good nor bad is a friend either to the good or to such as itself.
—οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἔφαμεν ἄρτι· ἦ γάρ; —
ναί. —οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τῷ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον φίλον οἷον αὐτό. —
οὐ φαίνεται. —
For surely nothing could be a friend to the bad."— "True." —"But yet we said just now that like is not friend to like, did we not?"— "Yes." —"Then that which is neither good nor bad will not have as a friend that which is of such a kind as itself."— "It seems not." —