§215ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ πάθοι;
Or what could it suffer, which it could not also suffer from itself?
τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη, μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα;
How then could such things be loved by one another, when they have no help to offer one another?
ἔστιν ὅπως; —
οὐκ ἔστιν. —ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῷτο, πῶς φίλον; —
οὐδαμῶς. —ἀλλὰ δὴ ὁ μὲν ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὐ φίλος· ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ καθʼ ὅσον ἀγαθός, οὐ καθʼ ὅσον ὅμοιος, φίλος ἂν εἴη; —
ἴσως. —τί δέ;
Is there any way?— "There is not." —And that which is not loved, how is it a friend?— "In no way." —But then, though like is not friend to like, would the good be a friend to the good insofar as he is good, and not insofar as he is like?— "Perhaps." —But what of this?
οὐχ ὁ ἀγαθός, καθʼ ὅσον ἀγαθός, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὑτῷ; —
ναί. —ὁ δέ γε ἱκανὸς οὐδενὸς δεόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα. —
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; —ὁ δὲ μή του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῴη ἄν. —
οὐ γὰρ οὖν. —ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῴη, οὐδʼ ἂν φιλοῖ. —
οὐ δῆτα. —ὁ δὲ μὴ φιλῶν γε οὐ φίλος. —
οὐ φαίνεται. —πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡμῖν φίλοι ἔσονται τὴν ἀρχήν, οἳ μήτε ἀπόντες ποθεινοὶ ἀλλήλοις—ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες—μήτε παρόντες χρείαν αὑτῶν ἔχουσιν;
Is not the good, insofar as he is good, to that extent sufficient for himself?— "Yes." —And the self-sufficient surely needs nothing, by reason of his sufficiency.— "Of course." —And he who does not need anything would not love anything either.— "Indeed not." —And that which does not love, would not be fond of either.— "Certainly not." —And he who is not fond of is not a friend.— "It seems not." —How then will the good be friends to the good for us in the first place, when they neither long for one another when absent—for they are sufficient for themselves even when apart—nor have need of one another when present?
τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς μηχανὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους; —
οὐδεμία,
ἔφη.
What means is there for such as these to value one another highly?— "None," he said.
—φίλοι δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτούς. —
ἀληθῆ. ἄθρει δή, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα.
"And yet, they would not be friends if they did not value each other."— "True." —Look then, Lysis, where we are going astray.
ἆρά γε ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα; —
πῶς δή; ἔφη. —ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν·
Are we perhaps deceived in some whole way?— "How so?" he said. —I once heard someone saying, and I just now remember it, that like is most hostile to like, and the good to the good.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα—
"
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ
"
"
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ,
"
καὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα πρὸς ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τὰ δʼ ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας·
And indeed he brought forward Hesiod as a witness, saying that after all: "Potter is angry with potter, and bard with bard "" and beggar with beggar, "and so indeed of all other things, he said it is necessary that those which are most like are filled with envy, rivalry, and enmity toward one another, while those which are most unlike are filled with friendship.
τὸν γὰρ πένητα τῷ πλουσίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι φίλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀσθενῆ τῷ ἰσχυρῷ τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα, καὶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῷ ἰατρῷ, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ἀγαπᾶν τὸν εἰδότα καὶ φιλεῖν.
For the poor man is forced to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong for the sake of help, and the sick to the physician, and indeed everyone who does not know loves and is fond of the one who knows.
καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἐπεξῄει τῷ λόγῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, λέγων ὡς ἄρα παντὸς δέοι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον εἶναι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον εἴη τούτου· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον.
And indeed he went on with the argument even more magnificently, saying that after all like is far from being a friend to like, but rather the very opposite of this is true; for the most opposite is most of all a friend to the most opposite.
ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ κενώσεως, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον.
For each thing desires such a thing, but not its like: for the dry desires the wet, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the dull, the empty filling, and the full emptying, and all other things in the same way according to the same argument.